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Abstract 
The claim that the exception has become the norm dominates the discourse of 
emergency politics.  Theories of emergency politics need not rely on norm/exception 
binary because it closes down possibilities for radical democratic political 
contestation.  Attempts to define a situation as exceptional by powerful political 
elites are a claim that politics must be foreclosed until they decide that the exigency 
has been resolved and a ‘normal’ state of affairs has resumed.  A theory which 
conceptualizes space for radical democratic contestation is essential because such 
contestation is crucial to preserving and enhancing liberal-democratic governance 
despite claims that they are facing an existential threat.  This thesis lays the 
foundation for such a theory.  First, it presents a criticism of the reliance of the 
norm/exception binary in the discourses of emergency politics.  I argue that ‘normal’ 
and ‘exceptional’ are polemical concepts used to in the defense of particular 
articulations of hegemonic and political power not liberal-democracy as such. 
Second, I develop a radical democratic theory of emergency politics.  This theory is 
based on an account of political contingency which conceives of the political realm 
as being unstable and continually evolving.  Thus liberal-democratic regimes never 
exist in ‘normal’ states because they are constantly engaging with exigencies which 
that emanate from the political realm.  Furthermore, this thesis contends that 
emergency politics should be inscribed within wider hegemonic practices.  What I 
identify as a paradox of contestation at the heart of liberal-democratic regimes is the 
terrain on which emergency politics are contested.  Liberal-democratic regimes can 
absorb situations sometimes defined as emergencies.  The goal of this thesis is to 
demonstrate theoretically how liberal-democratic regimes can preserve the 
possibility of radical democratic politics in the face of claims on the part of powerful 
political elites that an emergency or exception exists, which must be met with 
unrestrained violence and by severely reducing the scope of legitimate political 
contestation. 
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Introduction - The Trouble with Normality and Exceptionality 
 
“In the first place it is evident that if we know the causes which 
destroy constitutions, we also know the causes which preserve them; for 
opposites produce opposites, and destruction is the opposite of 
preservation.”   
Aristotle, The Politics 
In scholarly discourses of emergency politics it is all too common to hear the 
phrase ‘the state of emergency is permanent’ or ‘the exception has become the 
norm’. The claim that the emergency is permanent comes in various incarnations 
which will be discussed throughout the body of this dissertation. Theorists of 
constitutional dictatorship Giorgio Agamben, following Walter Benjamin, claims 
that the state of exception is the permanent paradigm of modern governance.
1
 While 
legal scholars such as David Dyzenhaus, Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ni Aolain 
acknowledge that emergency governance is both increasingly utilized by liberal-
democratic regimes and difficult if not impossible to separate from normal or 
ordinary law.
2
 Nomi Lazar and Bonnie Honig attempt to remove the element of 
exceptionalism from emergency politics, but as I will show in chapter five both of 
their attempts are unsuccessful. Political theory is faced with “the problem of the 
politics of exceptionalism, particularly its discursive and socio-political processes 
and conditions of possibility.”3 Exceptionalism is problematic because it severely 
curtails possibilities for radical democratic contestation of emergency politics.  
The norm/exception binary is not analytically productive for theorizing 
emergency politics. On the contrary, it forecloses the possibility of radical 
                                                          
1
 Agamben, State of Exception, 2005 and Benjamin, Theses, 1968 
2
 Dyzenhaus, Constitution of Law, 2005 and Gross and Ni Aolain, Law in Times of Crisis, 2006 
3
 Andrew Neal, ‘Giorgio Agamben’, p. 2, emphasis in original 
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democratic emergency politics which can resist attempts by powerful elites to 
declare a state of emergency. Additionally, it removes justifications for the use of 
emergency powers from critical scrutiny. This thesis breaks through the binary in 
order to expose the politics of emergency. Any claim by state officials or political 
elites that a situation is exceptional or constitutes a state of emergency is an attempt 
to remove politics and political contestation from that situation. More specifically, it 
is an attempt to eliminate any possibility of including democratic political 
contestation as an element of both deciding that the situation is an emergency as well 
as what types of responses should be considered appropriate. The notion of 
normality is equally as problematic as that of emergency or exceptionality. The 
norm/exception binary presumes an uncontested, shared understanding of normality. 
This is problematic because, as I will argue in this thesis, any claim by elites that a 
state of affairs is normal conceals the elements of political and hegemonic power 
involved in invoking such a definition.  
What is at stake in discourses of emergency politics is the possibility of 
theorizing how liberal-democratic regimes can be defended in the face of claims that 
their existence is threatened and the only possible response is to eliminate or subvert 
the constraints they place on political contestation and violence. Theories of 
emergency politics which rely on the norm/exception binary severely reduce or 
eliminate our ability to negotiate this problematic by lessening the scope of 
democratic politics and contestation. Furthermore, we need to move away from the 
idea that the exception/emergency is now the norm because to accept that position is 
to give up the defense of liberal-democracy. “[M]ust a democracy leave free and in a 
position to exercise power those who risk mounting an assault on democratic 
freedoms and putting an end to democratic freedom in the name of democracy and of 
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the majority that they might be able to rally around their cause?”4 Certainly not. 
Resisting attempts by state officials and political elites to exercise unrestrained 
power and violence requires a new approach to emergency politics, one that 
understands ‘emergencies’ and ‘exceptions’ as phenomena which are largely internal 
to the basic processes and paradoxes of liberal-democratic governance. 
A Radical Democratic Theory of Emergency Politics 
In order to counteract the effect of the norm/exception binary I will put forth 
a critique of its deficiencies as they appear in various attempts to theorize and 
conceptualize emergency politics. In the face of the ever increasing use of 
emergency powers by liberal-democratic regimes as well as the conceptual grip the 
norm/exception binary has on the discourse of emergency politics what is needed is 
“a response that calls into question, at their most fundamental level, the most deep-
seated conceptual presuppositions in philosophical discourse.”5 Furthermore, “[w]e 
must also recognize here strategies and relations of force. The dominant power is the 
one that manages to impose and, thus, to legitimate, indeed to legalize (for it is 
always a question of law) on a national or world stage, the terminology and thus the 
interpretation that best suits it in a given situation.”6  I examine those relations of 
force as they appear in the politics of defining states of affairs or events as normal or 
exceptional. Such strategies and relations of force are always part of larger 
hegemonic processes at work in liberal-democratic regimes. We need to unseat the 
norm/exception binary and develop a new approach to the problems associated with 
politically declared exceptions and emergency politics.  
                                                          
4
 Derrida, Rogues, p. 34 
5
 Derrida, ‘Autoimmunity’, p. 100 
6
 Derrida, ‘Autoimmunity’, p. 105 
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I develop a theoretical and heuristic framework which demonstrates that the 
norm/exception binary is unhelpful because it closes down a radical democratic 
politics of emergency. We should inscribe situations politically defined as 
emergencies within the wider context of contestation over the articulation of the rule 
of law and extra-legal, democratic power in conditions of contingency. The necessity 
of a new theory of emergency politics is affirmed by Ernesto Laclau when he argues 
that “Society requires constant efforts at re-grounding… and if the plurality of 
demands requires a constant process of legal transformation and revision, the state of 
emergency ceases to be exceptional and becomes an integral part of the political 
construction of the social bond.”7 This thesis does not develop a practical 
programmatic or blue-print for designing emergency powers. It exposes the 
conceptual limits of the current discourse of emergency politics then lays the 
foundation for a new approach that preserves space for radical democratic 
contestation of declarations of states of emergency as well as the use of emergency 
powers. 
What is to be gained through my approach is a theorization of emergency 
politics that can preserve radical democratic contestation even in situations powerful 
political elites attempt to define as an emergency or as exceptional. I argue that the 
first step in building this theory is to break the grip the norm/exception binary has on 
the discourse of emergency politics. When theorizing emergency politics we need 
not make the “mistake of counterpoising normality and emergency…”8 My approach 
conceptualizes emergencies not as exceptional or extraordinary circumstances which 
should not and cannot be contained via a legal order.  
                                                          
7
 Ernesto Laclau, ‘‘Bare Life or Social Indeterminacy’’, p. 16 
8
 Neocleous, Critique of Security, p. 71 
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I contend that the situations defined as emergencies are part and parcel of 
ordinary, everyday political contingency and arise out of liberal-democratic 
governance. Furthermore, situations defined as emergencies or exceptions are 
entangled with both basic structures of liberal-democratic regimes as well as several 
paradoxes which inhabit those regimes. Any attempt to define a state of affairs as an 
emergency is a political tactic with the aim of securing an equally politically 
determined notion of normality. Following Machiavelli, my approach to emergency 
politics takes the perspective that emergencies need not always be seen as harmful to 
the regime. By understanding the conditions of possibility for declaring emergencies 
as well as the intricacies of the paradoxes which form the contours of emergency 
politics it is possible to utilize emergencies for radical democratic ends.  
Subsuming emergencies within the larger category of political contingency 
does not mean that they can be considered normal occurrences either. We cannot 
only equate normality with “the separation of powers, entrenched civil liberties… 
public policy and the rule of law…”9 Normality also names specific articulations of 
political and hegemonic power within liberal-democratic regimes. This thesis will 
demonstrate how ‘normality’ always refers to claims that a particular articulation of 
political power within a given liberal-democratic regime should be considered as 
normal.  
A number of paradoxes exist in the foundations of liberal-democratic 
regimes. Four of which are central to emergency politics. They are the paradoxes of 
sovereignty, of politics, the democratic paradox and the paradox of contestation. 
These paradoxes are particularly evident during periods defined as acute political 
                                                          
9
 Neocleous, Critique of Security, p. 71 
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crises by powerful elites. They are the terrain on which emergency politics play out. 
They occur at founding moments and continue to exist in a variety of political 
practices.  
Paradoxes cannot be either solved or transcended. They also need not be 
conceptualized in such a way that “each term not only opposes the other but also 
props it up and between them the vast, complicated, and subtle terrain of politics is 
excluded.”10 The paradoxes involved in emergency politics are not binaries which 
prop each other up. They involve distinct theories, ideologies, strategies, regimes, 
which have no necessary relation to one another but have been combined in 
discourses of emergency politics as well as actually existing regimes. They are not 
necessarily in binary opposition to one another; they simply have no necessary or 
determinate relation. A better way to view their relationship is one of contingency 
and irresolvable tension not of binary opposition. Irresolvable tension is not binary 
opposition. Some relation between the two can and does exist, but there will never be 
a complete harmonic fusion. 
The paradox of sovereignty captures the idea that sovereign power is both 
external and internal to legal order. William Connolly notes that intellectuals such as 
Rousseau, Schmitt, Kafka, Ricoeur, Arendt, Derrida, Deleuze, and Agamben, while 
differing on many points, all agree that “a democratic state seeking to honor the rule 
of law is also one with a sovereign power uncertainly situated within and above the 
law. The rule of law in a state is enabled by a practice of sovereignty that rises above 
the law.”11 In this dissertation I modify it through the work of Schmitt and Lindahl 
such that sovereign power is a reflexively oriented agency which must make 
                                                          
10
 Honig, ‘Between Decision and Deliberation’, p. 15 
11
 Connolly, ‘‘The ‘The Complexities of Sovereignty’’’, p. 24 
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decisions concerning legal order as a whole. It is an inescapable aspect of liberal-
democratic governance that legal order is legitimized by an extra-legal sovereign 
demos, ‘we, the people’. This paradox cannot be solved. Nor can it be transcended as 
Giorgio Agamben suggests. Sovereignty and law will always exist in an unstable 
relationship.  
Bonnie Honig, following Rousseau and William Connolly, describes the 
“paradox of politics” as the fact that good laws require good citizens to make them, 
but good citizens are made by good laws.
12
 Each is necessary for the other but 
neither can come first. It is one of the contours “of everyday political practice,” even 
though it may not be highly prominent or visible at all times.
13
 Honig’s paradox of 
politics is important because it points to a problematic of conceptualizing political 
agency. However, it insufficiently theorized because it presupposes that ‘good 
citizens’ can be conceived as a plurality without antagonism. My claim that political 
antagonism is a constitutive element of emergency politics will be developed 
throughout this thesis, notably in chapters two, six and seven. 
The third crucial paradox is identified by Mouffe, following Schmitt, as ‘the 
democratic paradox’.14 This paradox is created by the very nature of ‘modern’ 
liberal-democratic regimes. Mouffe states:  
“…with modern democracy, we are dealing with a new political form of society whose 
specificity comes from the articulation between two different traditions. On one side we have the 
liberal tradition constituted by the rule of law, the defense of human rights and the respect of 
individual liberty: on the other the democratic tradition whose main ideas are those of equality, 
                                                          
12
 Honig, Emergency Politics, p. 3 
13
 Honig, Emergency Politics, p. 3 
14
 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 2000 
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identity between governing and governed and popular sovereignty. There is no necessary relation 
between those two distinct traditions but only a contingent historical articulation.”15 
These two traditions exist in irresolvable tension with one another. Liberalism calls 
for equality of all while democracy necessarily creates an inequality between those 
who constitute a demos and those excluded in the process of production of a demos. 
This thesis follows Mouffe in disagreeing with Schmitt that the tension between 
liberalism and democracy renders all liberal-democratic regimes fundamentally 
unviable. Rather this tension constitutes one of the fundamental paradoxes which can 
help clarify the conditions of possibility of emergency politics.  
One of the ways this paradox manifests itself is through what this thesis will 
identify as ‘the paradox of contestation’. This paradox consists in the fact that a 
liberal-democratic regime must maintain itself as a coherent order and defend itself 
from existential threat yet, in order to be liberal-democratic it must leave its basic 
principles open to contestation. Not all contestation will be deemed legitimate by the 
regime. The decisions surrounding legitimate contestation are implicated in the 
declaration of emergencies because they label certain groups or forms of contestation 
as illegitimate threats to the regime itself. In this paradox of openness and closure the 
contingency of politics can take the form of an emergency. Schmitt was the first to 
identify this paradox though he did not label it a paradox as such.  
The goal of my approach to emergency politics is to preserve the possibility 
of radical democratic politics in the face of claims on the part of powerful political 
elites that an emergency or exception exists, which must be met with unrestrained 
violence and by severely reducing the scope of legitimate political contestation. I 
take my cue for a notion of radical democracy comes from Laclau and Mouffe in 
                                                          
15
 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, p. 2-3 
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Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. I contend that liberal-democratic regimes can be 
considered radical when they leave open to contestation their most fundamental 
principles as well as the methods by which they construct political exclusions and 
negotiate antagonisms. This is precisely the issue at hand in the paradox of 
contestation. The goal is to ensure “[t]he multiplication of political spaces and the 
preventing of the concentration of power in one point.”16 This is all the more crucial 
when facing increasing attempts by political elites to foreclose politics and 
consolidate power via claims that an exceptional state of emergency exists. 
Plan of the Work 
Chapter one criticizes the theory of constitutional dictatorship developed by 
Clinton Rossiter, Carl Friedrich and Frederick Watkins. It argues that they 
uncritically rely on the possibility of separating normal from exceptional 
circumstances. Such reliance leaves their theories unable to explain how or why 
‘states of emergency’ seem to be ever-present aspects of liberal democratic regimes. 
This also leaves them unable to theorize a politics of emergency which includes 
scope for democratic contestation of the decision to declare an emergency, the 
methods used to respond to an ‘emergency’, or the best means for limiting abuses of 
emergency powers.  
 Chapter two argues that Schmitt’s Weimar work can be used to theorize 
emergency politics without the norm/exception binary. I read Schmitt against 
himself to show that his work contains what I call ‘the problematic of the exception’. 
This problematic consists in the fact that liberal-democratic regimes cannot banish 
extra-legal sovereign power which has the ability to make decisions on legal order as 
                                                          
16
 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, p. 178 
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a whole. Sovereign power is particularly pronounced in situations defined as 
exceptional. This problematic is further compounded by the paradox of contestation 
outlined in Schmitt’s work. The principle of justice on which liberal-democratic 
regimes rely consists in an equal chance.  
 Chapter three argues that Giorgio Agamben’s work on states of exception is 
flawed because he posits the exception as an unchanging, ontological structure of 
Western politics. His conceptualization of sovereign power and the state of 
exception, characterized as a state of anomie between law and life, erase the political 
as well as any space for radical democratic politics which contest sovereign 
decisions that an exception must be declared. Furthermore, he offers no practical 
alternative to the permanence of the exception. His solution of a new metaphysics of 
law and violence is vague and cannot conceptualize real world tactics for combating 
the increasing use of emergency powers by liberal-democratic governments. 
Chapter four critiques two attempts to subsume emergency politics within 
liberal legality. Both of these theories demonstrate the entrenchment of the 
norm/exception binary in legal discourses of emergency politics. Oren Gross 
contends that emergency measures always seep into ‘normal’ legal order and should 
thus never be used. David Dyzenhaus argues that normality and emergency measures 
can be kept separate but that state officials have little interest in doing so. Both are 
unsatisfactory because they contend that extra-legal sovereign power is unacceptable 
within liberal-democratic regimes. Thus, they remove any scope for theorizing 
emergency politics in a way that preserves scope for democratic contestation of 
sovereign decision-making processes, especially concerning crises.  
17 
 
Chapter five analyzes two attempts to theorize emergency politics without 
recourse to the norm/exception binary. Nomi Lazar’s work attempts to show that 
emergency powers have always been a constituent element of liberal-democratic 
governance thus they are not exceptional. However, she recreates the norm/exception 
binary by transposing it into the realm of ethics while arguing that what she refers to 
as ‘existential’ and ‘quotidian’ ethics limit emergency powers. Bonnie Honig’s work 
attempts to ‘de-exceptionalize’ emergency politics.17 I agree with the aim of Honig’s 
project. Yet, I disagree with the specific methods she uses for reaching that goal, 
notably her critique of Schmitt and her claim that the paradox of politics is the most 
fundamental paradox of liberal-democracy. 
In chapter six I turn to Machiavelli in order to lay the foundations of my 
radical democratic approach to emergency politics. I contend that his concepts of 
fortuna and accidenti are useful because they show that situations that may be 
defined as emergencies are a constituent element of the political realm. Furthermore, 
as Clement Fatovic notes, for Machiavelli, “contingency is the single constant in 
politics.”18 Additionally, Machiavelli cautions against the use of extraordinary 
measures for dealing with crises. He contends that the best response to changes in 
fortuna and dangerous accidenti is the construction and maintenance of regimes 
based on the rule of law. 
Finally, in chapter seven I argue that situations defined as emergencies or as 
exceptional are always in some sense entangled with the processes of constructing a 
reflexively oriented demos. The exclusions necessary to consolidate a demos create 
antagonisms and the presence of ‘aliens’ as they are understood in the work of 
                                                          
17
 Bonnie Honig, Emergency Politics: Paradox, Law, Democracy, 2009 
18
 Clement Fatovic, Outside the Law, p. 11 
18 
 
Bernard Waldenfels. Additionally, I argue that declarations of emergency and 
exceptionality as well as normality are tactics of hegemonic power. They are 
polemical weapons used by dominant groups to limit contestations over the 
contingent foundations of their own polities, their collective selfhood.  
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Chapter 1 - Against Dictatorship: Roman and Constitutional 
Introduction 
It is crucial to begin a study of emergency politics in liberal-democratic 
regimes with the dictatorship of republican Rome. The dictatorship is the conceptual 
and theoretical as well as institutional model for emergency regimes in liberal-
democratic states. Modern scholars hold the Roman dictatorship up as an example of 
successful emergency governance in which relaxed legal and constitutional 
restrictions on executive power enable an efficient and effective response to what is 
perceived to be an existential crisis for the state and society. Furthermore, the Roman 
dictatorship serves as an ideological and moral point of inspiration for theorizing 
emergency politics. Clinton Rossiter refers to the dictatorship as “a theoretical 
standard” and “moral yardstick” for contemporary forms of emergency 
governance.
19
 He bases his assessments of emergency measures both theoretical and 
practical on how well they compare to what he understands as the successful 
implementation of dictatorships in republican Rome. Bruce Ackerman states that the 
Roman dictatorship was the “first great experiment with states of emergency,” as 
such he “heavily” relies on it for inspiration when theorizing about emergency 
politics.
20
 Finally, Watkins considers the dictatorship as “perhaps the most strikingly 
successful of all known systems of emergency government.”21 As such he, like many 
other scholars, considers it the best place to begin an investigation of emergency 
politics in liberal-democratic regimes. They claim that if liberal-democratic regimes 
can design and implement similar provisions for situations defined as existential 
threats to their existence they will be able to survive such crises.   
                                                          
19
 Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, p. 15 
20
 Ackerman, Before the Next Attack, p. 78 
21
 Watkins, ‘The Problem of Constitutional Dictatorship’, p. 332 
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Beyond providing inspiration for thinking through emergency politics 
scholars and politicians rely on the dictatorships institutional features for guidance 
when designing modern emergency measures. As Oren Gross aptly puts it, “The 
institution of the Roman dictatorship has been regarded as the prototype for modern-
day constitutional emergency regimes.”22 While there are vast differences between 
the Roman republic and modern liberal-democratic governments, Ackerman claims 
that the Romans were right to search for institutional restraints on abuse of 
emergency powers.
23
 However, their model is neither “desirable nor practical under 
modern conditions”.24 Simply transplanting the Roman dictatorship into liberal-
democratic states is not an option. However, many scholars still argue that while the 
specific institutional provisions of the dictatorship cannot be recreated in current 
regimes similar provisions can be made to work within the scope liberal-democratic 
governance. As will be discussed below, Clinton Rossiter’s model of constitutional 
dictatorship is essentially the Roman dictatorship but modified slightly to fit liberal-
democratic forms of governance. 
This chapter argues that such reliance on the Roman dictatorship, both as 
theoretical and conceptual inspiration as well as institutional prototype, is misguided. 
Relying on the dictatorship embeds the norm/exception binary in liberal-democratic 
thought on emergency politics. Dictatorship necessary assumes that a duly appointed 
dictator can return exceptional times to normal times. Indeed, it is the entire premise 
of the justification of the office. However, as will be argued in chapter six, liberal-
democratic regimes never exist in a static state. They are constantly being contested 
and renovated though such contestation. The norm/exception binary essential to any 
                                                          
22
 Gross, ‘The Concept of ‘Crisis’’, p. 1 
23
 Ackerman, Before the Next Attack, p. 79 
24
 Ackerman, ‘The Emergency Constitution’, p. 1046 
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notion of Roman or constitutional dictatorship obscures the changeable and 
continuously evolving nature of liberal-democratic regimes. Theories of 
constitutional dictatorship take for granted the existence of exceptional 
circumstances thus eliminating any possibility of contesting the decision to declare a 
state of emergency of exception. Additionally, reliance on an uncritical notion of 
exceptional circumstances removes any scope for democratic participation in 
emergency politics.  
Modern scholars have misappropriated the Roman dictatorship. The Roman 
dictatorship is not a suitable prototype because the ancient sources on which it is 
based are contradictory. The knowledge gained from ancient sources is biased, 
politically motivated and based more on myth and legend rather than historical fact. 
No modern scholar has adequately accounted for these factors in their account of 
Roman dictatorship. As Nomi Lazar states “the Roman dictatorship is a favorite 
trope of scholars of emergency government, widely cited but ill understood”.25 They 
project their own concepts of legal order, constitutionalism, as well as emergency 
and normality back onto the dictatorship. Scholars focus on a few basic institutional 
factors of the dictatorship and tout them as the best way to enable a liberal-
democratic regime to respond to what they perceive as a crisis while also preventing 
abuse of emergency powers. This highly selective reading of dictatorship cannot 
provide liberal-democratic regimes with an adequate model of emergency 
government because it has not accounted for the complexity and politics of 
emergency governance.  
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 The first section of this chapter takes the model of ‘constitutional 
dictatorship’ as developed in the work of Clinton Rossiter, as well as his colleagues 
Carl Friedrich and Frederick Watkins, as exemplary of the deficiencies of relying on 
the Roman dictatorship and the norm/exception binary for theorizing and 
conceptualizing emergency politics as well as justifying the use of similar measures 
in liberal-democratic regimes. It will provide exegesis and critique this model of 
emergency governance. The second section of this chapter will demonstrate how this 
model is based on a historical misappropriation of the Roman example. Roman 
dictatorship was not well understood by the ancient historians on which current 
scholars of constitutional dictatorship and emergency governance base their 
reasoning. I will argue that the idea Roman dictatorship has been misread and 
misappropriated such that its shortcomings have become embedded in current 
discussions on emergency politics. The ancient sources drawn upon are Cicero, 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Livy and Polybius.  
Constitutional Dictatorship 
 The model of constitutional dictatorship is trapped between an empirical 
assessment that emergency government is becoming permanent with no return to 
normality and a normative belief that dictatorship can and should be used to defend 
liberal-democratic states from crises. Rossiter is resolute in his assertion that “no free 
state has ever been without some method by which its leaders could take dictatorial 
action in its defense. If it lacked such a method or the will of its leaders to use it, it 
did not survive its first real crisis.”26 He furthermore believes that constitutional 
dictatorships can be effectively used to defend liberal-democratic states without state 
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officials abusing their enhanced powers or relaxed or suspended legal restrictions.
27
 
However, Rossiter, Friedrich and Watkins present clear reservations about the 
possibility of regulation of dictatorial powers and a full return to normal times after a 
crisis. This is indicative of theorizing which relies on the Roman dictatorship for its 
conceptual and theoretical framework. Further analysis of constitutional dictatorship 
will further clarify this point. 
 Firstly, there are three criteria which, Rossiter argues, provide the rationale 
for constitutional dictatorship: 1) democratic governance is designed for “normal, 
peaceful conditions” and is therefore “unequal to the exigencies of a great national 
crisis” 2) because of this democratic governments must be ready and willing to be 
“temporarily altered to whatever degree is necessary to overcome the peril and 
restore normal conditions” and 3) “this strong government” can have no other 
function except “to end the crisis and restore normal times.”28 The norm/exception 
binary is already clearly at work in Rossiter’s thought. He assumes that such a 
distinction can be made without critically examining what constitutes normal or 
emergency times. For Rossiter a state of emergency is an objective state of affairs 
not a situation which is determined politically. Indeed, these rationales and the model 
of constitutional dictatorship cannot function and are incoherent without simply 
assuming that it can be easily determined when times are normal and when they are 
exceptional. This assumption is problematic because it removes any chance of 
contesting the decision to resort to emergency measures. They also require a static 
notion of the state and society. In order to return ‘normal times’ after a crisis 
normality must be assumed as both an empirical and conceptual possibility. I will 
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argue throughout this thesis that, contra the theorists of constitutional dictatorship, 
‘emergency’ and ‘normality’ are politically determined concepts with no neutral or 
objective definition. These uncritical assumptions are also at work in the criteria put 
forth by Rossiter and Friedrich to ensure that dictatorship remains constitutional. 
Rossiter delineates eleven criteria for judging whether or not modern 
dictatorships are used in accordance with constitutional standards. These criteria can 
be roughly divided into three categories, though some criterion overlap.
29
 First are 
criterion to determine when and how to initiate a constitutional dictatorship. For 
instance, criteria one states that dictatorship should not be initiated unless it is 
absolutely necessary to preserve the state or constitution while criteria two states that 
whoever decides that a dictatorship is necessary should never be the one to wield 
dictatorial power.
30
 The second category of criteria concern whether or not a 
dictatorship should be continued as well as how it should be implemented. In this 
case Rossiter states clearly that any use of dictatorial power must be exercised 
legitimately and “effected in pursuit of constitutional or legal requirements.”31 
Thirdly are criteria to specify when to terminate it.
32
 These criteria consist of 
provisions which specify that no dictatorship should exist longer than absolutely 
necessary nor should one be instituted without determining a time limit in advance. 
Criteria six, ten and eleven bear further analysis because they directly 
highlight the reliance on the norm/exception binary by constitutional dictatorship as 
well as the impossibility of ever definitively separating the two. Criteria six states: 
“The measures adopted in the prosecution of a constitutional dictatorship should 
                                                          
29
 Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, p. 298 
30
 Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, p. 298-299, 302 
31
 Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, p. 300 
32
 Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, p. 298. 
25 
 
never be permanent in character or effect.”33 Criteria ten states: “No constitutional 
dictatorship should extend beyond the termination of the crisis for which it was 
instituted.”34 Finally, criteria eleven states: “…the termination of the crisis must be 
followed by as complete a return as possible to the political and governmental 
conditions existing prior to the initiation of the constitutional dictatorship.”35 These 
criteria are not formal legal restrictions on dictatorial governance. However, Rossiter 
recommends that they be built into a legal and constitutional order before they are 
needed. The most pressing question is who determines whether or not these criteria 
have been adequately fulfilled? Rossiter is attempting to create limitations which are 
as specific and as objective as possible. However, all of these criteria rely on 
subjective, and what will ultimately be, political decisions concerning the existence 
and scope of an alleged crisis, when the threat has passed and whether or not a return 
to a state of normality has been achieved.  These criteria demonstrate that Rossiter is 
using the words crisis and emergency as neutral, objective determinations of a state 
of affairs. However, the criteria he puts forth to assess and respond to such situations 
are entirely subjective and politically determined. This makes the institution of 
constitutional dictatorship suspect. It relies on an uncritical and assumed distinction 
between normality and exceptionality which even the supporters of constitutional 
dictatorship worry cannot be maintained in practice. Their reliance on an uncritical 
notion of exceptionality leaves their theory blind to the politics of declaring, 
responding to and ending an emergency. 
Rossiter, Friedrich and Watkins warn that constitutional dictatorship is 
vulnerable to four types of abuses. Firstly, state officials who are given enhanced 
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may abuse that power for personal gain.
36
 This is certainly a possibility but can be 
prevented by a trial of the offending individual. Rossiter recommends this in his 
eighth criteria of constitutional dictatorship. Secondly, there are emergency 
provisions enacted for a supposed “internal crisis, but [are] actually [initiated] for no 
other reason that the maintenance of some privileged group in power.”37 This is a 
concern of particular importance if one assumes, as I do with agonistic democratic 
theory, that society is constitutively split. Rossiter states that dictatorial authority 
should never be used “to the advantage of one part of the population” however, 
“There is obviously no sure way to guarantee the observance of this…”38 The depth 
of this issue is fully discussed in chapter seven. At the moment it is sufficient to note 
that because of antagonisms which are constitutive of liberal-democratic societies 
this issue can never be resolved. Not because there are no institutional guarantees as 
Rossiter suggests but because an ’emergency’ is always politically determined by 
powerful elites and groups for the protection of their specific understanding of the 
state and normality. Any attempt to protect normality will have polemical 
consequences for groups who are on the opposite side of an antagonism from 
powerful elites. 
The third warning against constitutional dictatorship is that measures enacted 
on a temporary basis may become permanent. Rossiter, Watkins and particularly 
Friedrich note that empirically and historically this has been the case at least to some 
extent. Rossiter warns that “No democracy ever went through a period of 
thoroughgoing constitutional dictatorship without some permanent and often 
unfavorable alteration in its governmental scheme, and in more than one instance an 
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institution of constitutional dictatorship has been turned against the order it was 
established to defend.”39  Rossiter even admits that an emergency measure may need 
to be made permanent.
40
 For him, the problem of emergency measures becoming 
permanent is primarily empirical in nature. The problem is not a conceptual 
impossibility of separating normality from emergency. His position is simply that the 
reality of constitutional dictatorship has never fully lived up to the theory. Even 
though Rossiter claims that the entire goal and duty of constitutional dictatorship is 
to “end the crisis and restore normal times” his position provides no definitive 
answer to the question of whether or not exceptional crises can be separated from 
normal times with normality being the predominant state of affairs.
41
 Neither does he 
recognize that normality may be a political concept such that powerful elites are able 
to define an emergency when they feel that their articulation of the state and society 
being is threatened.  
Watkins, on the other hand, does argue that separating normal times from 
exceptional crisis and dictatorial governance is conceptually impossible. He argues 
that “In the strictest sense it is inconceivable… that a previous constitutional system 
should be restored in undiminished vigor after a period of emergency absolutism.”42 
He defends this position by arguing that perfection cannot be demanded of 
constitutional dictatorship. A return to normality on his account is an ideal goal, a 
limit case which should be strived toward even if it can never be attained in practice. 
On his account then normality and emergency become politically determined goals, 
flexible concepts determined by the groups and officials involved in emergency 
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politics. However, Watkins does not recognize or draw out the implications of this 
position. 
The final warning put for by Rossiter, Watkins and Friedrich is that modern 
constitutional limitations are not adequate.
43
 The main problem with the criteria 
enumerated and discussed above arises precisely when they are to be tested and 
enforced. The criteria discussed above are the measures by which “the democratic 
and constitutional character of a democratic and constitutional dictatorship is to be 
tested”.44 However, Friedrich argues that there “are no ultimate institutional 
safeguards” against the abuse of dictatorial power.45 This is because any limitations 
whether they be legal and constitutional or not can only be as effective as the people 
who enforce them. All three defenders of constitutional dictatorship rely heavily on 
the ability of the people to enforce the necessary criteria and ensure that dictatorship 
does not become permanent. However, their reliance on the norm/exception binary 
excludes any possibility for theorizing a politics of deciding on and contesting the 
use and abuse of emergency powers. Rossiter argues that more than in strict legal 
regulation “the conditions of secure and workable constitutional dictatorship… exist 
first of all in the minds and hearts of the… people and only secondarily in the 
Constitution or any laws that we could ever work out”.46 It is the people, not the 
institutions that will ensure that a constitutional dictator remains constitutional. 
Friedrich makes the argument more forcefully arguing that “behind all these 
procedural devices there must stand an alert people, a real constituent power, 
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determined to see to it that these limitations are effectively utilized…”47 Yet, their 
theory cannot account for how a people can effectively restrain emergency powers 
when the very rights and laws necessary for public control of political officials may 
be suspended or curtailed by a dictator? Neither Rossiter nor Friedrich provide any 
formal or institutional mechanism for ensuring that the people will always have the 
power to end a dictatorship. Friedrich is aware of the problem, asking “how are the 
people to exercise their restraint, when the constitution does not contain effective 
working limitations?”48 Again the defenders of constitutional dictatorship are in the 
ambiguous position of assuring us that constitutional dictatorship can be utilized and 
controlled while also raising strong, unchallenged criticisms that dictatorial power is 
ultimately uncontrollable and has a tendency to become permanent. The theories of 
constitutional dictatorship lack the element of democratic participation and 
contestation necessary to limit emergency powers enacted by state officials. Given 
their reservations concerning the ability of citizens and laws to restrain dictatorial 
power, where does their faith in normative argument that it can and should be 
implemented come from? 
Friedrich claims that it is pointless to argue against some form of 
constitutional dictatorship whatever its dangers may be. Certainly dictatorial powers 
are suspicious and threatening but, he argues, they are not as threatening or as 
dangerous as the destruction of a constitutional order by invasion or civil war.
49
 
Rossiter argues along similar lines that “[n]o sacrifice is too great for our democracy, 
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least of all the temporary sacrifice of democracy itself.”50 More than these generic 
assertions Rossiter, Friedrich and Watkins are committed to the idea that 
constitutional dictatorship can be successful and restrained because of the example 
they believe is set by the dictatorship of republican Rome. For each of these scholars 
the problem with modern forms of emergency governance is that they have not been 
properly created. The conceptual and theoretical framework of dictatorship is not at 
fault, they claim, simply because when we compare modern provisions for 
emergency governance with Rome “our present-day arrangements leave much to be 
desired.”51 The Roman dictatorship on their account serves to prove that dictatorial 
power can not only be successful at resolving what they understand as exceptional 
crisis but it can also be restrained and limited to such a degree that it can only be 
used for the defense of a constitution, not against it.  
The Historical ‘Record’ of the Ancient Sources  
On the account of Rossiter, Friedrich and Watkins the historical record of the 
Roman dictatorship proves that regimes of emergency dictatorship can be designed 
and implemented in the service of liberal-democracy. Watkins refers to the 
dictatorship as “the most strikingly successful of all known systems of emergency 
government.”52 After an exegesis of what he reads as the basic features of the 
dictatorship he goes on to stress that “the experience of ancient Rome is important… 
as a demonstration of the fact that a reasonably effective solution can be found to the 
problem of constitutional dictatorship.”53 Rossiter is equally sure that the Roman 
dictatorship is the historical example that proves the necessity of constitutional 
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dictatorship. As already noted he considers it a ‘theoretical’ and ‘moral yardstick’ 
against which to measure modern emergency regimes. Indeed, he considers the 
example set by the dictatorship as the most important political lesson demonstrated 
by Republican Rome.
54
 Friedrich is more circumspect in his assessment of the 
Roman dictatorship. He claims that while the actual institutions of the Roman 
dictatorship are not usable in the modern world, “its underlying conceptions are still 
valid”.55 We must, however, interrogate these claims.  
Roman dictatorship was not as successful as they claim. Their reading of the 
historical record is inaccurate in that it is not sensitive enough to the nuances and 
complexities of ancient Roman law and politics. The historical record of the Roman 
dictatorship does not bear out the claims made on it by Rossiter, Friedrich and 
Watkins. The ancient sources are inconsistent and in some cases contradictory. 
Additionally, their accounts of the institution may be politically biased and based 
more on myth and legend than precise historical fact. Furthermore, Rossiter, 
Friedrich and Watkins focus on only a few institutional details of the dictatorship 
reducing the complexity of Roman law and politics to what they consider the 
essential elements and limitations of dictatorial power. They uncritically project 
modern notions of law and constitutionalism back onto the Roman dictatorship thus 
blurring an already inconsistent historical record. Their reading cannot be relied on 
as proof that any form of constitutional dictatorship can be successfully 
implemented. I will first address the problems associated with relying on ancient 
sources then demonstrate how the modern defenders of constitutional dictatorship 
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have presented a selective reading of Roman dictatorship which focuses too heavily 
on what they consider its essential institutional features. 
Contradictory Ancient Sources 
Any study of the Roman dictatorship must admit that modern scholars do not 
know much for certain when it comes to the constitution and politics of the Roman 
republic. Lazar’s criticism of the historical record of the dictatorship is worth 
quoting at some length because it highlights the problems associated with relying on 
the ancient sources: 
“Classicists accept that the literary accounts we have are at least partly fictitious, or at least 
so politically motivated that it would be irresponsible to take them as plainly factual. Later thinkers 
madly embellished and selectively reproduced earlier accounts. But even Livy and Dionysius, our so-
called primary sources, were up to those same tricks, at least to some extent.”56  
For Lazar this is enough to demonstrate that the “trope [of the Roman dictatorship] is 
a late construction.”57 These biases and ideological motivations result in blatant 
inconsistencies between ancient authors. As such it is intellectually suspect to rely on 
it to justify contemporary forms of emergency dictatorship.  
Cicero, Livy and Dionysius all present different accounts of why the 
dictatorship was first used and what its main function was. From the earliest 
accounts “[t]he tradition about the invention of the dictatorship is confused”.58 
Cicero attributes it to the people desiring unified power and command in the hands 
of one person when the city was at war.
59
 Livy’s narrative on the early history of 
Rome suggests that the main functions of the dictatorship were to respond effectively 
to threats of invasion and military exigencies as well as to instill fear in the general 
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Roman population.
60
 Finally, Dionysius is clear from his first mention of the dictator 
that it was primarily a weapon of class warfare used by the patricians against the 
plebeians.
61
 The power to control the army outside the city in defense of the state 
was a secondary function. The truth of the matter is not important though.  It will 
never be certain what the primary function of the dictatorship was, either repelling 
foreign invasion or suppressing insurrection and sedition. Neither will we know for 
sure how the different classes of Roman citizens felt about the dictator. What is 
crucial is that there is no agreement among the ancients on the initial justification of 
the dictatorship. The ancient record is forever inconsistent. 
There are further inconsistencies surrounding the extent of the power wielded 
by Roman dictators. The extent of dictatorial authority is particularly ambiguous 
surrounding the right of provocatio. Provocatio was the right of appeal plebeians had 
against summary arrest, flogging and execution by magistrates. Dionysius holds that 
the dictator could violate this right with impunity.
62
 However, Livy recounts a story 
in which a dictator did not execute a plebian because of an appeal to provocatio and 
support of an assembly which gathered to back the plebeian.
63
 This case presents an 
element of popular restraint on dictators which theories of constitutional dictatorship 
lack. The most that can be accepted with any certainty is that the power of the 
dictator was not absolute but open to contestation in some cases. Lazar notes that 
“the range of the dictator’s powers are a matter of continuing contention” due to the 
political motivation on the part of the ancient authors and the inconsistencies 
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between their accounts.
64
 This ‘continuing contention’ casts serious doubts as to 
whether or not the Roman dictatorship can be relied on as a successful example of 
constitutional dictatorship which is both effective and limited.  
Concerning political biases and motivations Kalyvas notes that Dionysius 
and Appian deliberately associated Roman dictatorship with the Greek notion of 
tyranny in their accounts in order to critique the dictatorship.
65
 Indeed, he portrays 
them as the first real critics of the Roman dictatorship.
66
 The effect of the close 
association drawn by the Greek historians had the effect of “blurring previous 
empirical, analytical, and normative distinctions” between dictatorship and 
tyranny.
67
 The selective ideological manipulation of the historical record is clear in 
this instance. Furthermore it serves to confirm Lazar’s point that “historical accounts 
can be bent to political purposes”.68 As such, any modern use of dictatorship needs to 
be wary of such motivations. However, as will be discussed below, Rossiter, 
Friedrich and Watkins pay little regard to the biases of the ancients. 
There is one further point to raise concerning inaccuracies in the historical 
record of the ancients. That is the presence of legend and myth in their accounts. The 
case of the dictator Cincinnatus is exemplary of this trait. Cincinnatus was made 
dictator in order to rescue the Roman army whose camp had been surrounded by 
Sabine forces. A delegation from the senate found him working on his small farm 
just outside the city. Upon being told of the danger facing the Roman army 
Cincinnatus immediately took up the position of dictator. Within sixteen days he had 
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rescued the trapped army and abdicated his dictatorial powers.
69
 Overtime this story 
has been held up as an example of how dictatorial power can and should be used by 
persons as different as Machiavelli and George Washington.
70
 However, it is 
impossible to separate historical facts from embellishments and legend.
71
 Any 
modern reliance on this story must account for this fact, however, most do not. 
Embellishments and political motivations aside most ancient sources 
acknowledge that the dictator was appointed by the consuls, that his term lasted no 
more than six months, and that he wielded more authority with fewer restrictions 
than did the highest ranking magistrates. However, there existed many other means 
by which Romans responded to what they considered emergencies. They could 
nominate a dictator, pass a tumultus decree which was supposed to prepare the city 
for war and call all citizens to arms, the senate could pass a “senates consultum de re 
publica defendenda” which was an exhortation to the consuls to do everything in 
their power to save the republic, though it did not bind the consuls to any particular 
action.
72
 None of these actions receives much analysis from Rossiter, Friedrich or 
Watkins. Rather they focus solely on the dictatorship, as will be discussed below. 
Emergency politics in republican Rome were complicated and nuanced, extending 
beyond the basic features of dictatorship. 
This complexity also applies to the Roman understanding of 
constitutionalism. The Roman ‘constitution’ was nothing like what exists in 
contemporary liberal-democratic regimes. Polybius himself admits that his account 
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of the Roman constitution may seem strange because he omits certain details.
73
 
Following Polybius, Lintott argues that: 
“The constitution of the Republic consisted of far more than statutes: it was based on 
traditional institutions defined by precedents and examples. These were above all embodied in stories, 
whether these related to more recent events and had good claims to historicity or were reconstructions 
of distant events with a strong sense of myth. Thus the constitution did not stand above politics like a 
law-code: it is what Romans thought to be right and did, and in more senses than one it was a product 
of history.”74 
Two of the main elements of Roman ‘constitutionalism’ which functioned alongside 
one another were lex and mos. Mos can be roughly translated as “the way things 
happened to be done at the time” while lex refers to written Roman statues.75 These 
two elements intermixed and certainly did not function alone. As such, the Roman 
constitution simply cannot be referred to in the same manner as modern liberal-
democratic constitutions. This is a mistake many modern scholars make, particularly 
Rossiter and Friedrich. Doing so imports connotations and assumptions from modern 
constitutionalism that simply do not fit with what can be ascertained from the ancient 
sources. Any attempt to do so betrays the political aims of modern scholars. Rather 
than relying on the Roman ‘constitution’ they are selectively describing in order to 
justify their preferred understanding of dictatorship in liberal-democratic regimes. 
 A further point needs to be made concerning political violence in the Roman 
republic. Lintott suggests, citing Sherwin-White, that in republican Rome there 
existed an underlying legality to political violence.
76
 Neither the magistrates nor the 
senate had a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Individuals were not legally 
restricted from using violence against personal opponents. Furthermore, violence 
                                                          
73
 Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire, 6.11-18 
74
 Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, p. 26. 
75
 Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, p. 4-6 
76
 Lintott, Violence in Republican Rome, p. 65-66 
37 
 
was a morally acceptable means of achieving a “certain political objective”.77 
Therefore, a dictator violating the plebeian right of provocatio was not necessarily 
seen as an act of legally unconstrainted, absolute power. It may have instilled fear in 
the plebeians but the act of killing an individual was not necessarily viewed as being 
particularly brutal or extraordinary. It is only in modern states which forbid the use 
of violence by individuals and its regular use by government officials that the act of 
summarily executing citizens comes to be seen as exceptional. The culture of 
violence and legality may have even encouraged private individuals to use force 
against those men considered outlaws, either because they were attempting to gain 
tyrannical power or because they were attempting to manipulate the constitution with 
violent means.
78
 A statute regulating political violence did not appear in Roman law 
until sometime around 78 BCE, long after the dictatorship in its constitutional form 
had fallen into disuse.
79
 It will be shown below that Rossiter, Friedrich or Watkins 
take almost no note of the complexity as well as legal and moral ambiguities 
surrounding political violence, particularly as it relates to the dictatorship. Rather, 
they emphasize the institutional mechanisms that authorized and constrained 
dictatorial violence. 
 
The Narrow Reading of Roman Dictatorship 
Rossiter, Friedrich and Watkins’ heavy reliance on Roman dictatorship as a 
successful empirical example of expanded and constrained emergency powers is 
unfounded. They focus on basic institutional features ignoring contradictory 
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accounts among the ancients and other factors which complicate their conceptual 
understanding of Roman dictatorship. In contrast to the messy and inconsistent 
understanding of the Roman dictatorship presented above Rossiter, Friedrich and 
Watkins’ readings of the institution are sparse, focusing on what they deem the 
essential institutional features of the office. Their presentations of dictatorship 
employ modern conceptualizations of law and constitutionalism ignoring Roman 
elements such as mos.  
Rossiter is fully aware that the social, economic and political conditions of 
ancient Rome and contemporary liberal-democracies are so vastly different that any 
call for the Roman dictatorship to be used as a model of emergency government is 
immediately suspect. Nevertheless, he is positive that the Roman dictatorship can be 
used as an ideal type for his theory of ‘constitutional dictatorship’. This is evident in 
his focus on the constitutional and institutional mechanisms of the dictatorship as 
well as his use of modern terminology to describe those mechanisms. Merely 
describing the Roman dictatorship as ‘constitutional’ does not do justice to the 
concept as the Romans knew it. Additionally, speaking of the constitution as a single 
entity or document, which Rossiter does throughout Constitutional Dictatorship, 
obscures the fact that it was composed more of a web of formal lex as well as well as 
informal stories, examples and ethics and mos. 
 According to Rossiter’s account, when the republic was threatened the Senate 
would advise the consuls to select a dictator. The consuls were ‘constitutionally’ 
empowered to the select the dictator, though it was only one consul who made the 
final decision.
80
 The constitutionality of the appointment was ensured by religious 
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rites performed only by consuls and by the lex curiata, which gave a “stamp of 
legality.”81  The dictatorship was primarily used to repel invading armies as well 
as to suppress insurrection amongst the plebian population.
82
  To this extent the 
dictator was given nearly absolute power. Rossiter describes this power as a relic of 
the extinct Roman monarchy.
83
 In order to resolve the crisis at hand the dictator 
could do almost anything he saw fit. There were though, important formal 
restrictions on his authority. Firstly, the dictator’s time in office was strictly limited. 
He could hold the office for no more than six months. Rossiter notes that this limit 
“was never transgressed, by law or by force.”84 Secondly, he could not alter the 
constitution or subvert the fundamental structure of the republic in anyway. Third, 
the dictator was dependent on the state for finances. Fourth, he could not initiate 
offensive wars. Finally, the dictator had no jurisdiction in civil matters.
85
 Aside from 
these limitations the dictator was not subject to any of the other restrictions placed on 
Roman magistrates. These are all formal restrictions on the power of the dictator that 
Rossiter asserts prove the constitutional nature of the office. For Rossiter the 
dictatorship is an office that exists primarily in the realm of Roman ius, the realm of 
the constitution and law. He does not even mention mos. Leaving aside mos 
highlights how Rossiter presents only a biased account of the Roman dictatorship 
which fits with his modern theoretical and political project of constitutional 
dictatorship. He does argue that the “sacred nature of the dictatorship” is responsible 
for the fact that no dictator violated these restrictions for the first three hundred years 
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of the existence of the office.
86
 However by giving the sacred nature of the office this 
role he relegates it to more of a support for the institutional limitations. The sacred 
nature of the office and the religious rites surrounding it are not restrictions on abuse 
of dictatorial power in their own right. According to Rossiter it is the formal, 
institutional restrictions that constrained Roman dictators from abusing their power.  
 If the limits on dictatorial power were primarily institutional in nature so 
were the powers granted according to Rossiter. The dictator had several powers of a 
political and legal nature which he could exercise. He could call assemblies and even 
the Senate into session, he had jurisdiction to decide any and all criminal cases 
pertaining to the crisis at hand, and he could arrest, judge and execute Roman 
citizens in violation of their right of provocatio.
87
 Just like the restrictions these are 
all powers involving what Rossiter understands as legal and constitutional structures. 
Rossiter does not account for any inconsistencies evident in the ancient sources 
discussed above. 
Friedrich and Watkins selectively narrow the historical record in order to fit 
their own understanding of constitutionalism as well as their defense of 
constitutional dictatorship. Friedrich’s description of the dictatorship reduces the 
complexity of Roman emergency governance discussed above to four basic criteria: 
the appointment of the dictator followed constitutional norms, the dictator could not 
nominate or institute himself, the term as dictator was strictly limited to the 
resolution of the emergency for which he was nominated or six months, whichever 
came first, and finally the dictatorship was always used to protect the constitution 
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and the republic, never against it.
88
  These are the ‘underlying conceptions’ he 
considers to be still valid. However, their validity must be questioned because they 
are so sparsely described. Friedrich trusts that the accounts of the ancient sources are 
accurate enough that the four criteria can be definitively taken from their work. 
Given the analysis above Friedrich’s theory is too narrow because it cannot account 
for the inconsistencies surrounding the main function, purpose, and limitations of the 
Roman dictatorship. Furthermore, he makes no attempt to qualify what he 
understands by ‘constitutional norms’. Since he does not mention the complexities of 
Roman constitutionalism it must be assumed that he is relying on a modern notion of 
constitutionalism. Watkins’ account of the Roman example is equally sparse and 
focuses on constitutional and legal limits to dictatorial authority. He argues that 
though the power wielded by the dictator was analogous to monarchical powers it 
was still constrained by a six month term limit as well as appointment by consuls.
89
 
Furthermore, dictators had to rely on senatorial approval “for the withdrawal of 
funds from the public treasury.”90 Projecting a modern concept back on to Roman 
dictatorship obscures the dilemmas and nuances of the office.  
 The contrast between Rossiter, Friedrich and Watkins’ account of Roman 
dictatorship and the inconsistencies and complexities of the historical record 
demonstrate that the dictatorship is not a suitable example of effective yet restrained 
emergency powers. Their reading of the dictatorship is biased by their contemporary 
notions of legality and constitutionalism. Roman dictatorship simply cannot be 
trusted as an example of emergency governance suitable for contemporary liberal-
democratic regimes.  
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Conclusion 
 Theories of constitutional dictatorship are unable to explain why ‘states of 
emergency’ and the use of emergency powers were so prevalent liberal-democratic 
regimes. Their primary focus is developing institutional means for limiting or 
preventing abuses of emergency powers. Such a focus forces them to rely on an 
uncritical understanding of the norm/exception binary. They too easily assume that 
‘states of emergency’ could be easily recognized and they could, at least in theory, 
be kept separate from ‘normal times’. In doing so they are unable to investigate and 
develop an argument as to why ‘states of emergency’ seem to occur so often. 
Rossiter, Friedrich and Watkins are extremely concerned about the presence of 
‘states of emergency’ in liberal-democratic regimes yet their theory of constitutional 
dictatorship provides no means for investigating why this may be the case. 
Reliance on Roman dictatorship as a prototype for emergency governance is 
misguided. Even as ideological inspiration it is suspect. The historical record is too 
complex and incoherent to be definitively relied upon as an example of a successful 
emergency measure. Any attempt to do so relies so heavily on modern 
understandings of law and constitutionalism that the Roman institution becomes bent 
to the political purposes of the author relying upon it.  
It is important to move beyond Roman dictatorship and its modern 
incarnation elaborated and defended by Rossiter, Friedrich and Watkins. Their 
reliance on an assumption that normal and emergency times can be objectively 
separated from one another has problematic implications for theorizing emergency 
politics. It removes any scope for contesting the decision to declare an emergency. It 
is also blind to elements of potential democratic participation and contestation of 
attempts by elites to wield emergency powers. Their model of constitutional 
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dictatorship has been highly influential in contemporary debates concerning 
emergency politics. David Dyzenhaus refers to Rossiter’s Constitutional 
Dictatorship as “one of the leading studies of the state of emergency…”91 The 
impact of constitutional dictatorship and subsequent discussion of it has been to 
embed the problematic implications of the norm/exception binary in wider 
discussions of emergency politics and governance. As I will argue throughout the 
rest of this thesis such a dichotomy cannot and should not be utilized when 
theorizing and conceptualizing situations which liberal-democratic regimes regard as 
states of emergency.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
91
 Dyzenhaus, Constitution of Law, p. 35 
44 
 
Chapter 2: Problematic and Paradox: Carl Schmitt’s Sovereign, Decision and 
Exception 
Introduction 
It is necessary to turn to the work of Carl Schmitt because he begins to 
answer the question at hand: namely, why situations defined as ‘states of emergency’ 
and the use and abuse of emergency measures seem to be ever present aspects of 
liberal-democratic regimes. In his work on what he calls ‘the exception’ we find 
what I will refer to as ‘the problematic of the exception’ and a paradox he implicitly 
identifies surrounding political contestation and the limits of pluralist contestation. 
The problematic of the exception is that liberal-democratic regimes, try as they 
might, cannot escape extra-legal power. This extra-legal power will act on the legal 
order, sometimes suspending it completely, when it decides that the system is facing 
an existential threat, what Schmitt refers to as an exception. This problematic leads 
to what I will call the paradox of contestation in Schmitt’s work. Liberal-democratic 
regimes must allow all groups an equal chance to achieve political power. This is 
because equal chance functions as a substantive notion of justice on which liberal-
democracy relies. However, they must also protect themselves from groups which 
would achieve power legally only to alter the system to their own advantage such 
that other groups no longer have any chance of achieving power. This paradox is at 
its most acute during ‘exceptions’ when an extra-legal, sovereign power is acting on 
and attempting to defend its own preferred articulation of a legal order as a whole.  
Schmitt’s work is important because he shows us that the problematic of the 
exception and paradox of contestation are fundamental to the structures of liberal-
democratic governance. His work will help move us away from the norm/exception 
binary and, ironically, see ‘exceptional’ situations as ‘normal’ or ‘ordinary’ 
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occurrences in liberal-democracies. However, Schmitt argues that liberal-democratic 
regimes are doomed to fail because they cannot adequately cope with the ‘exception’ 
nor can they adequately solve the paradox. We need not agree with Schmitt’s dire 
prognosis of liberal-democratic regimes nor the solution he proposes to resolve the 
problematic of the exception. As Rasch notes “The value of Schmitt today lies more 
with the structure of conflict that he outlines than with any attempt to rehabilitate his 
particular carriers of that structure.”92 This chapter will demonstrate that we can read 
Schmitt’s work against itself such that we can accept his diagnosis of the 
problematic without agreeing with him that liberal-democracy cannot defend itself or 
that the best resolution of the problematic paradox is a non-liberal, authoritarian 
democracy.  
To accomplish this task I will re-read his dictum that “Sovereign is he who 
decides on the exception” in the broader context of his critique liberal-democracy.93 I 
will also provide a critical exegesis of the paradox of contestation Schmitt describes 
but does not name directly as a fundamental paradox. In doing so we will find 
conceptual and theoretical resources for understanding sovereignty, decision and the 
exception in a way that can help us describe the problem of ‘states of emergency’ 
and emergency powers away from the norm/exception binary and embedded in the 
contingency and political contestation at the heart of liberal-democratic regimes. 
Sovereign is he? 
Schmitt’s conceptualization of the sovereign can be read as a response to a 
question he poses: “who is competent to act when the legal system fails to answer 
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the question of competence?”94 According to Schmitt the sovereign is responsible for 
acting in situations for which a legal system “makes no provision.”95 Competency to 
decide ‘the exception’ may or may not be prescribed by a written constitution or 
legal statute. The sovereign, on his reading, fills an inevitable gap in the legal 
system. Schmitt argues that this characteristic defines both the sovereign as well as 
the concept of sovereignty generally. Thus his dictum: “Sovereign is he who decides 
on the exception.”96  
How much power and authority the sovereign has or should have remains an 
ambiguity never definitively answered in Schmitt’s work.  In Political Theology, he 
argues that sovereign authority is unlimited.
97
 The sovereign suspends or silences the 
law, leaving only the state. The sovereign can do whatever they feel necessary to 
resolve what they have decided is an exception. Yet, in Constitutional Theory, he 
notes that the sovereign cannot make permanent changes to the legal order or 
constitution. Furthermore, they must give up their power after the crisis is resolved.
98
 
Balakrishnan does note that Schmitt “held an extreme view” in the debate among 
Weimar legal scholars as to the precise meaning and implication of Article 48.
99
 
However, that position only related to the specifics of Article 48, Schmitt does not 
make a definitive theoretical statement on the issue.  
On a strict reading of his dictum, the sovereign is a single individual who acts 
effectively and unilaterally. The sovereign decides both that there is an exception as 
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well as what must be done to resolve it.
100
 Schmitt’s reference point for the person of 
the sovereign is Article 48 of the Weimar constitution. Article 48 gave the 
Reichspraisdent the ability to suspend certain articles of the constitution in order to 
assure “public security and order” or to force a German Land to “fulfill its duties 
according to the Reich Constitution or Reich statutes.”101 While the Weimar 
constitution and Article 48 are referred to often in Schmitt’s writings he never argues 
that the president or the executive must be the sovereign. Writing in support of the 
use of Article 48 in 1932 Schmitt goes so far as to argue that “in abnormal times… 
In a race between the executive and the judiciary, the judiciary will mostly arrive too 
late.”102 Cleary Schmitt preferred the executive to act as sovereign because of the 
premium on political power they hold, as well as their speed and efficiency when 
dealing with crises.
103
 In the context of democratic regimes Schmitt supported the 
executive as sovereign because as a state official elected by the entirety of the 
masses, the executive was the most direct representative of the will of the people.
104
 
But he held back on arguing logically and theoretically that the sovereign must be 
the executive. This leaves open the possibility that the sovereign may be anyone. 
Each state must decide how they will choose the person to act as sovereign. It can be 
prescribed before an emergency via the constitution or a statute, or a state may make 
no mention at all of who should be given emergency powers. The sovereign is not a 
permanent office or position within a state. They do not exist at all times, waiting for 
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a crisis that requires the suspension of law. The sovereign is created anew each and 
every time s/he decides on the exception.  
This implies a performative aspect of the sovereign. The decision on the 
exception brings about the sovereign. Not all constitutions prescribe who shall act as 
sovereign. Many do but some do not. Until the decision on the exception is made 
whoever acts as the sovereign is not necessarily recognized as such. The constitution 
may specify an individual or a position, the person in which is to assume sovereign 
power. However, until that person actually makes the decision and the decision is 
supported by the rest of the state and acted upon accordingly, the sovereign does not 
actually exist. Schmitt was keenly aware of the ambiguity surrounding the sovereign. 
As noted above sovereignty is framed around the question of competency in 
situations for which none is prescribed by the legal order. We can use other aspects 
of Schmitt’s work to develop an expanded notion of whom or what the sovereign is 
or could be. 
The sovereign certainly need not be a single individual, let alone a ‘he’. In 
Political Theology Schmitt characterizes the sovereign as a single person empowered 
to make the decision on the exception. However, the possibility that the sovereign is 
a group, or even the demos itself is not excluded from the problematic of the 
exception. As Rasch points out: “[t]he sovereign is figured as an autonomous entity, 
an agent, or at least agency, which has the authority to make decisions. That agent 
may be a monarch, a dictator, a ruling body, or any variety of other decision-making 
mechanisms.”105 The sovereign is an agency, not necessarily a single 
individual/agent. Though, as noted above, when it came to the situation of the 
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Weimar Republic, Schmitt held the view that the executive was sovereign and 
Article 48 of the constitution gave the president unlimited power. Yet, the possibility 
that the sovereign is a group of people is not logically or conceptually excluded from 
Schmitt’s formulation. Sovereignty can be understood as the term used to describe 
decisions regarding a legal order however they are arrived at. Thus sovereignty is not 
a quality of a person or an ability, it is the attribution of a decision to an agency. 
To this we must add Schmitt’s acknowledgement that in the modern world 
democracy is widely considered to be the only acceptable and legitimate form of 
government.
106
 This is not a normative statement on Schmitt’s part. He does not 
believe that liberal-democracy is viable as a form of governance. For Schmitt, 
democracy entails that the sovereign agency and sovereign decisions are legitimate 
only when they represent and act in the name of the demos. The label of ‘sovereign’ 
would then have to be retroactively applied to the form the agency took in the 
instance of a particular decision. Schmitt believes that the executive in a liberal-
democratic state will most likely be able to act as sovereign though this need not 
logically be the case. Here we can modify Rasch’s characterization of Schmitt’s 
understanding of sovereignty. He argues that “When personified as an individual, an 
institution, or a general will, sovereignty appears as if it precedes the law, giving the 
law its force. Yet, sovereign is simply the name given to a logical effect.”107  Rasch 
furthermore argues that Schmitt’s notion of sovereignty exposes liberal-democratic 
government and legal order as one particular state form. “Indeed, it seeks to explain 
it as an order, as one possible order among many – in short, as a political reality, and 
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not merely a legal or moral ideology.”108 In addition to being a logical effect we can 
now see sovereignty as attributable to a demos, or a partial group of a demos, 
reflectively acting on its own legal order. Schmitt’s concept of sovereignty does not 
attempt to cover over or erase the fact that, in a liberal-democratic regime, any 
constitution and legal order must be legitimized by a source external to itself. 
Furthermore this external, extra-legal sovereign power does not disappear after the 
moment of founding. It remains to provide legitimacy to acts of state officials or 
political groups via attribution of those acts to the demos. This line of argument will 
be further developed in chapter seven. 
Dyzenhaus argues that Schmitt’s defense of the necessity of extra-legal 
power and the superiority of the state is unacceptable. He argues that “one needs to 
maintain Hans Kelsen’s Identity Thesis: the thesis that the state is totally constituted 
by law. When a political entity acts outside of the law, its acts can no longer be 
attributed to the state and so they have no authority.”109 For Dyzenhaus the crucial 
aspect of liberal legal order is that it fully contains any form of extra-legal, political 
power. For him, liberal legality cannot accept any power which is external to legal 
order or acts outside of law. He argues that for Schmitt: “The space beyond law is 
not so much produced by law as revealed when the mask of liberal legality is 
stripped away by the political.”110 This argument, however, is unacceptable because 
in a democratic regime the legitimacy of legal order and the acts of state officials 
must be grounded outside of law. Legitimacy must be vested in ‘We, the people’, not 
in the legal order itself. As I will discuss further in chapter seven, Lindahl 
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demonstrates that Schmitt is right on this point.
111
 Democratic governance requires 
that acts of the state are legal and legitimate but this legitimacy is derived not from 
the state ‘acting legally’, so to speak. The legitimacy of sovereign acts is derived 
from the possibility that such acts can be attributed to a reflexively oriented 
collective external to a legal order, i.e. to a demos. Extra-legal, sovereign power is an 
inexorable element of liberal-democratic governance. 
Schmitt’s conceptualization of democracy and the demos is too simplistic, 
however, and needs to be expanded before we can fully develop a notion sovereignty 
in liberal-democracy which accounts for this dimension of the problematic of the 
exception. He defines democracy as a form of governing in which there is an 
“identity of ruler and ruled, governing and governed.”112 This identity rests on a 
substantive equality between the people who constitute the demos. The homogeneity 
created by substantive equality is totalizing to the extent that those who are chosen to 
rule “may not deviate from the general identity and homogeneity of the people.”113 
Thus for Schmitt, extra-legal power is vested in a homogenous group of individuals 
unified by an ambiguous ‘substantive equality’ which guides the decisions of the 
rulers such that they never rule against the demos as a whole. However, it is easily 
objected that modern societies are not and cannot be made homogenous to the extent 
that Schmitt requires. Lindahl, concurring with Kelsen, points out that “even a 
cursory survey reveals that the alleged unity of a collective subject is deeply 
problematic…”114 Any demos is split by a myriad of ethnic, religious, moral, 
economic, national, etc. divisions. Schmitt attempts to cover over these divisions 
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because he prefers, politically, a type of conservative, authoritarian democracy 
which rules over the demos with a minimum of oversight and citizen involvement. 
However, I argue that given that sovereignty is the attribution of an agency and not 
the characteristic of an agent, a homogenous demos is not conceptually necessary for 
the problematic of the exception. At this point we can activate Schmitt’s notion of 
‘the political’ to open up his conception of the demos and democracy so that we can 
more fully account for the process of attributing sovereignty and sovereign acts to an 
extra-legal power.  
Using Schmitt’s notion of ‘the political’, we can develop an understanding of 
the demos which accounts for the problematic unity of a demos. Introducing the 
political will complicate the nature of sovereign power and sovereign decision 
making, demonstrating that it can be contested and is sometimes the result of 
antagonistic conflict. This division however does not render Schmitt’s notion of 
sovereignty unusable. On the contrary, this expanded understanding of sovereignty 
within the problematic of the exception allows for contestation and conflict within 
the agency labeled as sovereign. It also opens the possibility for political contestation 
over sovereign decision making in situations which come to be defined as 
exceptional.  
The Political Sovereign  
On Schmitt’s account the political is a constitutive dimension of social 
existence. It is a constitutive split between two or more groups which arises in the 
process of forming an identity, a ‘we’. It is an autonomous dimension which is 
characterized by a distinction “between friend and enemy” which consists of a 
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“degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation.”115 
This ‘degree of intensity’ can be understood as a spectrum ranging from benign co-
existence to outright war. What is crucial though is the “ever present possibility of 
combat” between groups in the realm of the political.116 The political cannot be 
reduced to war itself. Rather, the political consists in a necessary split and 
antagonism of a society. Developing a ‘we’, a demos to which sovereign acts can be 
attributed and in which legitimacy can be grounded requires a politically determined 
exclusion. As Mouffe notes, Schmitt’s notion of the political “is an ever present 
possibility; the political belongs to our ontological condition.”117 This means that a 
demos can never be unified or homogenous in the sense that Schmitt’s definition of 
democracy requires. However it does open an ineradicable element of contestation at 
the foundation of every liberal-democratic regime.  
 This element of contestation is crucial to account for because the political is 
the most basic element on which the state, Schmitt’s extra-legal, sovereign power, 
and legal order are constructed. In The Concept of the Political Schmitt writes, “The 
concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political.”118 As Schmitt defines 
the state it “is the political status of an organized people in an enclosed territorial 
unit.”119 It is the necessary extra-legal element which secures legal order and from 
which legal order gets its legitimacy. The relationship is a three level hierarchy, the 
political on the bottom, then the state, and finally law and legal norms on the top. 
Schmitt also claims that the political “remains alongside and above the 
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constitution.”120 All three elements do not exist independently of one another. The 
political and state remain latent, ready to fill in the gaps of the legal order in 
situations for which competency has not been proscribed. The state cannot exist 
without the political; legal order necessarily relies on the political and the state for its 
legitimacy. “The political element cannot be separated from the state…”121  The state 
then is a specific form that the political takes when it is stabilized to the point that 
the people can organize and regulate their processes of collective decision making. 
The state decides who is a friend and who is an enemy. But this by no means implies 
that such a decision is made without contestation and conflict. 
 Permanent political contestation of sovereign political decisions is a core 
aspect of the problematic of the exception and liberal-democratic governance 
generally. The political ensures that sovereign ‘decision-making mechanisms’ are 
subject to permanent contestation of decisions on exceptional situations. Such 
contestation is a necessary and positive aspect of the expanded notion of sovereignty 
I have developed with and through Schmitt’s work. As Rasch notes:  
 “The political does not exist to usher in the good life by eliminating social antagonism; 
rather, it exists to serve as the medium for an acceptably limited and therefore productive conflict in 
the inevitable absence of any final, universally accepted vision of the good life. The political, 
therefore, can only be defined by a structure that allows for the perpetual production as well as 
contingent resolution of dissent and opposition.”122  
The sovereign is not an agent imbued with the authority or ability to make and 
enforce decisions on the exception. The sovereign, and sovereignty, are the 
attribution of an agency to an individual or group that is able to make such a decision 
in a context of political antagonism and contestation.  Thus both the decision on the 
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exception as well as the extent of the powers wielded by the sovereign agency can 
never be fixed or assumed a priori. Furthermore, the legitimacy of sovereign 
decisions will always be contested. Legitimacy comes from attribution of the 
sovereign decision to a demos which is constitutively split by political antagonism. 
This means that the attribution of legitimacy can only be made to a part of a demos, 
not to it as a homogenous whole.  
What is crucial is that Schmitt conceptualizes sovereignty as the nexus 
between legal order and extra-legal, political power. For him, the sovereign is the 
guardian of legal order. “The sovereign is the highest legislator, judge, and 
commander simultaneously. He is also the final source of legality and the ultimate 
foundation of legitimacy.”123 On his account, the sovereign agency makes reflexive 
decisions concerning the safe guarding of legal order as a whole. But, because any 
demos is constitutively split which ever group is able to have their decisions and 
actions retroactively defined as sovereign can only represent a portion of the 
individuals and groups that make up a demos. Though liberal-democratic regimes 
attempt to do away with sovereign power it none the less emerges as a necessary 
feature. Legal order cannot be an entirely closed, fully self-referential system. It 
must be legitimized by extra-legal, sovereign, political power. This is Schmitt’s 
position: because it rests on a political decision to create and apply it in the first 
place legal order remains forever open and contingent on the maintenance of a 
‘normal situation’ in which it can be valid. The rule of law is the rule of contested 
sovereign decisions to apply and enforce the law. As Rasch points out: “Sovereignty 
here emerges as a ‘supplement’, one might say, that attaches itself to the system as if 
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from outside to serve as a kind of communal bodyguard.”124 Thus on Schmitt’s 
understanding, the state and sovereignty are not only external to legal order but also 
superior to it, such that when the state and ‘We, the people’ are threatened a legal 
order, “must appear as a hindrance to state self-defense.”125 Schmitt is able to justify 
the suspension of legal order because the state and law are separate and unequal.  
This position helps us to begin to break down the norm/exception binary as it 
operates in Schmitt’s work and the scholarly discourse on states of emergency. No 
one agent is every fully empowered to make sovereign decisions regarding the 
existence of an ‘exception’ without being subject to contestation. Thus ‘normal’ and 
‘exceptional’ must be understood not as objective conditions or descriptions of states 
of affairs but as subjective, politically determined concepts. Furthermore, they are 
inherently conservative concepts. ‘Normal’ refers to a state of affairs in which a 
powerful political group is able to define its specific articulation of power as such. 
‘Emergency’ refers to situations when a powerful political group feels that their 
‘normal’ articulation is threatened to the extent that they must free themselves from 
self-imposed restraints on political action. This conceptualization of sovereignty 
ensures that the moment of decision on the exception and the content of the decision 
are all the more prescient. Decisions must be made but they will be the result of 
contestation between individuals and groups struggling to have their decision 
deemed sovereign. Rasch aptly formulates the problem: “When push comes to 
shove, who decides? Who is this he, she, or it?”126 And push will, from time to time, 
come to shove when society is constitutively split by the political and no one 
individual or group is fully empowered to make sovereign decisions concerning the 
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regime as a whole. We now turn to the moment of decision to further expand 
Schmitt’s problematic of the exception. 
Decision 
 Given the contestation inherent in sovereign agency the moment of decision 
becomes all the more crucial. Legal order cannot decide on itself as a system, it 
cannot make reflective judgments on itself as a whole. Furthermore, the political 
ensures that within a society there is no third party, perspective, or adjudicator who 
can make politically neutral decisions on the legal order. For Schmitt, this means that 
the decision on the exception is a “decision in absolute purity”.127 By this he means 
that the decision is made without the guidance of the legal order. The decision is not 
legitimized by the legal order itself, but by power external to it. As noted in the 
previous section, the decision on the exception is a decision about the status and 
application of legal order for which legal order has made no provision and has not 
provided any strict determination of who should be competent to make the decision. 
However, to argue that the decision exists or is made from ‘absolute purity’ should 
be read as an overstatement by Schmitt.  
An alternate reading suggests that his work exhibits a tension on this point. 
He argues that the decision is “within the framework of the juristic” even though it 
must be a decision concerning the legal order as a whole, as one order among other 
possibilities.
128
 Rasch points out that on Schmitt’s account: “Decisions are not… 
arbitrary, but once the ineluctability of decision is acknowledged, the question of 
what regulates decisions in the absence of logical necessity becomes pre-eminently 
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political, contestable and arguable.”129 This is certainly the case in moments which 
sovereign power decides are exceptional. We can read Schmitt against himself to 
show that decision exists in an ambiguous position between extra-legal, sovereign 
power and legal order all the while being subject to political contestation.  
As noted above sovereign decisions concern legal order as a whole. Schmitt 
argues that sovereign decision is a determination as to whether not a “normal 
situation” exists in which norms and legal order can be applied.130 Within the 
problematic of the exception this entails “the suspension of the entire existing 
order.”131 The state, specifically the sovereign who acts in the name of the state, not 
only produces and guarantees this normal situation but decides when the situation is 
abnormal and that law should be suspended.
132
 Furthermore, as Rasch points out: 
“Establishing norms does not precede politics and evade sovereignty; it is politics, 
sovereign politics.”133 In the problematic of the exception the moment of decision is 
what marks the distinction between normality and exceptionality. Schmitt’s work 
can be read to demonstrate that the norm/exception binary is not a neutral, objective 
determination of a situation but rather the result of a contested political decision. 
Sovereign power establishes and applies norms when it has been able to decide that a 
‘normal’ situation exists. I will further argue the point in chapters six and seven that 
it is actually through the process of making and applying norms that a ‘normal’ 
situation is created by sovereign political power. 
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We can now further expand Schmitt’s notion of decision to further describe 
the problematic of the exception. Firstly, a decision that a state of exception exists 
does not necessarily lead to the suspension of the entire legal order. It could suspend 
certain rights or articles of a constitution, as Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution 
did. Or it could suspend rights for certain groups of people within a society. Honig 
points out that the decision on the exception need not necessarily entail all political 
power accruing to a single sovereign who makes a single decision to suspend law.
134
 
Modern governmental bureaucracies are large complex apparatuses of decision 
making and implementation. The notion that one person will be able to make a single 
decision that effects every bit of the apparatus is rather simplistic. Schmitt focuses on 
the suspension of the entire legal order because he considers it the most extreme and 
interesting case. But this does not exclude the possibility that the decision can affect 
smaller parts of the legal order, rather than the legal order in its entirety.   
Schmitt is often interpreted as if he writes that decisions are simply made by 
the sovereign… ‘the sovereign decides on the exception’. On this reading, for 
Schmitt the decision is simply made and its directives executed by the relevant state 
officials empowered to do so. I disagree with this interpretation of Schmitt’s work on 
the moment of sovereign decision. There are two aspects of the nature of the 
decision and the decision-making process we can develop through and against 
Schmitt’s work which undermine the possibility that decisions can simply be made. 
The first is that decisions are made by the sovereign agency, discussed above, which 
is subject to permanent political contestation. The presence of the political and 
antagonism will lead to contestation over the decision itself as well as the legitimacy 
of the decision ex post facto. The second concerns the performative aspect of 
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sovereignty discussed above. Making a sovereign decision and the performative 
aspect that entails requires that, at least to some extent, the people over whom the 
decision is made are receptive to it.
135
 Furthermore, the people must agree to the 
decision or at least not openly challenge it if it is to be effective. This performative 
element of sovereignty and decision means that decision can only function as a 
claim, not a command or a directive which must necessarily be followed. As with the 
attribution of sovereign agency, decision is subject to ineluctable contestation. 
If this is the case then some form of consensus will be necessary in order for 
the performative decision to be successful and to take effect. In ‘Ethic of State and 
Pluralist State’, Schmitt argues that any form of consensus requires an element of 
power:  
“For every consensus, even a ‘free’ one, is somehow motivated and brought into existence. 
Power produces consensus and often, to be sure, a rational and ethically justified consensus. 
Conversely, consensus produces power, and then often an irrational and – despite the consensus – 
ethically repugnant power. From a pragmatic and empirical perspective, the question arises of who 
controls the means of bringing about the ‘free’ consensus of the masses…”136 
This question is all the more relevant given that sovereignty is an agency which is 
attributed to a group or individual after they have made their ‘decision’ in the form 
of a claim. Consensus involves the production of a unity, a ‘we’ opposed to a ‘them’ 
in the dimension of the political. He argues that, “The unity of the state has always 
been a unity of social multiplicity. In different times and in different states, it was 
always complex and, in a special sense, internally pluralist.”137 Schmitt’s work 
demonstrates that power is a necessary element in the problematic of the exception at 
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the moment of decision. Political power produces consensus which attributes 
sovereignty to an agent and is necessary if the decision is to be implemented.  
My reading of Schmitt contends that we should focus on the moment of 
decision on the exception, as well as on what the sovereign agency has been able to 
determine constitutes an exception through a process of organizing consensus. I 
argued above that legal order can provide some guidance when such decisions are 
made. However that guidance is necessarily limited because legal order relies 
heavily on vague indeterminate concepts. Schmitt notes that closely linked to the 
notion of the exception are “undetermined and evaluative concepts, such as ‘public 
security and order,’ ‘danger,’ ‘emergency,’ ‘necessary measures,’ ‘hostility to the 
state and constitution,’ peaceful disposition,’ ‘life and death issues,’ etc.”138 These 
terms and their evaluative nature points to the indeterminacy of legal order generally. 
This indeterminacy renders the decisions on such terms all the more important. I 
argue that the decision on these terms, on the exception specifically, is more 
important than the concepts of exception or emergency themselves.  A close reading 
of Schmitt’s conceptualization of the exception can help further describe the 
problematic of the exception.  
Exception  
Schmitt’s conceptualization of the exception can be read to demonstrate that 
the decision on the exception is of greater significance than any definition of what 
constitutes an exception as such. We can initially see this in the way Schmitt 
differentiates the exception from the concept of emergency. Emergency situations do 
not always necessitate decisions on the exception. He writes: “The exception, which 
is not codified in the existing legal order, can at best be characterized as a case of 
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extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the state or the like. But it cannot be 
circumscribed factually and made to conform to a preformed law.”139 In this passage 
he defines the exception in terms of the event which necessitates a defense of the 
state by any means necessary. This is similar to many other descriptions of states of 
emergency in both ancient and contemporary literature alike. George Schwab argues 
that for Schmitt the exception constitutes “any kind of severe economic or political 
disturbance that requires the application of extraordinary measures.”140 Schwab’s 
interpretation of Schmitt’s exception focuses more on the events or situation that 
necessitate the application of extraordinary measures, rather than on the measures 
themselves. Tracy B. Strong adds that Schmitt is rather ambiguous with his word 
choice when speaking of the state of exception. He uses several different words to 
describe the same idea - Ausnahmezustand, Ausnahmefall, Notstand, and Notfall.
141
 
What Schwab and Strong do not point out is that the event which precipitates a 
decision on the exception is not as crucial as the decision itself.  
Schmitt alludes to a narrower definition of the exception in a passage just a 
few pages later. He states that:  
“…not every extraordinary measure, not every police emergency measure or emergency 
decree, is necessarily an exception. What characterizes an exception is principally unlimited authority, 
which means the suspension of the entire existing order.” 142 
Because Schmitt differentiates between emergencies and exceptions the sovereign 
may decide that even in an emergency a decision on the exception is not warranted. 
The exception is the effect of a decision. He is highlighting the idea that an exception 
is more than an objectively verifiable emergency situation or the presence of a threat 
                                                          
139
 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 6 
140
 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 5, footnote 
141
 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. xiii 
142
 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 12 
63 
 
to the state, what defines an exception is the subjective decision on the part of a 
sovereign agent to suspend law. 
This does not mean the concept of the exception is not of central importance 
for Schmitt. On the contrary he claims that “the exception is to be understood to refer 
to a general concept in the theory of the state, and not merely applied to a construct 
applied to any emergency decree or state of siege.”143 As Balakrishnan notes: 
“Schmitt claimed that looking at the legal system from the vantage point of the 
emergency situation was ‘more interesting’ because it was only from this perspective 
that one could understand the nature of the relationship between the norms of a legal 
system and the facts of political power.”144 We can see Schmitt’s work on the 
exception as beginning to ‘de-exceptionalize’ the exception, so to speak. The 
exception is not external to the basic structures of liberal-democratic regimes. 
Against Schmitt, I claim that if a concept is built into the basic functioning of a 
regime then it can hardly be said to be exceptional.  
Rather, it is the name for a gap in those regimes which demonstrates that they 
must be reflexively acted on as a whole by a political agency. Schmitt “is correct to 
assert that a state of exception is a latent possibility accompanying every imaginable 
polity...”145 This is because there will always be moments when legal order must be 
acted on by the agency on which its legitimacy is grounded. As Rasch explains, “The 
exception makes itself known as the failure of subsumption – as the impossibility, 
one might say, of determinate judgment… The exception presents itself as the 
ineluctable necessity of choice precisely at the moment when none of the normal 
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criteria is available to guide selection.”146 What is crucial about the exception is that 
the moment of failure is decided upon by the sovereign agent in a context of 
contingency, indeterminacy and political contestation. The exception demonstrates 
that the relationship between legal order and democratic, sovereign power is 
constitutively problematic and subject to political contestation. Furthermore, we 
should see decisions on the exception as points of periodic re-articulation of the 
relationship between legal order, extra-legal power, and the political. 
It has been suggested that the exception and the political in Schmitt’s work 
are one and the same. Ellen Kennedy writes: “In this primary sense of an existential 
decision about friends and enemies, the political appears instead as the exception.”147 
Kennedy’s reasoning is based on Schmitt’s definition of the political and it’s relation 
to war. Alternatively, Rasch contends that: “As the ability to distinguish between 
friends and enemies, the political asserts itself fully not only as a constituted order, 
but as a constituent power that reveals itself in states of emergency. If the political 
system is normalcy, the political is the exception that establishes the norm.”148 This 
conflation between the two concepts is unwarranted because the political is defined 
by the possibility of killing and war, when those possibilities become immanent then 
the political can appear as the exception. However, Schmitt argues that the political 
involves the possibility of war and killing the enemy, but the political is not entirely 
exhausted by war. The crucial element is the possibility of conflict, not the conflict 
itself. The exception is the most extreme form that conflict in the political may take. 
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Certainly a sovereign agency is sometimes able to make decisions on who is 
friend and who is an enemy and also when to declare an exception and suspend law. 
But to collapse the two into one another could foreclose the possibility of politics 
within the state. Schmitt puts forth a theory of the political that lends itself more to a 
sliding scale between deciding on friend and enemy and declaring an exception. 
Violence is always a possibility and the closer it gets to becoming reality the closer 
the scale moves towards the exception. If the sovereign agency is able to decide that 
situation is dire and any means necessary must be taken then the exception can be 
understood as a form of the political. All exceptions are political, but not every 
political decision necessarily results in an exception.  Finally, the exception is a 
decision, or more precisely a claim, regarding a legal system while the political 
refers to a constitutive dimension of social existence. As Rasch pointed out above the 
political functions to regulate conflict. Such regulation would not be possible if it 
was only expressed in and through the exception. For Schmitt the political and the 
exception are closely related. However, not every instance of political contestation 
and conflict will necessarily lead to a decision on an exception. 
Finally it is necessary to stress that Schmitt’s thought on the exception is not 
greatly influenced by his political theology. He does state that: “All significant 
concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts.”149 
Specifically, he argues that the exception is analogous to the miracle.
150
 However, 
Schmitt does not undertake a detailed defense of his claim that all modern concepts 
of state theory are directly analogous to Christian theological concepts. Nor does he 
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present a detailed comparison between the miracle and the exception. He does argue 
however that: 
“The idea of the modern constitutional state triumphed together with deism, a theology and 
metaphysics that banished the miracle from the world. This theology and metaphysics rejected not 
only the transgression of the laws of nature through an exception brought about by direct intervention, 
as is found in the idea of the miracle, but also the sovereign’s direct intervention in a valid legal 
order.”151 
Schmitt’s notion of the miracle does indeed come from Christian theology and is 
much indebted to chapter 37 of Hobbes’ Leviathan. In that chapter Hobbes defines a 
miracle as an act that “is the effect of the immediate hand of God.”152 God violates 
the normal functioning of natural law. Schmitt’s sovereign, who “stands outside the 
normally valid legal system”, directly intervenes within that system.153 The 
exception on this reading would be an intervention by an outside force on the general 
functioning of a system of laws just as in miracles God intervenes directly with 
earthly affairs thereby violating divinely created natural laws. It is clear that on a 
strict reading Schmitt’s theory of the exception shares many similarities with the 
miracle in Christian theology. On the other hand, as has been demonstrated 
throughout this chapter, in the wider context of Schmitt’s work on liberal-democracy 
the exception, the sovereign and the decision are concepts which describe a 
problematic. They are too contested to simply have been transferred from theology 
to political theory. 
Schmitt uses the miracle as a metaphor to explain his understanding of the 
exception and how it functions. Honig argues that Schmitt uses the theological 
metaphor to “secure political sovereignty” and cut short debate on the status and 
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function of exceptions in political theory.
154
 She derides this move as Schmitt 
attempting to make a “miracle” of the metaphor he’s constructed.155 
Schmitt’s theory of the exception is not definitively trapped by this metaphor, 
or by any other elements of what he refers to as political theology. Rather, Schmitt 
focuses on the necessity of secularization.
156
 Rasch notes that, “…if the concepts of 
the modern theory of the state still carried the traces of their ethereal origin, they 
were nonetheless political concepts, and these traces had been thoroughly 
profaned.”157 The analogy Schmitt draws between the miracle and the exception 
need not bind the problematic of the exception to that narrow understanding of 
miracles. We need not think of the sovereign only as personified as a godlike figure. 
As demonstrated above, the sovereign can be many people acting through a 
representative. Nor do we need to conceptualize the exception and sovereign power 
as breaking through a ‘normally’ operating system of law in the same way that God 
divinely intervenes in natural law.  
Schmitt’s reputation as a Catholic scholar and depth and influence of political 
theology on his work are the subject of much debate. This text follows the 
convincing argument of Balakrishnan that Schmitt’s theological work generally does 
not have a dramatic effect on his legal and political theory. As Balakrishnan argues, 
Schmitt’s overtly theological works are confined to a small period of time in 1922.158 
Furthermore, his theological influences do not appear as a consistent system. Roman 
Catholicism and Political Form, written just after Political Theology, does not take 
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up a defense of Schmitt’s claim that modern state theory concepts are secularized 
theological concepts.
159
 Rather it focuses on the political benefits of the Catholic 
Church as an institution. Political Theology II does not offer much guidance either. It 
is a theological polemic defending the idea of political theology in general, not a 
defense of a particular notion of secularization.
160
 
 The exception, then, in Schmitt’s work points to situations in which an 
agency has been able to have sovereign power attributed to itself so that it can make 
decisions, which function as claims, concerning the articulation between legal order 
and extra-legal power in a wider context of political contestation. The focus should 
be on the moment of decision as well as on how and why a particular agency has 
secured for itself the ability to make such a decision. This is of particular importance 
because at the heart of the problematic of the exception in liberal-democratic regimes 
lies a paradox. Deciding on an exception and unleashing the use of emergency 
powers has profound and paradoxical implications for what Schmitt regards as the 
substantive notion of justice on which liberal-democratic regimes must be based. 
However, he does not believe that liberal-democracy is viable as a form of 
governance precisely because it cannot uphold this notion of justice in the face of the 
exception. This notion of justice is that all political groups have an equal chance of 
attaining state power. However, the effect of emergency powers usually severely 
restricts this equal chance by limiting or eliminating the rights necessary to contest 
for such power. I will refer to this effect as the paradox of contestation.  
The Paradox of Contestation 
Equal Chance 
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It needs to be noted at this point that for Schmitt liberal-democracy is not 
viable as a form of governance because it cannot adequately respond to the 
problematic of the exception. He believes that liberal-democracy cannot cope with 
the problematic of the exception nor the paradox of contestation. Political parties, on 
his account, will not respect the need for liberal-democratic regimes to remain 
neutral to the aims of all political parties and ensure an equal chance of attaining 
state power for all minority groups. On the contrary, the first party to gain power will 
“close the door to legality” thus permanently enshrining itself as the dominant 
party.
161
 However, we can read Schmitt’s paradox of contestation against this claim 
to demonstrate that neither it nor the problematic of the exception lead to an 
inevitable death sentence for liberal-democratic regimes. 
The paradox of contestation is implied in Schmitt’s work though never 
directly stated as such. It is a paradox which liberal-democratic regimes must always 
negotiate but can never resolve. In order to be liberal-democracies they must allow 
any party and ideology the chance of attaining state power. That is the essence of 
liberal-democracy. However, being so open leaves the regime vulnerable to groups 
which seek to gain power legally then change the system permanently (via legal 
means) such that the principle of equal chance is eliminated. Thus liberal-democratic 
regimes must allow all contestation yet limit it so as to preserve the principle of 
equal chance. I call this the paradox of contestation. The paradox demands that some 
limits be imposed on the principle of equal chance but also that those limits will 
always be indeterminate and fiercely contested. 
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The first element of the paradox is the substantive notion of justice which, 
Schmitt argues, is necessary if a liberal-democratic regime is to maintain itself as 
such. This notion of justice required for legality in liberal-democratic states is an 
equal chance for all groups to achieve a majority and thus gain state power. He 
writes:  
“…a substantive principle of justice will nevertheless always still have to be presupposed, if 
one wishes to keep the entire system of legality from collapsing immediately: the principle that there 
is an unconditional equal chance for all conceivable opinions, tendencies, and movements to achieve a 
majority.”162  
The ‘unconditional’ nature of equal chance is problematic. Certainly an equal chance 
of attaining state power is a necessary condition for liberal-democratic regimes. It is 
also a defining characteristic of liberal-democracy. But it cannot be unconditionally 
so. Certain groups will need to be excluded because they refuse to struggle for power 
legally or because they wish to fundamentally alter the regime, thereby erasing the 
principle of equal chance. 
Schmitt does not include minority rights within the purview of equal chance 
but they are absolutely necessary if the principle is to have any concrete meaning. 
This principle depends upon the protection of minority and individual rights to 
participate in politics. Without rights to free speech and association, at least, it would 
be impossible to engage in political struggle. Thus, minority rights to political 
participation are an essential component of the principle of equal chance. Liberal-
democratic regimes vary on the extent to which they guarantee the rights of all 
‘opinions, tendencies and movements’ to fight for political dominance. But, for the 
most part, the vast majority of political groups are allowed to participate. 
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The principle of equal chance and the rights that guarantee it generate within 
liberal-democratic regimes legal neutrality towards all political parties and their 
programs. Schmitt argues that “the parliamentary legislative state’s concept of law 
inherently has a wide-ranging neutrality regarding the most varied content.”163 This 
neutrality, however, is not all encompassing. As Schmitt rightly points out a state 
“may not be neutral towards itself and its own presuppositions.”164 Liberal-
democratic regimes must defend this substantive notion of justice and fairness which 
underpins both legality as well as political contestation. This necesitates that liberal-
democratic regimes must exclude certain groups. “All parties that are not partners of 
the pluralist system will be denied an equal chance,” writes Schmitt.165 As well they 
should be. The question is then who makes the decision to exclude certain political 
groups? What criteria should be used? And what becomes of the rights of citizens 
and groups to participate in politics and advocate for their preferred regime type? 
This is the crux of the paradox; how can a regime be neutral towards all 
parties while not neutral towards itself as a regime? Schmitt does not think that 
liberal-democratic states can survive such a situation. He argues that the principle of 
equal chance and subsequent state neutrality is necessary yet impossible.  
“Preserving the availability of the principle of equal chance cannot be read out of the 
parliamentary legislative state. It remains the principle of justice and the existentially necessary 
maxim of self-preservation… But, with this system, the principle would also already come to an end 
after the first majority is achieved, because that majority would immediately establish itself as the 
permanent legal power.”166  
Schmitt simply assumes that political parties have no interest in preserving equal 
chance and would thus dispense with it as soon as they came to power. Furthermore, 
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deciding political struggle with a simple majority vote cannot protect equal chance. 
However, Schmitt is wrong to assert that the system collapses after the first majority 
is achieved.  
He does argue that there is one possibility which could preserve equal chance 
and neutrality.  If “an essential similarity among the entire people can be assumed” 
then a liberal-democratic state could survive.
167
 If this cannot be assumed then, 
Schmitt argues, liberal-democracy cannot function and it becomes oppressive to 
minority groups which are not able to gain state power. In such a situation “The 
majority commands, and the minority must obey.”168 Schmitt is overstating his case 
here. As demonstrated above, such homogeneity cannot be assumed. Nor can it be 
produced because of the divisions created by the political. In some cases the minority 
must obey, for instance when a law is passed allowing black citizens to vote in a 
segregated society, those who wanted to keep them from the franchise must obey the 
law and register black voters. Liberal-democratic legal order does not lose its 
substantive principle of justice because society is constitutively split; rather, legal 
order becomes a terrain on which substantive principles are contested. As long as the 
minority has some method of fighting back legally then the parliamentary legislative 
state and democracy remain functioning.  
Because of the necessity of preserving the principle of equal chance and the 
assumed disregard political parties have for it, the liberal state, on Schmitt’s 
account, “lays itself open to the legal takeover of the state by forces expressly 
committed to destroying the existing legal order.”169 Certainly this is a possibility 
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but this situation is by no means inevitable. Nor does it render liberal-democracy 
unfeasible as a form of governance. Yes, the state must legally exclude groups from 
legitimate contestation which it feels are a threat to the regime as such. As Schmitt 
notes: “…it is self-evident that one can hold open an equal chance only for those 
whom one is certain would do the same. Any other use of such a principle would not 
only be suicide in practical terms, but also an offense against the principle itself.”170 
Legal neutrality is more an ideal than a substantive requirement of liberal legal 
orders. Total neutrality would leave liberal-democratic regimes open to the type of 
hostile takeover Schmitt is concerned about. Exclusions must be made to protect 
regimes. In this case the question of who is able to decide and enforce the limits of 
political contestation is of central importance.  
Schmitt argues that it will be whichever party happens to hold state power. 
For him, “the party in legal possession of power, by virtue of its hold on the means 
of state power, must determine and judge every concrete and politically important 
application and use of the concept of legality and legitimacy. That is its inalienable 
right.”171 Again Schmitt is overstating his case. Legal possession of state power in no 
way confers an ‘inalienable right’ to decide questions of the legality and legitimacy 
of political contestation by minority groups. Such decisions will be made by a 
sovereign agency, which as demonstrated above, is subject to political contestation. 
Possession of state power is not total and all encompassing. However, if one party is 
dominant within a state they will have an advantage in struggles over the limits of 
legitimate political contestation. This advantage Schmitt calls the ‘supra-legal 
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premium’ on the possession of state power, and it is the second element in the 
paradox of contestation. 
Supra-Legal Premium on Legality and the Limits of Contestation 
Schmitt argues that what he calls the ‘supra-legal premium’ on state power is 
what grants the ‘inalienable right’ to decide questions concerning the legality and 
legitimacy of political contestation. He argues that “…the mere possession of state 
power produces an additional political surplus apart from the power that is merely 
normative and legal, a supralegal premium on the lawful possession of legal 
power… that lies beyond any normative consideration.”172 I agree that, to an extent, 
this is an effect of gaining a majority in a liberal-democratic regime. However, 
Schmitt overstates the effect of the supra-legal premium. Even with large majorities 
dominant parties do not wield a power which is ‘beyond any normative 
consideration’. It is based on extra-legal power but that power enables a party to act 
on the legal order, to make reflexive judgments on it as a whole. Political power is 
never wholly removed from normative considerations. 
This supralegal premium has three aspects: Firstly, “It emerges, first, from the 
concrete interpretation and use of undetermined and evaluative concepts, such as 
‘public security and order,’ ‘danger,’ ‘emergency,’ ‘necessary measures,’ hostility to 
the state and constitution,’ ‘peaceful disposition,’ ‘life and death issues,’ etc. 
[Concepts such as these] receive their specific content initially through concrete 
application [which is] decisive in all difficult and politically important times.”173 
Notice that Schmitt refers to these as evaluative concepts which only live through 
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their concrete application, that is only when a sovereign agency has been able to 
‘decide’ that it is necessary or appropriate to use them and determine their meaning 
in a specific situation. Secondly, “the legal holder of state power has the presumption 
of legality on his side in hard cases, which, of course, with such indeterminate 
concepts one always encounters in difficult political circumstances.”174 This means 
that, for Schmitt, the executive will not immediately be questioned by opposition 
groups in the moment the decision is made and the initial emergency measures 
undertaken. However, these concepts are hard to determine in situations defined as 
crises. And because they are made by a sovereign agency which is always contested, 
declarations of an exception are always going to be politically determined and 
subject to multiple interpretations. This indeterminacy is compounded by the third 
element of the supra-legal premium. This element consists in the fact that the 
executive is usually able to act faster than the legislature or the judiciary in a 
situation defined as a crisis. The executive can act and put forth a justification for 
those actions based on these concepts before any other branch of government or any 
political group has a chance to question the actions or the use of any evaluative 
concepts. Even if there is opposition to how a sovereign agency is able to define an 
exception and the way it acts to resolve that situation in all likelihood the opposition 
will come too late. The executive will act and the damage will have already been 
done.  
Schmitt argues that the supra-legal premium grants the ruling party the ability to 
make and enforce any statutes they please such that they gain power over legality 
and legitimacy itself.
175
 Furthermore, Schmitt believes that the ruling party and the 
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state become synonymous with one another. For him the supra-legal premium is “a 
political power that extends far beyond that over the mere validity of norms… The 
majority is now suddenly no longer a party; it is the state itself.”176 As such the 
ruling party, as soon as it is elected, would be able to “close the door to legality, 
through which they themselves entered, and to treat partisan opponents like common 
criminals, who are then perhaps reduced to kicking their boots against the locked 
door.”177 Not only can it enshrine its place as the only legal ruling party, the ruling 
party can use the supra-legal premium to determine the limits of legal and legitimate 
contestation, if it decides to allow any at all.  “On its own initiative, the ruling party 
determines what possibilities for action it permits domestic opponents. In this way, 
the ruling part decides when the illegality of competitors commences. Obviously, 
that is no longer equal competition and no longer an equal chance.”178 The effect of 
such decision is to exclude opposition groups from the demos itself.
179
 Obviously 
this cannot be accomplished as easily as he claims.  
Schmitt is clearly overestimating the power conferred upon majority parties by 
the supra-legal premium in liberal-democratic states. A ruling party does not become 
the state when it attains a majority. Nor do they become the sole arbiter of legality 
and legitimacy. The ruling party cannot simply decide; all decisions will be 
contested. Yet, the majority does have some extra political influence, especially over 
issues of the validity of statutes as well as how statutes are to be applied and 
enforced. This is definitely the case when the issue is the legality, legitimacy, and 
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limit of political contestation of domestic opposition groups. But they do not become 
the state itself.  
Fundamental civil and political rights for minority groups ensure that the ruling 
party cannot simply trample on their opponents because they disagree with them and 
have gained a majority in government. These rights and laws also guarantee that a 
ruling party cannot arbitrarily close the door to legality thereby rendering its 
opponents illegal. The rule of law is stronger than the whims of the majority. 
Opposition parties will continue to exist thanks to the fundamental rights which 
ensure an equal chance of political participation. Even in a declared exception in 
which rights have been suspended the principle of equal chance will not necessarily 
be destroyed because the suspension of rights will be contested. Additionally, 
Schmitt’s own work on sovereignty and the moment of decision demonstrate that 
decisions on the limits of legality and legitimacy will always be problematic and 
contested. As argued earlier sovereign power is not a characteristic of an individual 
or a group, it is thoroughly indeterminate until it has been able to act. Because any 
liberal-democratic society is constitutively split sovereign agency is forever 
contingent and contestable. 
We can read Schmitt’s work against itself to show that it points to a fundamental 
paradox and a politics of legality at the limits of equal chance and political 
contestation. He rightly points out that liberal-democratic regimes must allow an 
equal chance for attaining state power for all groups. He also convincingly argues 
that a ruling majority group will always try to use the supra-legal premium to 
entrench its power and status, though he overstates the advantages this supra-legal 
premium gives to the ruling party. Finally, he demonstrates that the state will need to 
protect itself as an order which ensures equal chance for all groups to attain power. 
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This will require that some parties be excluded from political participation. The state 
cannot allow violent revolutionary groups which seek to over throw the liberal-
democratic core of the state the possibility of attaining state power. When making 
decisions as to which groups are not allowed to participate the ruling party will have 
the advantages of the supra-legal premium on legality. However, such advantages 
will be checked, to an extent, by the requirement of equal chance as well as political 
rights to which all citizens are entitled. The paradox of contestation can never be 
finally resolved but only negotiated again and again. In situations which are declared 
to be exceptional the paradox becomes all the more prescient and problematic. 
Particularly so because it is in these times that Schmitt argues the equal chance is 
most under threat and the supra-legal premium can be used to its fullest effect. 
Problematic and Paradox in the State of Exception and the Right to Resistance 
The paradox of contestation is a fundamental problem which exists in the 
basic structures of liberal-democratic governance. The principle of equal chance 
itself provides no guidance for resolving the issues and crises it is implicated in. As 
Schmitt points out: “The problem stemming from the principle of equal chance 
would not be solved through the principle itself. It would, rather, only be 
acknowledged that the principle merely leads to irresolvable questions and critical 
situations.”180 This is important because Schmitt is suggesting that ‘critical 
situations’ are caused by fundamental structures of liberal-democracy itself. Or, 
rather, that the basic structures of liberal-democratic regimes do not provide answers 
in critical situations. Far from providing answers, they actually complicate matters 
by engendering a politics of legality and legitimacy at the limits of contestation with 
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no third party to adjudicate the conflict. It is in these situations, declared to be 
exceptional by a sovereign agent, that the principle of equal chance is most 
vulnerable. 
It is also in these situations that the supra-legal premium on political power 
reaches its maximum effect. “This political premium is relatively calculable in 
peaceful and normal times; in abnormal times, it is entirely incalculable and 
unpredictable.”181 Moreover, because Schmitt does not believe that liberal-
democracy is a viable form of governance he argues that the supra-legal premium 
will easily overcome the principle of equal chance. This will occur during exceptions 
on Schmitt’s account, “Its entire, primary effect eliminates any thought of the equal 
chance and becomes manifest in the proper use of the extraordinary powers in the 
state of exception.”182 I concur that, in situations which are defined as exceptional by 
a sovereign agency, the supralegal premium is most pronounced and the principle of 
equal chance most threatened. However, it must be remembered that, as Schmitt’s 
thought suggests, the state of exception is the result of a contested political decision.   
Schmitt presents us with a tension which will be continually negotiated and 
renegotiated via highly contested political struggles over the right to act as a 
sovereign agency and render reflexive judgment on the boundaries of legal order as a 
whole. It is the principle of equal chance, along with the rights which guarantee it, on 
which liberal-democracy rests. Schmitt writes: 
“Everything thus hinges on the principle of an equal chance to win domestic political power. 
If principle is no longer defended, then one gives up on the parliamentary legislative state itself, its 
justice and legality… Every critical moment endangers the principle of the equal chance because it 
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reveals the inevitable option between the premium on the legal possession of power and the 
preservation of the availability of the equal chance for achievement of domestic political power.”183  
This passage need not be read to imply a strict opposition between the principle of 
equal chance and the supra-legal premium on political power.  Schmitt’s work 
suggests a politics of sovereign decision-making at the limits of legality and 
contestation. When a ruling party excludes an opposition group during a declared 
emergency, equal chance is not necessarily fully destroyed. Rather, equal chance is 
an ideal, a goal which cannot be perfectly or strictly adhered to. What Schmitt’s 
work demonstrates is that when a ruling party is able to declare an exception they 
will use the supra-legal premium against opposition groups, attempting to deny them 
the possibility of equal chance and the political rights which guarantee it. If 
successful, this has the effect of excluding the opposition group from the demos. 
Liberal-democratic regimes need to avoid this scenario as much as possible. 
But because equal chance and the system of legality based on it contain no inner 
defensive mechanisms, liberal-democratic legal orders are not able to fully defend 
themselves. On Schmitt’s account, “legality, or the rule of law… can neither 
legitimize nor effectively defend itself against determined enemies in times of 
crisis.”184 Schmitt’s argument needs to be tempered here. It is not that a legal order 
cannot defend itself during a declared crisis. Rather, such a defense cannot be based 
solely on the legal orders’ own structures. It will require the use of contested extra-
legal, sovereign power. 
Legality and the rule of law need to be defended. Liberal-democratic regimes 
cannot be neutral towards themselves. In order to provide a defense the rule of law 
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will have to give way to the sovereign agency, however contested it may be, which 
underpins it. As Rasch points out: “The rule of law inevitably reveals itself, 
precisely during moments of crisis, as the force of law, perhaps not every bit as 
violent and ‘irrational’ as the arbitrary tyrant, but nonetheless compelling and 
irresistible – indeed, necessarily so!”185 This type of scenario is the clearest 
expression of sovereign decision-making. But as this chapter has argued, sovereign 
decisions are never made without political contestation and are always only 
contingently resolved. 
When the principle of equal chance has been suspended or permanently 
removed for an opposition group that is not necessarily the end of the conflict. 
Schmitt demonstrates that far from being straight forward actions, decisions over the 
limits of contestation will be bitterly fought over. The legitimacy of sovereign 
actions will be highly indeterminate because of the political and the contestation it 
engenders. Both the ruling party as well as opposition group(s) will struggle to act as 
the sovereign agency.  
“However, it is just as much an inalienable right of the minority seeking to gain possession 
of the state means of power, on the basis of its claim to an equal chance with full legal equality, to 
render judgment itself over not merely its own concrete legality or illegality, but also over that of the 
opposing party in control of the means of state power… in a case of conflict, who removes doubts 
and resolves differences of opinion?”186  
Any resolution of ‘differences of opinion’ will be the result of extra-legal power. It 
will be the result of a struggle between a ruling party and an opposition group 
exercising a right to resistance.  
Schmitt argues that in ‘critical situations’ when a ruling party is able to wield 
the supra-legal premium to maximum effect threatening both the principle of equal 
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chance and the existence of opposition groups, legality recedes into the background 
leaving exposed pure political struggle. He argues that “When things really have 
done that far, it ultimately comes down to who holds the reins of power at the 
moment when the entire system of legality is thrown aside and when power is 
constituted on a new basis.”187 Here Schmitt can be read to suggest that using the 
supralegal premium to re-articulate the limits of contestation is a partisan tactic 
directed at maintaining the power of the ruling party not the safety and order of the 
state as such. The ruling party acts in the name of defending the state as well as itself 
as a political group. On the other hand, because the existence of opposition groups is 
threatened they must exercise their right of resistance.
188
   
However, in situations deemed ‘normal’ liberal-legality attempts to eliminate 
the right to resistance. On the other hand though, “the ancient problem of ‘resistance 
against the tyrant’ remains, that is resistance against injustice and misuse of state 
power...”189 And because legality has receded behind the political, minority groups 
have no other choice but to make use of that right. In such a situation legality will 
recede and political contestation will reach a ‘critical juncture’ in which “each 
denounces the other, with both playing the guardian of legality and the guardian of 
the constitution. The result is a condition without legality or a constitution.”190 
According to Schmitt the result of such a situation would be the transformation of 
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legality into a tactic of political power.
191
 On his account, such a situation would be 
terminal for a liberal-democratic regime. 
As mentioned above Schmitt believes that this type of situation will render 
liberal-democracy unviable as a form of governance. It simply will not be able to 
cope with conflict which exceeds the boundaries of legality, he argues. This is 
another element of his argument that Schmitt has overstated. Certainly the 
restrictions which legality places on political struggle are lessened in such situations. 
But legality and legal order are not necessarily destroyed. ‘Critical junctures’ or 
states of exception are not the final nail in the coffin for liberal- democracy as a 
regime and form of governance. These situations should be read as moments of 
intense contestation over their contingently articulated fundamental structures as 
well as the substantive notion of justice on which such regime rely. My reading of 
Schmitt’ problematic of the exception and paradox of contestation demonstrate that 
the limits of legality and political contestation are always partisan tactics. They have 
the goal not of preserving ‘normal situations’ but specific articulations of political 
power. States of emergency and exception are tactics of political struggle. 
Here it is necessary to pause and sum up the argument thus far. Schmitt’s 
statement that ‘Sovereign is he who decides on the exception’ should be read in the 
wider context of his work. When this is done we see that, far from making concise 
statements about sovereign power and exceptional situations, Schmitt in fact opens 
up emergency politics as a fundamental problematic of liberal-democratic 
governance. Liberal-democratic regimes rely on extra-legal, sovereign power. It is 
this power, ‘We, the people’, that secures democratic legitimacy. Additionally, this 
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power will need to act on and make reflexive judgments on the legal order as a 
whole when that order and the substantive principles it is founded on are, from time 
to time, perceived to be threatened. However, sovereign power is not unified in a 
single individual, group or office. Some individuals, groups and offices may be able 
to act as a sovereign agency but they are labeled as such only after the fact. 
Furthermore, any attempt to wield sovereign power will be highly contested. 
Because society is constitutively split, any act of sovereign power will only represent 
a portion of society. This notion of sovereignty means that any moment of decision 
will also be contested. Decisions concerning a legal order are never simply made, 
nor do they have a priori legitimacy. Decisions are claims that are taken up and 
implemented by the state bureaucracy as well as the wider citizenry. Finally, the 
exception is highly problematic because what triggers a decision on an exception is 
never an objective situation. It is a subjective judgment that an individual or group is 
able to get recognized and acted up on as an exception.  
Deciding on an exception, and the problematic of the exception generally, 
has profound implications for what Schmitt argues is the substantive notion of justice 
on which liberal-democracy must be based. That is the principle that all citizens and 
groups have an equal chance of attaining state power, no matter the content of their 
political program. They have a right to political participation. This leaves liberal-
democratic regimes vulnerable to being taken over by groups which come to power 
legally, then alter the system to their advantage, destroying the possibility of equal 
chance. Schmitt believes that liberal-democracy is unable to defend itself from this 
possibility. The defense of equal chance is paradoxical because it requires 
eliminating equal chance for those groups who seek to destroy it. This paradox is 
compounded by the supra-legal premium on legality which gives the ruling party an 
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advantage when deciding questions of legality and legitimacy, particularly in cases 
of contestation by domestic opposition groups who enjoy rights to political 
participation. In some cases legality may give way to extra-legal power to such an 
extent that no one group can be said to being acting ‘legitimately’. If that occurs, 
minority groups must utilize a right to resistance or face political exclusion. Schmitt 
is wrong to argue that liberal-democratic regimes will necessarily collapse because 
of the problematic of the exception and the paradox of contestation. Rather, liberal-
democratic regimes are forever engaged in contestation over who is protected by 
equal chance and minority rights as well as how struggles over the substantive notion 
of justice are fought.  
Schmitt’s solution for the problematic and the paradox is both conceptually and 
empirically impossible as well as highly undesirable. Instead of attempting to defend 
liberal-democracy Schmitt argues for a non-liberal, authoritarian democracy. He 
wishes to avoid one partisan group gaining control of state power then closing the 
door to legality behind itself. Were that to occur “the name of the state serves only 
political suppression and deprivation of rights.”192 Certainly this is a concern which 
must be addressed. But Schmitt’s solution is unacceptable. “Schmitt argues for a 
domestic, democratic despotism based on the indivisibility of sovereignty in order to 
construct an international republican order...”193 This ‘indivisible sovereign’ will 
supersede the political and the possibility of partisan groups attaining state power all 
together. He believes that only a political unity, which can create and enforce 
homogeneity, can prevent a state from inevitably degenerating into civil war.
194
 
Schmitt attempts to displace the political to the international realm, thereby creating 
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a unified, homogenous demos in the domestic sphere. Obviously, this argument 
cannot be supported or sustained. As demonstrated above it is conceptually 
impossible to expel ‘the political’ to the international realm. Political antagonisms 
are a constitutive element in every society. The possibility of antagonism at the level 
of the domestic must be retained. Additionally, sovereignty cannot be understood as 
indivisible, Schmitt’s own work can be read to show that sovereignty is 
indeterminate and contested. It is not a characteristic which can be ascribed 
permanently to one group or even an individual. Finally, the creation of a 
homogenous demos leads to the most monstrous consequences. Genocide and ethnic 
cleansing are often the result of attempts to purify or homogenize a society. 
Obviously, these possibilities need to be avoided. 
Conclusion 
The problematic of the exception and the paradox of contestation are 
fundamental to the structure of liberal-democratic regimes. They concern the 
substantive notion of justice on which liberal-democratic regimes rely as well as 
questions as to who is entitled to the protections of justice and who is excluded from 
the demos. We cannot ignore them, nor can they ever be finally solved. That would 
be an unacceptable act of power and would certainly be considered an ‘ethically 
repugnant’ consensus for some individuals and groups. Schmitt’s resolution of the 
paradox and problematic - democratic despotism and enforced homogeneity - cannot 
be the answer. What is needed is to find ways to negotiate the problematic and the 
paradox in a way that preserves, yet regulates, antagonism and conflict in domestic 
politics. Equal chance to attain state power and minority rights must be preserved to 
the fullest extent possible while also recognizing that some groups are determined to 
undermine them. Those groups need to be prevented from doing so, even if they are 
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composed of citizens with constitutionally protected rights to political participation. 
Finally, it is necessary to both retain as well as restrain extra-legal, sovereign power. 
Without extra-legal power democratic legitimacy is not possible. The problematic of 
the exception and the paradox of contestation open the possibility that legality and 
legitimacy may become mere tactics of power utilized by partisan political groups 
for short-term gain. Schmitt rightly argued that social division leads to conflict over 
legality and legitimacy. What is crucial is to negotiate that division, as well as the 
problematic and the paradox, in ways that do not threaten or close down democratic 
politics, even in situations declared to be an ‘emergency’ or an ‘exception’. 
The following three chapters turn to various attempts to resolve the 
problematic and the paradox. These attempts are found in the work of Giorgio 
Agamben, David Dyzenhaus & Oren Gross, and Nomi Lazar & Bonnie Honig. Each 
scholar seeks to find ways to limit the impact and possible negative consequences of 
sovereign declarations of an emergency or exception. Agamben looks for a solution 
in an ontology of the relationship between law and political power. Dyzenhaus and 
Gross attempt to build similar, yet divergent, understandings of law which can 
subsume extra-legal sovereign power and the exception. Finally, Lazar and Honig 
attempt to break down the norm/exception binary such that its negative effects are 
mitigated. Each attempt will be shown to be ultimately unsatisfactory.  For various 
reasons which will be discussed in detail they do not resolve the problematic of the 
exception or the paradox of contestation in ways that encourage democratic 
contestation in situations defined as exceptional. 
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Chapter 3 - Without Significance: Giorgio Agamben’s State of Exception 
Agamben in Schmitt’s Wake 
Agamben’s work on states of exception is a response to his particular reading 
of Carl Schmitt’s work on the exception. Agamben agrees with Schmitt that there 
exists an “essential contiguity between the state of exception and sovereignty.”195 
Furthermore, he contends that this contiguity ensures that emergency politics are a 
fundamental problematic of politics for contemporary forms of governance. On this 
basic point Agamben’s reading of Schmitt is compatible with my reading outlined in 
chapter two. 
Agamben further agrees with Schmitt that state of exception is the result of a 
subjective decision. Arguing against the notion of necessity he claims that “the only 
circumstances that are necessary and objective are those that are declared to be 
so.”196 It will be shown below that Schmitt and Agamben differ greatly on the nature 
of subjective decisions on the exception. Agamben’s understanding is not useful 
because it does not include any conceptualization of contestation over sovereign 
decision-making processes. Furthermore, his understanding of sovereign power is 
flawed in that it cannot account for sovereignty as a contested agency. 
Agamben, in further agreement with Schmitt, argues that extra-legal power is 
an inextricable element of modern governance.
197
 However, Agamben reads Schmitt 
in such a way that this element of concurrence between the two theories is obscured. 
His reading of Schmitt is too formal.
198
 He makes no attempt to read Schmitt against 
himself in order to further understand the problematics of emergency politics. On the 
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contrary, Agamben argues that Schmitt’s work on the exception is “fallacious” 
because it “seek[s] to inscribe the state of exception indirectly within a juridical 
context by grounding it in the division between norms of law and norms of 
realization of law, between constituent and constituted power, between norm and 
decision.”199 For Agamben, the state of exception is a space which cannot in any way 
be reconciled with legal order. But, as chapter two demonstrated, Schmitt’s theory of 
the exception acknowledges and relies on a notion of extra-legal power that exists 
outside of legal order and functions as a source of contested legitimacy for legal 
order in liberal-democratic regimes. 
 On the issue of extra-legal power Agamben comes close to identifying extra-
legal power with Schmitt’s concept of the political.200 He argues that in a state of 
exception the “suspension of law freed a force or a mystical element, a sort of legal 
mana… that both the ruling power and its adversaries, the constituted power as well 
as the constituent power, seek to appropriate… [i]ndeed it is possible that what is at 
issue… is nothing less than what Schmitt calls ‘the political’.”201 I argue throughout 
this thesis that this is precisely the case. Extra-legal power is exerted by groups 
struggling for power and control in a context of political antagonism and 
contestation. Conceptualizing extra-legal power as ‘mystical’ legal ‘mana’ only 
serves to complicate the problematic of the exception and remove the element of 
political contestation. However, Agamben does not pursue this line of inquiry. 
As a response to Schmitt, Agamben builds an alternate theory of ‘states of 
exception’ based on his reading of Western political thought on sovereignty. He 
                                                          
199
 Agamben, State of Exception, p. 50-51 
200
 Agamben, State of Exception, p. 51 
201
 Agamben, State of Exception, p. 51 
91 
 
attempts to expand the notion of the exception arguing that it is not just a 
problematic for liberal democracy but for the entire intellectual history and tradition 
of Western politics. Agamben’s work on the ‘state of exception’ is ‘without 
significance’ because his re-conceptualization of the norm/exception binary 
obliterates the norm in favor of the exception. For him, the exception has become the 
rule and “has today reached its maximum worldwide deployment.”202 His work 
reifies the exception as the both “the constitutive paradigm of the juridical order” as 
well as the paradigm of modern governance.
203
 The ‘state of exception’ then is both 
an ancient, ontological structure of politics as well as a thoroughly modern tactic of 
governance. Despite its widespread acceptance among many academics Agamben’s 
two main claims regarding the state of exception are highly problematic. This 
chapter will demonstrate that neither of his arguments can be sustained. His 
reconceptualization of the ‘state of exception’ is counter-productive because it erases 
the political as well as any practical or conceptual possibilities for challenging the 
increasing use of emergency measures by contemporary governments. We will begin 
with a critique of Agamben’s claim that the state of exception is the ‘constitutive 
paradigm of juridical order’. 
The Ontological and Paradigmatic Exception 
Exegesis 
 We begin with a brief exegesis of Agamben’s account of the state of 
exception. According to him, the state of exception is defined by two main 
characteristics. On the one hand, it is a “zone of anomie…” between law and life.204 
                                                          
202
 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 9 and State of Exception, p. 87 
203
 Agamben, State of Exception, p. 6-7 
204
 Agamben, State of Exception, p. 23 
92 
 
On the other, it is a relation of sovereign abandonment.
205
 The function of the state 
of exception, on his account, is to secure a relation and a boundary between legal 
order and reality.
206
 This is accomplished by sovereign power presupposing a 
“nexus” between them in a space in which law and life are indistinguishable.  
Firstly, for Agamben the state of exception is a ‘zone’ in which the boundary 
between legal and reality secured, though in the exceptional space itself they blur 
into one another. Thus, “The state of exception… defines law’s threshold or limit 
concept,”207 “a threshold of undecidability”208 between law and life; “a zone in 
which application is suspended, but the law [la legge] as such, remains in force…”209 
In this ontological formulation the state of exception should not be understood as a 
physical or topographical space. Rather, states of exception are a topological 
phenomenon which blur the boundaries between fact and law.
210
  
Sovereign power must produce states of exception in order to secure the 
relation between legal order and reality. This is because “The state of exception is… 
the principle of every juridical localization, since only the state of exception opens 
the space in which the determination of a certain juridical order and a particular 
territory first becomes possible.”211  Juridical order must differentiate itself from 
what Agamben calls ‘bare life’ in order to secure its own existence. There is a certain 
amount of ambivalence within Agamben’s texts as to the sequencing of the creation 
of sovereign power, the opening of states of exception and the production of bare 
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life. Sovereignty is only evident after it has opened a state of exception. For 
Agamben that ambivalence is precisely the point. States of exception are zones of 
anomic undecidability where it is difficult if not impossible to determine what law is 
and what life is, what is inside and what is outside.  
Because the state of exception is characterized by anomie and undecidability 
it cannot be understood as analogous to dictatorship. It does not constitute a 
“pleromatic state”, a fullness of powers that supposedly existed before their 
separation into executive, legislative and judicial spheres.
212
 On the contrary, 
Agamben characterizes the state of exception as “a kenomatic state, an emptiness of 
law.”213 While a ‘fullness of powers’ or a dictatorship is one possible effect of the 
opening of a state of exception it “does not coincide with it.”214 A state of exception 
is a space in which law and life blur into pure anomie. The analogy Agamben utilizes 
to describe the state of exception is the village below the castle in Kafka’s novel, The 
Castle.
215
 In the novel the protagonist ‘K.’ is forced to negotiate a labyrinthine 
network of villagers and castle officials in an attempt to begin his tasks as a land 
surveyor.
216
 K. seemingly exists at the whim of castle officials, subject to laws and 
regulations he has no knowledge of but which encompass and reference all of his 
actions, whether they are interacting with the castle messenger assigned to him or 
becoming engaged to a local barmaid. 
On its second main characteristic, the state of exception is a relation between 
sovereign power and that which it excludes from its legal order. How then does 
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Agamben characterize this relation? “The relation of the exception is a relation of 
ban.”217 More precisely, it is abandonment of lives by the sovereign.218 Agamben 
claims that what is banned is “taken outside, and not simply excluded.”219  What is 
taken outside is life itself. Life still retains a relation to sovereign power but this 
relation consists solely in the fact of being abandoned. The exclusion of bare life is 
‘inclusive’ in that it is included via its very exclusion, claims Agamben. 
This abandonment by sovereign power and exclusion from legal order 
reduces life to the pure fact of living, what the Greeks called zoē, according to 
Agamben. The relation of the exception is an “inclusive exclusion of zoē in the 
polis.”220 This ‘bare life’ is life which is stripped of all forms of identity and 
communal belonging. Such life exists at the whim of sovereign power against which 
it has no defense. It is excluded from both divine and human law.
221
 Bare life can be 
killed by sovereign power and yet not sacrificed.
222
 Agamben’s two most prominent 
examples of bare life are the “loup garou, the werewolf” and the “muselmann”, men 
in Nazi concentration camps who appeared to have lost all recognizable traces of 
their humanity.
223
 Both are forms of ‘life’ which exist at the boundaries of humanity 
and are subject to death at any moment. 
Bare life, according to Agamben, demonstrates that politics is always 
biopolitics. Sovereign power produces the biopolitical body.
224
 Biopolitics, the 
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politicization of life itself, then is “at least as old as the sovereign exception.”225 
Because of this, Agamben claims that the very possibility of distinguishing law from 
life “coincides… in the biopolitical machine.”226 This inclusive exclusion of bare life 
is the key moment and founding structure of all western politics for Agamben. He 
argues that the originary structure of politics is a sovereign ban, in the state of 
exception, through which life is included in law through its very abandonment by 
that law. Sovereign power produces a juridical localization via an exception in the 
same moment that it ‘inclusively’ excludes bare life.  
Thus, for Agamben, the sovereign exception is the originary structure of 
Western politics and juridical order.  Because he argues that “the production of bare 
life is the originary activity of sovereignty,” all politics must be biopolitics for 
Agamben.
227
 States of exception serve as spaces in which sovereign power can 
produce a “biopolitical body.”228 The state of exception is “the original structure in 
which law encompasses living beings by means of its own suspension.”229 
Furthermore, Agamben argues that this relation of ban is more originary than 
Schmitt’s friend/enemy distinction.230 By making such a claim he removes any 
element of collective identification and action from the realm of the political. The 
political consists of sovereign power abandoning life to a ‘bare’ existence outside of 
any communal belonging. This abandoning takes places in states of exception where 
law and life blur with one another and in which bare life is subject to execution at 
any moment. Having outlined the main components of Agamben’s theory of the state 
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of exception it can now be demonstrated how his theory cannot withstand critical 
scrutiny.   
Flawed Methodology 
For Schmitt the exception is primarily a problem for liberal legality and 
liberal-democratic regimes. Agamben expands the problematic of the exception; he 
turns it into an ontological “structure [which] appears… to be consubstantial with 
Western politics.”231 On his account, it is “the constitutive paradigm of the juridical 
order” arguing that “the relation of ban has constituted the essential structure of 
sovereign power from the beginning.”232 Not only is the production of exceptions of 
central significance, according to Agamben the structure and function of the 
exception has remained unchanged at least as far back as ancient Roman law. Since 
then this structure has been functioning as a hidden, unchanging nucleus of Western 
politics.  All politics then, is reducible to the production of the exception. Thus, the 
sovereign production of bare life in the state exception is the fundamental activity of 
Western politics. These claims highlight suspect elements of Agamben’s 
methodology.  
 It is unclear how the insights concerning Roman law which Agamben 
develops impact and exert influence over structures of contemporary emergency 
politics in liberal-democratic regimes. For example, he is unable to draw a definitive 
link between the Roman institution iustitium and liberal-democratic provisions such 
as Article 48 of the Weimar republic. As Laclau notes, Agamben “jumps too quickly 
from having established the genealogy of a term… to its actual working in a 
                                                          
231
 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 7 
232
 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 111 
97 
 
contemporary context…”233 The effect of such a move is that Agamben implies that 
somehow the original definition and use of a concept have some “determining 
priority” over its contemporary use.234 Surely this cannot be the case. Political 
concepts, as Schmitt pointed out, are vague and ‘evaluative’ in nature. As such their 
definition, function, and use change over time. As I demonstrated in chapter one with 
the Roman dictatorship, ancient institutions and legal provisions cannot simply be 
transplanted from ancient to modern contexts. Though the genealogy of a concept is 
important it cannot have critical priority over a structural diagnostic of its 
contemporary manifestations. 
 By giving genealogy such priority in his analysis, Agamben demonstrates 
that his method adheres to a strict formalism. His method attempts to delineate a 
tightly controlled ‘logic’ of sovereignty and emergency politics. This ‘logic’, 
however, cannot account for the ambiguities and complexities of sovereign power 
which were discussed in chapter two. Connolly points out that Agamben 
encapsulates sovereign politics within “ironclad paradoxes”.235 Paradoxes are a 
feature of emergency politics but they need not be conceptualized as binary 
structures which allow no scope for negotiating them through political contestation. 
Agamben is “captivated, captured by this model” in much the same way as he 
captured sovereignty within a rigidly defined logic and paradox.
236
 Paradoxes are 
never ironclad and thus do not remain unchanged throughout time. It is only 
Agamben’s flawed methodology that allows him to arrive at the fallacious 
conclusion that Western politics has been defined by the sovereign production of 
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bare life in states of exception. Nor can his claim that the exception is 
‘consubstantial with Western politics’ be sustained. Political institutions and 
concepts evolve over time. Agamben’s account of sovereignty suffers from similar 
flaws.  A closer investigation of it will demonstrate that sovereign power cannot be 
as strictly defined as Agamben argues, nor is its function limited only to producing 
bare life in states of exception. 
A Mechanical Sovereign Power 
Agamben’s sovereign power, though trapped in an ‘ironclad’ paradox, 
functions as an agent whose actions are uncontested and unchallengeable. Whereas 
Schmitt’s sovereign is reactive, lying behind legal order until a dangerous lacuna is 
exposed by a situation defined as an emergency, Agamben’s sovereign is active. He 
argues that “the state of exception appears as the opening of a fictitious lacuna in the 
order for the purpose of safeguarding the existence of the norm and its applicability 
to the normal situation.”237 Sovereign power must intentionally open up ‘fictitious 
lacunae’ in the legal order whenever it deems them necessary. Agamben’s sovereign 
is constantly on the defensive, it is forced by the paradoxes Agamben encases it in to 
create states of exception and bare life.  
How is it that sovereign power appears in Agamben’s work as virtually 
unchallengeable? Though never stated explicitly, Agamben's sovereign maintains a 
monopoly on the use of violence, to borrow a phrase from Weber. Furthermore, 
Agamben abides by Walter Benjamin’s assertion in his Critique of Violence of a 
necessary and constitutive link between law and violence.
238
 Violence exists in one 
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of two types, law-making or law-preserving. Agamben’s sovereign exception secures 
the possibility of both types by making them indistinguishable in a state of 
exception. There is no resistance to this nexus between law and violence because 
bare life is by definition, subject to execution by sovereign power at any moment. 
Additionally, Agamben asserts that sovereign power has such a command of law and 
violence that it can ensure their relation, even though it must make them 
indistinguishable from time to time in the state of exception.
239
 
It is unclear however how Agamben’s sovereign is able to accomplish this 
with such apparent ease. By reducing sovereign actions to an ontological structure at 
the unchanging heart of politics Agamben removes any possibility of accounting for 
the kind of contingency and contestation embedded within sovereignty that was 
demonstrated in chapter two. On Agamben’s account the sovereign appears to act 
with “unconstrained efficacy” and an uncontested “finality.”240 He provides no 
defense for these claims of finality and efficacy aside from the definition of 
sovereignty as an originary structure of politics that creates bare life in a state of 
exception.
241
 The paradox can be formulated thusly, “the state requires a final 
authority to resolve questions of law, while the final authority is insufficiently 
informed by any law that precedes it.”242 There is nothing objectionable to such a 
formulation. What is objectionable is the idea that this paradox is an originary 
structure which determines the functioning of sovereign power in its entirety.  
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Agamben’s analysis presents a paradox of sovereignty then promptly 
removes any scope for altering or it. Rather than presenting this paradox as a 
complex problem to be negotiated and resolved Agamben “acts as if an account of 
the ‘logic of sovereignty’ reveals ironclad paradoxes that could be resolved only by 
transcending that logic altogether.”243  Agamben confronts this paradox as being 
constituted by the logic of sovereignty which has a binding and unchanging 
character. As described above this logic of sovereignty produces bare life which is 
subject to execution by sovereign authority. Agamben can, therefore, only conceive 
of sovereignty as an unchanging structure. He is left in a position in which sovereign 
power becomes unstoppable and all life becomes bare life. His theory cannot 
entertain any ideas that would allow the paradox to be negotiated or articulated 
productively.
244
    
There is a ‘democratic deficit’ within Agamben’s account of sovereign 
power. Understanding sovereignty as the will of the people or the decision of a 
supreme court on the interpretation of a constitutional text is erased by positing 
sovereignty as ‘originary structure’ of Western politics. As Neal points out, 
Agamben “pays no attention to the constitution of modern sovereignty itself.”245 The 
sovereign, as an originary, ontological structure appears to have no need to 
legitimize its actions by reference to a sovereign demos. Furthermore, his analysis 
lacks any notion of “’democratic elements…’ of the state of exception.246 
Agamben’s sovereign simply acts. There is no scope for sovereignty to be contested 
and fought over. Nor can sovereignty be exercised by political groups struggling for 
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power and hegemonic dominance. Thus his theory is not useful for understanding 
sovereign and emergency politics in contemporary liberal-democratic societies 
where sovereign power and decisions are enacted by political groups and/or state 
officials. 
Agamben’s vision of sovereignty is too mechanical to capture the nuance and 
complexity of contemporary emergency politics. Sovereign politics cannot be 
reduced to simple logics. At times politics and sovereignty may operate in irrational 
and illogical ways.  This leaves Agamben’s analysis blind to the idea, developed in 
chapter two, that sovereign decisions can only function as claims which must be 
taken up by the people and institutions over which they are made. The difference 
between the acting authority and the institutions which agree with the decision and 
implement it is foreign to Agamben’s analysis. This deprives him of explanatory 
power when faced with real world examples of emergency regimes which rely on a 
massive and highly complex bureaucracy to implement the decisions of state 
officials. His framework offers no scope for analysis of the nuances and difficulties 
of opening a camp such as Guantanamo. In the next section this will be shown to 
betray a critical weakness. Agamben’s analysis of the Guantanamo Bay detention 
facility is blind to the institutional forces which implement the decision of the Bush 
administration to operate a camp there. 
As argued in chapter two sovereign power is merely the name given to those 
situations in which decisions about the boundaries of law must be made. Sovereign 
power can emerge from anywhere and cause a variety of effects on legal order. It is 
not tied to an ancient structure from which it cannot escape. This conception of 
sovereignty suggests that the state of exception is not a core articulating structure of 
an originary political relation. Rather, a politically decided ‘exception’ can be 
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created at any point, and there are many, where ever a decision of the nature and 
boundaries of law must be made yet legal order is not fully prepared to make the 
decision. The explanatory power of this understanding of sovereignty is far superior 
to Agamben’s because it is sensitive to the plurality of instances in which law fails to 
provide an adequate course of action in the face of uncertain events. 
Agamben’s analysis of sovereignty is also unsustainable because of its 
narrow focus on the production of bare life in a state of exception. It is not attuned to 
the modern articulations of sovereign power and the contexts in which sovereign 
power operates. Sovereignty is a central concern embedded in issues of the limits of 
law and situations which have been politically defined as exceptional; however it is a 
larger and more nuanced problematic than Agamben’s work can account for. 
Not So Bare Life 
As sovereign power is always contested it cannot produce life which is bare 
to the extent that Agamben claims it is. Nor can it do so with uncontested efficacy 
and finality. Certainly forms of inclusion and exclusion are necessary and 
constitutive of politics.
247
 And sovereign power is implicated in the construction of 
such exclusions. But all forms of political exclusion cannot be reduced to the relation 
of abandonment in a state of exception as Agamben conceives it. All political 
subjectivities require conditions of possibility in order to emerge. Sovereign power, 
however it is conceived, is only one of a myriad of conditions of possibility that act 
on subjects. Neal notes that “[e]ven without law, the subject remains within a web of 
constitutive relations with social forces, institutional discipline, custom, capital, 
belief, sexuality, memory, trauma, desire, and so on; …even in the radical 
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deprivation of these things, the subject is forced into a relation with their 
absence…”248 He goes onto suggest that perhaps Jews were considered bare life by 
the Nazis who imprisoned them but none the less they remained humans enmeshed 
in a number of social discourses.
249
 Agamben selects one condition of possibility and 
reifies it as the core, original condition of possibility for the emergence of the subject 
of politics. There is no space for the plethora of other discourses that act on and 
influence the production and emergence of ‘life’.  
Bare life is never fully bare. It is a project which may be attempted by 
sovereign power. Sovereign power may strip a subject of all legal identity; however, 
it can never strip away all forms of collective identification. Ziarek poignantly 
argues that bare life is not zoe but “rather it is the remainder of the destroyed 
political bios.”250 Furthermore, she concurs with Neal’s perspective that bare life, as 
the remnants of collective identifications “cannot be regarded in complete isolation 
from all cultural and political characteristics.”251 At the very least bare life maintains 
a relation to those lost identifications, specifically “as the remnant of a specific form 
of life that… is not yet or is no longer.”252 Life can only be understood as ‘bare’ 
from the perspective of sovereign power. But there is no reason to accept the 
perspective that sovereign power creates bare life. Because Agamben presents 
sovereign power as both highly effective and uncontested he can also claim that bare 
life is simply produced by sovereign power. His work is not open to the possibility 
that that the production of bare life is asymmetrical, that life is only considered bare 
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from the perspective of sovereign power itself. Agamben does not see that life is still 
enmeshed in any number of communal relations even if sovereign power is 
attempting to strip those relations away. Agamben gives no justification for always 
inhabiting the perspective of sovereign power. His theory is trapped in that 
perspective because he posits sovereign power as an originary structure which can 
act with uncontested finality and efficacy.  
A final problem with Agamben’s conceptualization of sovereign power and 
‘bare’ life is that the relation he describes between the two is ultimately apolitical. 
The dimension of the political is inhabited by groups that struggle for power, not 
individuals and stripped of communal belonging whose solitary political relation is 
one of abandonment from sovereign power. By positing the sovereign abandonment 
of life as the originary political relation, more fundamental than Schmitt’s 
friend/enemy distinction, Agamben’s theory erases the dimension of the political 
from his analysis of emergency politics. 
The Erasure of the Political and Politics 
In the introduction of this chapter I mentioned that Agamben comes close to 
identifying extra-legal power with what Schmitt calls ‘the political’. I noted that 
Agamben does not develop a full analysis of the relationship between extra-legal 
power and the political. This is because his theory of sovereignty and the production 
of bare life removes the political from the purview of his theory.  
The sovereign production of bare life cannot be the originary political 
relation. Stripping life from all forms of collective identification would radically 
erase any notion of politics or the political. The political requires mutual exclusion 
between groups which are each capable of political activity. “Agamben… has 
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presented as a political moment what actually amounts to a radical elimination of the 
political.”253 Certainly the political entails “a moment of negativity that requires the 
construction of an inside/outside relation and requires that sovereignty is in an 
ambiguous position vis-à-vis the juridical order.”254 However, Agamben has 
hypostatized one possible form of the inside/outside relation and given it the unique 
position of being the originary structure of Western politics.
255
 Simply because 
someone is outside of a legal order does not mean they are outside of every existing 
legal order. Nor does it necessarily mean that they are wholly given over to 
possibility of execution by sovereign violence, against which they have no defense. 
The sovereign ban as Agamben describes it is not a political relation but a 
relation that destroys the possibility of democratic politics. Laclau rightly argues that 
the relation of ban would have to be mutual for “a political relation” to exist.256 
Agamben’s understanding of the relation of sovereign power to society and 
individuals is so asymmetrical that it closes down any space for legitimate 
contestation between opposing groups with equally valid political goals. Nor is there 
any scope for ‘bare‘ life to challenge its categorization as such by sovereign power. 
Politics would be impossible if the only two political actors are a sovereign wielding 
violence which may not be challenged and a bare life stripped of all relations with 
any form of collective identifications.  
On Agamben’s account there exists only one subject that is capable of 
political action, the sovereign. And that political action consists in stripping away 
political existence from all other subjects. Agamben’s understanding of the political 
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is simply the production of bare life. It has been shown that bare life cannot be 
constructed; life cannot be stripped of all collective identification. Agamben’s 
account of the sovereign production of bare life in the state of exception effectively 
erases the political and all forms of collective political contestation. Therefore it is of 
no use for any theory of democratic politics which seeks to counteract the increasing 
use of emergency and exceptional tactics on the part of state officials. 
Furthermore, Agamben’s image of sovereign power creating bare life relies 
on “an increasing control by an over-powerful state.”257 Such an image of a unified 
state, acting with precision and efficacy cannot be maintained. Even the most cursory 
investigation of modern state forms reveals a massive bureaucracy, competing goals 
on the part of various officials, and large areas of contestation within the state as well 
as between the state and political opposition parties. It is doubtful that the state can 
be understood as unitary in any meaningful sense. Moreover for the political and 
politics to exist, there must also exist subjects with the capacity for political agency.  
William Rasch rightly notes that “what Agamben calls the political, Hobbes 
calls the ‘state of nature’.”258 Agamben’s vision of politics and the political is 
characterized by what Hobbes would have called a war of all against all. If each 
person is bare life which can be killed with impunity then they are also each 
sovereign with respect to everyone else. Sovereign and bare life are interchangeable 
roles.
259
 In direct opposition to Hobbes who argues that the state of nature 
necessitated legal order and the commonwealth, Agamben argues that the state of 
nature is in fact produced by the sovereign. The sovereign ban reduces all subjects to 
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bare life and thereby creates a state of nature within the political itself. When 
Agamben argues that the state of exception begins to become permanent he is also 
implicitly arguing that the political has ceased to exist and the state of nature is what 
replaces it. Rasch notes that if the state of nature is a product of a political relation 
then it is a problem of the political as such, and not merely a political problem.
260
 
Consequently any political action taken to counteract the effects of the state of 
exception will come to naught. Only transcending the logic of the permanent 
sovereign exception and its erasure of the political would be of any use. Rasch 
rightly condemns Agamben’s erasure of the political as fatalistic and nihilistic. 
The state of exception cannot exist and operate as an ontological structure of 
Western politics as Agamben’s analysis suggests that it does. Sovereignty is more 
diverse a notion that he understands it to be. The sovereign ban cannot be the 
originary political relation of Western politics because it cannot produce its desired 
subject, bare life. And even if it could produce a perfect example of bare life, that 
life is by definition apolitical. Life stripped of all its capacity for communal 
belonging loses any potential for political agency. The ultimate consequence of 
Agamben’s analysis of the exception is the total erasure of the political from 
Western societies. 
Furthermore, Agamben’s analysis displaces the norm and legal order in favor 
of the exception. Legal order is dependent on and subservient to the exception which 
plays a more fundamental and determining role in politics. Without the exception, in 
Agamben’s work, the norm would be impossible. This ontological prioritization of 
the exception needs to be entirely dismissed. It is possible, as chapter two 
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demonstrated, to argue that sovereign power is extra-legal and that it does more than 
produce bare life in states of exception. Exceptions are sometimes produced by 
sovereign power but that production is always highly contested. Finally, it is possible 
to argue that current governments maybe be increasingly using exceptions as tactics 
of governance without concluding that it is an originary structure which is brought to 
the forefront of politics. 
The ‘Exceptional’ Tactics of Contemporary Governance 
It is certainly the case that emergency measures are increasingly used by 
liberal-democratic states as a tactic of governance. However, the creation of states of 
exception, as Agamben understands them, is not one of those tactics. Thus his 
second main claim, that the state of exception can be considered the dominant 
paradigm of contemporary governance to the extent that the exception has “become 
the rule” is false.261 If the state of exception on his understanding is implausible then 
the idea that the state of exception is a paradigm of government such that it eclipses 
the functioning of normal legal order is even more so. 
Agamben’s claim that the state of exception is the paradigm of modern 
government requires not only the erasure of the political and politics but, it also 
requires that legal order could in no way be used to resist attempts by sovereign 
power to open states of exception and create bare life. This claim is utterly 
implausible. Legal order remains a crucial resource for those individuals and groups 
seeking to counteract the use of emergency powers by contemporary governments. A 
notable example of this is the case of Rasul v Bush. In that case the United States 
Supreme Court held that detainees held at Guantanamo Bay had a legal right to 
                                                          
261
 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 20 
109 
 
challenge their detention in U.S. federal civilian courts.
262
 This demonstrates that law 
is still a resource that can be utilized even by those who are supposedly bare life 
precisely to challenge that categorization. Agamben’s claim that the state of 
exception has brought forth a permanent zone of anomie cannot explain how and 
why Guantanamo Bay detainees can challenge their detention in court. Agamben 
claims that the form of law is “being in force without significance.”263 This means 
that sovereign power acts but that the texts of laws have no meaning. Clearly this is 
not the case. 
Agamben claims that permanent states of emergency are the product of 
voluntary creation by contemporary states.
264
 This view wrongly gives the 
impression that it is easy for a sovereign to create a state of exception. In some cases 
it may be, however this misses the point made in chapter two, that sovereign claims 
of exceptional circumstances and attempts to wield emergency powers are always 
met with political contestation. ‘States of emergency’ and emergency measures are 
not ‘voluntary’ acts. They are the result of struggle and contestation.  
The paradigmatic form the permanent exception takes is the concentration 
camp. Auschwitz, Omarska, and Guantanamo Bay are all physical localizations and 
materializations of Agamben’s state of exception. He argues, “The camp is the space 
that is opened when the state of exception begins to become the rule.”265 It is in 
concentration camps that life is most exposed to the whims of sovereign power. At 
any moment a prisoner of the camp may be killed by any one and no crime will be 
committed, no sacrifice observed. In the camps “power confronts nothing but pure 
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life, without any mediation.”266 Though the camps are the extreme examples of the 
state of exception as the paradigm of government many other spaces exist according 
to Agamben. The body of Karen Quinlan, a comatose patient, zones d’attente at 
airports and the body of a researcher conducting experiments on himself are all sites 
of the exception and biopolitics. At its most benign the camp is a metaphor for how 
sovereign power operates in Western politics. At its most dangerous the camp is an 
actually existing locality in which sovereign power can operate on human bodies 
without any restraint. Agamben’s claim is that the camp is the nomos of the modern 
is overstated and unsustainable. To assimilate all of Western politics to the 
concentration camp is to be blind to the complexities, contingencies and struggles of 
contemporary liberal-democratic politics. 
It was noted in the first section that Agamben’s analysis was blind to the 
complexities of sovereignty and the social forces that are required to make and 
enforce sovereign decisions. An example of this is his depiction of the US detention 
facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Agamben describes it as a space in which “bare 
life reaches its maximum indeterminacy.”267 Detainees presumably then would be 
subject to a sovereign violence that could be wielded by any guard or even a janitor. 
If bare life reaches ‘maximum indeterminacy’ then pure anomie must exist, the rule 
of law would have to be entirely absent and no norms whatsoever could be 
operational. This however is certainly not the case. Fleur Johns has detailed the 
many forms of law that were and are operative within the Guantanamo Bay detention 
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facility.
268
 Her conclusion is that the detainees at Guantanamo Bay are not reduced to 
bare life. On the contrary,  
“the plight of the Guantanamo bay detainees is less an outcome of law’s suspension or 
evisceration than of elaborate regulatory efforts by a range of legal authorities. The detention camps at 
Guantanamo Bay are above all works of legal representation and classification. They are spaces 
where law and liberal proceduralism speak and operate in excess.”269  
Each detainee is subjected to interrogation, analysis and classification by a plethora 
of institutions and experts ranging from the Combatant Status Review Tribunal to 
visits from defense lawyers and the Red Cross. What is occurring at the detention 
facility is not the maintenance of a space without law. It is political contestation over 
forms of legality and how those laws are applied. The hyper-legalism of 
Guantanamo Bay presents sovereign power with a terrain of contestation, not an 
anomic space in which bare life can be executed at will.  
Agamben’s analysis is utterly blind to this kind of hyper-legalism. He cannot 
account for the fact that in some cases ‘exceptional’ or ‘emergency’ situations result 
in the creation of new, multi-faceted layers of legality. Suspension of law in its 
entirety is one tactic that may be used when a state of exception is successfully 
declared. However it is not the only tactic. Because Agamben only envisages the 
state of exception as an emptiness of law in which apolitical bare life is produced he 
cannot account for the variety of emergency and exceptional tactics wielded by a 
contested sovereign agency. 
One final claim Agamben makes must be dispensed with. He argues that “the 
state of exception appears as a threshold of indeterminacy between democracy and 
                                                          
268
 Johns, ‘Guantanamo Bay and the Annihilation of the Exception’, p. 616-619 
269
 Johns, ‘Guantanamo Bay and the Annihilation of the Exception’, p. 614 
112 
 
absolutism.
270
 Certainly the increased use of emergency powers and the diminishing 
of legal protections can move a democratic state toward more authoritarian or 
dictatorial forms. However, the contemporary world is nowhere near the threshold of 
absolutism. Agamben argued that the state of exception has ‘today reached its 
maximum worldwide deployment.’  In such a scenario it would be impossible to 
differentiate between transgression and application of the law to the extent that “a 
person who goes for a walk during the curfew is not transgressing the law any more 
than the soldier who kills him is executing it.”271 If that is the case democracy no 
longer exists and all of Western politics is reduced to sovereign absolutism. This is 
precisely what Agamben argues: “The normative aspect of law can thus be 
obliterated and contradicted with impunity by… governmental violence.”272 
Nowhere is this hyperbolic assessment true. It is not even the case in the 
Guantanamo Bay detention facility. Every attempt to create such a zone of anomie is 
met with opposition, political contestation and in many cases legal challenges. 
The Metaphysics of Fatalism 
Agamben wholly agrees with Benjamin’s claim in his eighth thesis of history 
“‘that the ‘state of emergency’ in which we live is not the exception but the rule.”273 
He also agrees with Benjamin that sovereignty is trapped in a nexus between law-
making and law preserving violence. Until this nexus can be severed forever we are 
doomed to oscillate between the two in a permanent state of exception. 
Unfortunately, Agamben’s work leaves very little room for struggling against such a 
predicament. 
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Agamben’s work erases the realm of the political and replaces it with the 
state of exception and sovereign abandonment. In such a space “any political 
action… is undertaken in vain.”274 Bare lives would simply throw themselves at a 
sovereign violence which can execute them at its whim. Neither does he offer any 
practical responses to the ‘voluntary’ production of ‘states of exception’. Politics, he 
says, is useless because it has been thoroughly contaminated by law and can thus 
only engage in law-making or law preserving violence.
275
 The only possible solution 
is a new metaphysics of law and politics which is free from the nexus of law-making 
and law-preserving violence. What is needed is “pure” law, law disconnected from 
violence.
276
 This “pure” law can only be the result of what Benjamin called “divine” 
violence.
277
 
 Waiting for a new metaphysics of law and violence is utter impractical and 
unrealistic. Because Agamben’s work can offer no useful diagnostic account of the 
increasing use of emergency measures by liberal-democratic states, it is without 
significance and should be abandoned. What is needed is a theory of emergency 
politics which is sensitive to the dimension of the political and political contestation. 
Additionally, it is imperative that legal order not be made subservient to claims of 
exceptionality. The exception has not become the rule as Agamben claims. Rather, 
the opposite is true, ‘normal’ politics has always included claims of emergency and 
exceptionality. The main problem is how to respond to such claims without 
dissolving liberal-democratic governance into a zone of anomic violence, a task for 
which Agamben’s work is unequipped. 
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Chapter 4 – Liberal Legality Against Schmitt 
Introduction 
Contemporary legal theory responds to Schmitt’s problematic of the 
exception through a critique of his work as well as via prescriptive models of 
emergency powers. The debate between Oren Gross and David Dyzenhaus is 
emblematic of this srtand of theorizing. For both authors law is a necessary but not 
sufficient restraint on emergency powers. They share the conviction that law does 
and should play a role in emergency politics. Both argue that law, on their individual 
readings of the role of legal order in liberal-democratic regimes, can limit abuses of 
emergency powers. Dyzenhaus emphatically argues that “States of emergency can be 
governed by the rule of law” to such an extent that “the exception can be banished 
from legal order.”278 Gross, for his part, attempts to banish the exception by 
upholding a stricter separation between normality and emergency measures.  
Their individual prescriptive models of emergency powers are a direct 
response to Schmitt’s work. However, they support the reading of Schmitt which 
was argued against in chapter two. For Gross and Dyzenhaus, Schmitt argues that 
law has no place in exceptional circumstances. The exception is outside law, so to 
speak. Their prescriptive models attempt to bring the exception and any form of 
emergency powers within the ambit legal order. In doing so they both strenuously 
argue against the existence and role of extra-legal, sovereign power. This produces a 
democratic deficit in both their models. By attempting to bring the exception within 
the scope of legal order they actually end up further entrenching the norm/exception 
binary within liberal legalism. That entrenchment leaves their prescriptive models 
squarely within Schmitt’s problematic of the exception. Therefore, an alternative 
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approach to emergency politics will need to seek a beginning outside of liberal 
legality as Gross and Dyzenhaus theorize it. 
Gross & Dyzenhaus on Schmitt 
Both Gross and Dyzenhaus claim that Schmitt’s work, lamentably, has 
analytical relevance for emergency politics. On their accounts, his work fairly 
accurately describes the way in which many liberal-democratic regimes are currently 
responding to emergencies. Gross argues that Schmitt’s work is “highly significant 
and instructive today.”279 Dyzenhaus claims that “the judicial record largely supports 
Schmitt’s claims” that “a formal or wholly procedural conception of the rule of law 
is appropriate for emergencies.”280 On their accounts, contemporary liberal-
democratic regimes are acting in ‘Schmittian’ ways, removing questions of legality 
from emergency politics. On the other hand, Gross and Dyzenhaus reject what they 
read as the normative implications of Schmitt’s work. Gross criticizes the normative 
aspects of Schmitt’s theory calling them “indefensible.”281 Dyzenhaus reads 
Schmitt’s work as a challenging the idea the rule of law has any place in emergency 
politics.
282
 Schmitt’s work can be considered accurate in this sense only if one 
accepts a narrow reading of Schmitt’s work, precisely the reading I argued against in 
chapter two of this thesis. I argue that both authors misread Schmitt because the 
prescriptive models of emergency powers they develop are not incompatible with the 
reading of Schmitt I put forth in chapter two. I will demonstrate in sections two and 
three of this chapter that both models remain within the problematic of the exception 
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and they do not go far enough in diminishing the role of the norm/exception binary 
in emergency politics. 
Gross’s main objection to Schmitt’s work, as he reads it, is that Schmitt 
displaces the norm in favor of the exception. He does this to such an extent that all 
politics and indeed all human activity must become focused on exceptional 
situations.
283
 By arguing that the sovereign should have unlimited powers to decide 
that an exception exists as well as unlimited powers to respond to an exception 
Schmitt creates an “exceptionless exception.”284 The exception is exceptionless 
because of the presence of the “recognition of a sovereign extra-constitutional 
authority that stands outside, indeed above, the constitution and the legal order.”285 
Any decision the sovereign makes is automatically considered legitimate because the 
normal means of assessing legitimacy have been suspended. Thus, the sovereign is 
able to use exceptional powers even under ‘normal’ conditions.286 Additionally, just 
the possibility that an exception may be declared is enough to remove any notion of 
normality from Schmitt’s work.  
Gross further contends that extra-legality cannot even factor into Schmitt’s 
thinking. Whatever the sovereign does is legitimate because the legal system 
ultimately rests on the decision of the sovereign.
287
 Accountability for actions taken 
while the legal system is suspended is impossible. If everything the sovereign does is 
by definition legal then the sovereign is free to abuse emergency powers with no 
accountability.  
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This is a misreading of Schmitt by Gross. Schmitt maintained that the 
exception was not a permanent state of affairs. While the possibility of an emergency 
or exception exists it had not done away with the normal situation entirely. As I 
argued in chapter two, it would be incorrect to conflate the political with the 
exception in Schmitt’s work. The realm of the political, on my reading of Schmitt, is 
a sliding scale between benign neglect between opposing groups to all out war. On 
my reading of Schmitt the sovereign certainly could not accused of being “paranoid” 
about the presence of exceptional situations.
288
 Sovereign power is not continuously 
focusing on exceptional situations or exceptional powers.  
Furthermore, as I argued in chapter two, the sovereign as a decision-making 
agency and the decision on the exception are always subject political contestation. 
The mere presence of a sovereign, extra-constitutional authority does not mean that 
they are necessarily endowed with unlimited exceptional powers. Gross reads 
Schmitt’s sovereign as a single individual. As I demonstrated in chapter two 
sovereign power should be read in Schmitt’s work as a contested decision-making 
agency which can be an individual but can also be a political party or any political 
group. Finally, the recognition of extra-legal political authority is essential to 
democracy. The people must be understood as sovereign, though they may not 
always have the capacity to act as such. 
Dyzenhaus’ primary critique of Schmitt is that he allows for an extra-legal 
space of sovereign power and decision-making. Dyzenhaus’ objects to Schmitt’s 
claim that the “space beyond law [is] a space which is revealed when law recedes 
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leaving the legally unconstrained state, represented by the sovereign, to act.”289 
Dyzenhaus continues, “nearly all liberal legal theorists find the idea of a space 
beyond law antithetical, even if they suppose that law can be used to produce a legal 
void.”290 Dyzenhaus objects not to legally uncontrolled spaces but rather a space 
beyond legal order as a whole. As will be discussed below, Dyzenhaus is less critical 
of what he calls legal black holes, legal voids produced by law ‘within’ legal order. 
As argued in chapter two this space beyond law is necessary for democratic 
governance and legitimacy. It is a constitutive element of any liberal-democratic 
regime which allows the sovereign people to make reflective decisions and 
judgments on legal order as a whole. 
The core problem posed by a space beyond law, Dyzenhaus argues, is that it 
places emergency measures outside of any legal regulation. Dyzenhaus reads 
Schmitt’s work on the exception as arguing that once an exception is declared the 
rule of law must no longer apply.  He reads this claim as Schmitt’s challenge “that 
the rule of law has no place in an emergency.”291 The lack of any legal order leaves a 
sovereign agent free to wield unlimited power when confronting an exception.
292
 
Dyzenhaus accuses Schmitt of making an unsupportable logical leap between normal 
and exceptional legal order; “it does not follow from the fact that a problem is 
ungovernable by rules, that is by highly determinate legal norms, that it necessarily 
takes place in a legal void.”293 As I argued in chapter two, Schmitt’s work can be 
read in a way that does necessarily support such a stark contrast between legal 
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regulation and legal voids. Schmitt did argue that declaring an exception granted a 
sovereign agent unlimited power but in the larger context of his work this can be 
seen as an overstatement. Even without any specific legal regulation sovereign 
decisions and sovereign actions are subject to political contestation which can 
function as a form of constraint.  
Dyzenhaus argues that for Schmitt the distinction between ‘normal’ legal 
order and an exceptional space beyond law resides at the level of the ontological. He 
argues the Schmitt covers over a political decision by assuming an ontology. The 
distinction between normal times when it is possible for law to function and 
exceptional times when it is impossible for law to apply has a “foundational status” 
for Schmitt’s theory of the exception.294 This is because, as Schmitt puts it, “there 
exists no norm that is applicable to chaos.”295  This is one way to read Schmitt but 
such a reading seriously downplays Schmitt’s claim that the sovereign ‘decides on 
the exception.’ Dyzenhaus seeks to displace this assumption, as he reads it, by 
showing that whether or not law applies during an exception is the result of a 
“genuine” political choice which Schmitt conceals.296 However Dyzenhaus 
incorrectly reads Schmitt to be asserting that just because a demarcation can be made 
that it must be made. A ‘genuine political choice’ is not excluded by Schmitt’s work. 
Dyzenhaus agrees that it is for the government, or sovereign, to decide that an 
emergency exists and the government must also decide whether or not the rule of law 
should apply. As I demonstrated in chapter two, Schmitt’s theory of emergency 
powers posits the moment of decision as more important than any characteristics of 
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situation deemed exceptional. The relationship between normality and exceptionality 
is political, not ontological.   
Dyzenhaus’ position is not contradiction with the reading of Schmitt I 
advanced in chapter two. Schmitt’s work displays a tension between his argument 
that law necessarily recedes during an exception and his claim that the sovereign 
decides both that there is an exception as well as what must be done to counter it. I 
argue that it is more productive to focus on the moment of decision on an exception 
because the decision is always subject to contestation. Without the moment of 
decision there can be no exceptions. Schmitt’s work emphasizes the role of the 
decisions regarding exceptions. Nor does it ontologize the distinction between 
normality and exceptionality. As I argued in chapter two that decision is always 
subject to political contestation. 
The scope of the validity of Schmitt’s is wider than Dyzenhaus or Gross 
allows. Reading Schmitt against himself opens conceptual space for an analysis of 
emergency politics which is more productive than a narrow reading which pigeon 
holes Schmitt only as a fascist theorist of unlimited sovereign power. A wider 
reading opens conceptual and theoretical space to move beyond the norm/exception 
binary. Neither Gross nor Dyzenhaus makes an attempt to disentangle that binary 
from the theorization of emergency politics. On the contrary, their prescriptive 
models of emergency measures embed it even further. 
Prescriptive Models of Legality in Emergency Politics 
Gross – Extra-Legal Measures Model 
Gross’s critique of Schmitt not withstanding he develops a prescriptive model 
of emergency powers which attempts to mitigate the effects of the exception 
122 
 
becoming the norm. On his account it is impossible to prevent emergency measures 
of any sort from seeping into the normal legal system. However, instead of moving 
beyond the norm/exception binary he argues that they should be more strictly 
separated. The best solution according to Gross is to force state officials to break the 
law when they feel it is absolutely necessary to respond to an emergency. Rather 
than rely on emergency legislation or constitutional provisions which grant 
extraordinary powers to an executive his ‘Extra-Legal Measures’ (ELM) model 
eliminates any extraordinary powers in favor of a process of ex post facto ratification 
of illegal acts by state officials.   
Gross contends that most scholarly work on emergency politics is 
underpinned by an “assumption of separation” between normal and emergency 
times.
297
 However, such “bright line distinctions between normalcy and emergency 
are frequently untenable.”298 He presents a wealth of convincing empirical evidence 
that the distinction between norm and exception has not been maintained empirically 
in a variety of areas such as: temporal – emergency times are not short and followed 
by a return to normal times, spatial – emergencies cannot be contained within 
demarcated zones such as Northern Ireland or French Algeria, domestic and 
international emergencies tend to blend together, national security does not and 
cannot remain a separate sphere of legislative and executive policy making and 
application, and finally communal – emergencies cannot be applied to certain 
populations within a society and not others.
299
 The empirical record tends to support 
Gross’ claim. Sooner or later any emergency measure will tend to become 
‘normalized’. It will seep into the regular legal system and become a base line for 
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further emergency measures. Over time constitutional principles such as individual 
liberty will be eroded.  
Gross is also very critical of the enactment of emergency legislation as a 
response to declared emergencies. He contends that while the legal order should not 
be suspended or altered in the face of an emergency, special emergency legislation 
should not be enacted to resolve the crisis. He argues: “In the haste to defend the 
state, governmental authorities may be all too willing to forego safeguards against 
abuse of power… All too frequently they may over-react against the terrorist 
threat.”300 During an emergency or in the direct aftermath of one is not a time for 
rational deliberation which protects core constitutional principles such as individual 
liberty and limited government. Furthermore, emergency legislation that is originally 
intended to be temporary has a tendency to remain on the books. Gross contends that 
finding emergency laws that outlasted their original intentions to be 
“commonplace.”301 Emergency measures seep into the ordinary legal system over 
time. To avoid this problem the best strategy is not to enact them in the first place. 
Emergency legislation, according to Gross, should be avoided in the same way and 
for the same reasons that other emergency alterations such as suspension of legal 
order and ex ante emergency provisions should be avoided. In order to protect a legal 
order and a constitution both must be kept as separate from emergency measures as 
possible. 
I agree with Gross that we cannot and should not rely on an “assumption of 
separation” between normal and exceptional times. Nor should we assume that 
emergency measures can be kept separate or distinct from ‘normal’ legal order. 
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However, I strongly disagree with Gross’s assertion that this lack of separation 
forces us to concede that “the exception has merged with the rule…”302 Empirically 
it may be the case that emergency measures are fast becoming ordinary tactics of 
governance. But that does not mean that the trend must continue. Nor does it mean 
that, conceptually speaking, the exception has replaced the norm. Even while 
decrying the empirical record, Gross relies on the conceptual distinction between 
norm and emergency. His ELM model seeks to uphold it by removing any forms of 
emergency powers in practice, legal or otherwise. This is particularly evident in his 
work on the arguments for and against the use of torture to prevent crises. 
 Despite arguing that the exception has become the norm, Gross relies on the 
distinction when justifying the use of torture. In his work on torture Gross argues 
that a categorical prohibition on the use of torture is “compelling”.303 However, in a 
‘catastrophic case’ state officials may violate the ban on torture so long as it is 
“preventative interrogational torture”, which is aimed at gaining information that 
will save innocent lives.
304
 ‘Catastrophic cases’ are described by Gross as being 
“truly exceptional”.305 The example Gross gives of a ‘catastrophic case’ is the 
familiar ticking time bomb scenario. Furthermore, Gross claims, “In the catastrophic 
case, when the underlying normal state of affairs is fundamentally interrupted, the 
relevant legal norm may no longer be applicable as is and cannot fulfill its ordinary 
regulatory function. ‘For a legal order to make sense, a normal situation must 
exist.’”306 In this quote not only is Gross relying on the dichotomous distinction 
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between norm and exception he refutes elsewhere but he directly quotes Schmitt, 
whose work he is trying to overcome. Gross cannot have it both ways. Either the 
separation between norm and exception is untenable or it is possible to distinguish 
‘normality’ the ‘catastrophic case’ which justifies disobedience from the rule of law. 
Gross undermines his own project by relying on the notion of ‘truly exceptional’ 
‘catastrophic cases’. The norm/exception dichotomy sits ambiguously in Gross’ 
work. He still attempts to define and utilize it, relying on Schmitt in the process, 
while at the same time attempting but not succeeding in minimizing its effects.  
Gross argues that liberal democratic regimes can respond to violent crisis 
while maintaining a strong commitment to the rule of law. He develops what he calls 
the ‘Extra-Legal Measures’ (ELM) model of emergency powers to elaborate this 
argument. ELM is a response to his reading of Schmitt as well as two other 
categories of emergency regimes, the ‘business-as-usual’ and ‘accommodation’ 
models.
307
 In ‘business-as-usual’ type regimes the state makes no changes to the 
application of the rule of law after it declares a state of emergency. Neither the 
constitution nor any specific statutes may be suspended or altered. It is assumed that 
ordinary criminal law covers all the actions terrorists take hence there is no need to 
suspend existing laws or to introduce new emergency legislation. In accommodation 
type regimes the rule of law is bent, manipulated and/or suspended in order to 
respond to the particular exigencies presented by declared emergencies.
308
 Ordinary 
law is deemed inadequate hence adjustments must be made so that the state and its 
officials may fully and adequately respond to emergencies. Gross finds fault with 
both of these types of emergency regimes. Neither type adequately responds to 
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emergency situations. The ‘Business-as-usual’ model fails because ‘ordinary’ laws 
and law enforcement mechanisms are not strong enough to withstand the threat 
posed by ‘catastrophic cases’. Accommodation type regimes fail because they allow 
emergency measures to seep into the normal, ordinary functioning of liberal-
democratic governance. 
The ELM model relies on the notion that normal and emergency times cannot 
be definitively separated in advance or in practice. The ELM model is designed to 
keep the normal legal system as separate and distinct from emergency measures as 
possible. It attempts to enforce the distinction by forcing state officials to break the 
law when they feel it necessary. It then asks society to determine, ex post facto, 
whether or not a crisis was dire enough to warrant official disobedience to 
entrenched legal and constitutional rules. Gross acknowledges that his work relies on 
the norm/exception dichotomy even while he tries to minimize its effects.
309
 Gross 
contends that emergency legislation and measures have a tendency to seep into the 
normal legal system thereby contaminating it and normalizing emergency 
government to the detriment of fundamental principles of liberal democratic 
government. “Emergency regimes tend to perpetuate themselves” he argues.310 For 
Gross the best way to protect the legal system is to ensure that it is never suspended 
or altered in response to an emergency. However the ELM model is not a workable 
response to Schmitt’s problematic of the exception, or a better alternative to 
Dyzenhaus’ ‘Legality model’, or the models of accommodation and business-as-
usual. The ELM model is internally flawed and does not overcome the problematic 
of the exception set forth by Schmitt. 
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What makes the ELM model different and superior, Gross claims, is that it 
does not allow for any extra-constitutional sovereign authority.
311
 There exists no 
possibility for state officials to legitimately suspend or violate legal order. All 
official disobedience must be understood as “a violation of the relevant legal 
rule.”312 He claims that this leaves open the possibility for accountability and 
punishment for disobedience that Schmitt’s theory does not. The problem with this 
view is that it is anti-democratic. Extra-legal, sovereign authority is necessary as it is 
what legitimizes the legal order.  
When Gross argues that Schmitt’s theory is dangerous because it allows for 
sovereign, extra-constitutional authority, he supports a version of Kelsen’s identity 
thesis in which the law and the state are one and the same. Elsewhere he approvingly 
cites Roberto Unger’s notion that “the rule of law [is] ‘the soul of the modern 
state.’”313 Gross never goes into detail regarding this position. He brushes past this 
issue which is of central concern for questions regarding emergency politics. It 
makes his reliance on the analytical elements of Schmitt’s theory for the ELM model 
all the more confusing. If certain norms cannot apply to catastrophic or exceptional 
cases and state officials are unlimited in their actions when responding to those 
situations and the process of ex post ratification ‘legalizes the illegality’ of extra-
legal actions how can Gross maintain that there is no power outside of the rule of 
law. Ex post ratification would seem to grant the façade of legality to actions that 
would fall outside the scope of the rule of law simply because it was decided that no 
norm could apply to the situation that necessitated extra-legal action in the first 
place. Extra-legal power is necessary for processes of ex post ratification to have any 
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legitimacy. Certainly the possibility of ex post punishment exists but as discussed 
below it has never provided any substantive limit to the actions of state officials.  
The ELM is also an attempt to overcome what Gross understands as the 
tragic aspects of emergencies. He writes: “Democratic nations faced with serious 
threats must maintain and protect life and the liberties necessary to a vibrant 
democracy. Yet, emergencies challenge the most fundamental concepts of 
constitutional democracy.”314 This tragic tension is resolvable according to Gross. 
His ELM model attempts to resolve the tension between the two “antithetical 
vectors” of limited government and raison d’état.315 This tension is resolved, 
paradoxically, by forcing state officials to violate the laws and constitutional 
principles they are attempting to save. Here Gross seems to be relying on an 
objective conception of what constitutes an ‘emergency’. This is misguided because, 
as argued in chapter two, emergencies are decided upon by political agents acting as 
sovereign powers. Gross’s assumption that emergencies always pose existential 
threats is blind to the political and contestated nature of decisions on states of 
emergency. 
 Positing unchallengeable assumptions in emergency politics is a way to 
remove certain aspects of the discourse from debate. This move should always be 
resisted given the highly contested nature of emergency politics. Yet, the ELM 
model presupposes that everyone can agree on three points: “(1) that emergencies 
call for extraordinary governmental responses, (2) constitutional arguments have not 
greatly constrained any government faced with the need to respond to such 
emergencies, and (3) there is a strong probability that measures used by the 
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government in emergencies will eventually seep into the legal system even after the 
crisis has ended.”316 Gross contends that these three assumptions taken together 
validate the notion that there may be situations in which it will be necessary to 
violate the legal order as well as “accepted constitutional principles” so that a state 
can defend its citizens as well as core constitutional principles.
317
 These assumptions 
are based on Gross’ empirical and comparative analysis of actually existing 
emergency regimes. While the empirical record may confirm that the second and the 
third assumptions are generally true, that does not provide sufficient grounds for 
drawing unalterable rules based on them. The first assumption is highly problematic 
because, as Gross points out, “it is not at all clear that even if a working definition of 
‘emergency’ could be formulated, it would stand the test of actual exigencies.”318 If 
‘emergencies’ are virtually impossible to define it becomes unclear how it is that 
they necessitate extraordinary responses from the state.  
 Gross elaborates his model via a ‘ticking time bomb’ scenario in which a 
terrorist attack is imminent but may be prevented because the authorities have a 
suspected terrorist in custody who can reveal the location and nature of the attack. In 
order to extract the relevant information it will be necessary to torture the suspected 
terrorist. The ‘ticking time bomb’ scenario is a problematic starting point for real 
world emergency politics. It is a trite construction which has never actually occurred. 
Honig points out that the ticking time bomb scenario, aside from being unrealistic, 
presents the dilemmas of emergency politics as a stark choice between two untenable 
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options.
319
 Real world politics never presents such oppositions. Furthermore, the 
notion of a ticking time bomb is used to cut short debate on how a government acts 
or if it should act at all. The time bomb scenario posits a situation in which 
governments have no choice, they must act. However, governments always have a 
choice, even the declaration of an emergency is a choice and a decision. Deliberation 
of whether or not to act should not be excluded from emergency politics. 
The ELM is based on “three essential components: official disobedience, 
disclosure and ex post ratification.”320 These three conceptual components of the 
model operate on the rule of law which Gross understands as categorical rules and 
norms which state officials must obey in all normal circumstances. These categorical 
rules and norms are supplemented with “highly circumscribed, but effective, escape 
mechanisms.”321 According to the ELM if a state official feels it necessary to violate 
a law or constitutional principle in order to effectively respond to a violent threat to 
the nation she may do so. When she acts the state official is acting extra-legally 
without any prior sanctioning of her actions. After the actions are complete she must 
openly acknowledge her actions and wait for ex post ratification or rejection of her 
actions. Rejection of her actions may involve a range of consequences from full 
criminal prosecution to social and moral condemnation entailing no official 
punishment. Society may determine that the official acted justly and does not 
deserve any form of punishment or even that she deserves a reward of some kind. 
 The first conceptual component of the ELM model is official disobedience. 
The ELM model does not allow for any alteration to a legal order so that an 
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emergency may be resolved. No measures, statutes or constitutional provisions or 
principles may be suspended or manipulated in any way that would give state 
officials more discretion when dealing with an emergency. Gross states forcefully 
that, “[t]he model rejects the possibility of ex ante lawful override of concrete legal 
rule and principles or, indeed of rule obedience itself…”322 State officials, like 
everyone else in society, should obey all laws at all times even if they happen to 
disagree with a specific statute.
323
 However, the ELM also acknowledges and 
expects that there will be times of crisis when state officials “regard strict obedience 
to legal authority as irrational or immoral.”324 These are situations in which 
following the strict letter of the law would lead to consequences which are far worse 
than the violation of a specific statute or constitutional principle.  
According to Gross, the “ticking time-bomb” scenario is a clear example of 
such a situation in which through violating a law against torture a state official is 
able to obtain information that will allow for the diffusing of the bomb and saving of 
hundreds if not thousands of lives. In that situation, Gross contends it would be 
immoral and irrational to obey the legal command against torture. The moral good of 
saving innocent lives outweighs the moral evil of violating the ban on torture. 
Because the ELM does not allow for ex ante suspension of the rule of law, in all 
cases in which a state official violates a law in the name of a higher moral good that 
official will be, in no uncertain terms, breaking the law. Gross stresses forcefully that 
“[r]ule departure constitutes, under all circumstances and all conditions, a violation 
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of the relevant legal rule.”325 Gross always refers to these types of actions by state 
officials as ‘extra-legal’, never illegal. This terminological quirk does not diminish 
the fact that the ELM forces state officials to commit acts which should be 
considered criminal and subject to punishment. Whether the official will be 
considered a criminal and punished accordingly depends entirely upon the process of 
ex post ratification, discussed below. 
 The ELM model does not pose any limits on the type or scope of actions a 
state official may take when acting extra-legally. Once they break the law they can 
do whatever they feel is necessary, so long as they openly acknowledge what they 
did and ask for ratification after the fact. This means that “Extra-legal power can 
only mean an unlimited power, constrained neither by any legal norms nor by 
principles and rules of the constitutional order.”326 Gross rejects even basic 
restrictions on extra-legal state violence. Instead, he hopes that state officials will 
embody Max Weber’s ‘ethic of political responsibility.’327 These officials recognize 
that politics is a vocation which may force them to violate the laws and principles 
they wish to save. Because they adhere to an ethic of political responsibility, Gross 
claims, they will be extremely cautious when violating those laws and principles. 
Ethical politicians would be less likely to abuse extra-legal activity, thus removing 
the need for ex ante limits on extra legal action to respond to an emergency. Gross 
also relies on the processes of public disclosure and ex post ratification to prevent 
state officials from committing truly heinous acts or from moving the state toward 
dictatorship and tyranny, to which we now turn.  
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Official disobedience forces individual state officials to make their own 
determinations as to whether or not a state of emergency exists. It privatizes the 
decision on the exception, in a sense, suspending contestation over the decision until 
after the official has already acted. Gross essentially turns all state officials or any 
individual acting extra-legally into a sovereign political actor. The problem with this 
move is that he removes the element of political contestation which can be found in 
the problematic of the exception. Political contestation over extra-legal actions is 
necessary because it can help prevent abuse of emergency powers and also provide 
some measure of accountability for state officials, even if the accountability is 
politically determined. 
 The ELM re-introduces a reduced form of political contestation only after the 
official has acted extra-legally. It demands that those state officials who take extra-
legal actions publicly and candidly disclose those actions. Gross states: “public 
officials who act extra-legally in extreme cases need to acknowledge openly the 
nature of their actions and attempt to justify both their actions and their undertaking 
of those actions.”328 This public disclosure of extra-legal actions is “a critical 
ingredient of the ELM model.”329 He argues that it is in the best interests of a state 
official who acted extra-legally to admit their actions and seek ex post ratification 
from society at large. Gross uses a romantic image of an official “boldly” 
acknowledging their actions, giving reasons for their violation of the law and 
selflessly throwing themselves “on the justice of [their] country.”330 In the immediate 
aftermath of a national emergency society at large will be more likely to justify any 
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actions that normally would have been judged solely as criminal.
331
  Additionally, 
the extra-legal nature of the actions themselves would push a state official towards 
disclosure. Presumably the official would be scared that if they did not admit their 
actions but the actions were exposed at a later time society would be less likely to 
ratify them.  
However, while Gross claims that disclosure is essential he never explains 
how state officials could ever be compelled to do it. The ELM model contains no 
institutional guarantee that officials would have to disclose their extra-legal actions. 
Rather than admit what they did state officials may find it in their best interests to 
cover up their actions behind state secrecy. Thompson notes that in the United States 
“almost 10,000 new secrets a day” are created and that “a massive ‘culture of 
secrecy’ has spread with little oversight throughout the government.”332 Sagar claims 
that any disclosure of official conduct is ironically flawed because the public must 
rely on the “faithfulness of officials” for their information.333 And there is a good 
chance that officials will attempt to justify their actions based on suppressed 
evidence which cannot be revealed for national security reasons. Finally Weaver and 
Pallito argue that in the US the state secrecy privilege has been used to cover up a 
variety of criminal acts by state officials. These include illegal surveillance of 
telephone conversations, money laundering by the Central Intelligence Agency and 
evidence in the Iran/Contra scandal which led to the case against the key defendant 
being dropped.
334
 These three brief examples directly challenge Gross’ claim that 
officials will, of their own accord, disclose their extra-legal actions. Gross does not 
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give any current examples of state officials disclosing their actions immediately after 
committing them. He describes Cicero’s actions during the Catiline conspiracy but, 
as noted in chapter one, using Roman history for contemporary theory is fraught with 
difficulty.
335
 Without a guarantee that state officials will be forced to disclose the full 
nature of extra-legal actions this conceptual component of Gross’ ELM is 
impractical. Sometimes information and evidence is brought to light, either through 
investigative journalism, whistleblowers, or declassification of secret documents. 
When and if information becomes available a process of ex post ratification can take 
place. Unfortunately, the damage of the extra-legal action will already have been 
done.  
Ex post ratification of extra-legal action is the third and final conceptual 
component of the ELM model. It is a process of public debate, deliberation and 
judgment. After a state official has committed and disclosed their extra-legal actions 
“[i]t is up to society as a whole, ‘the people’, to decide how to respond ex post to 
extra-legal actions taken by government officials in response to extreme 
exigencies.”336 Furthermore, in the process of public deliberation the entire society 
becomes “morally and politically responsible for the decision” of whether or not to 
punish the state official for their extra-legal actions.
337
 Involving all of society is a 
means of reaffirming the laws and constitutional principles which were violated. 
Gross hopes that through a variety of information technologies a great number of 
citizens would be able to participate in the deliberation. Certainly some would have 
more influence than others but everyone, in their own way, should have their voice 
heard. Presumably, this would be a highly politicized process. In that case, it makes 
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no sense to leave such political contestation until after the extra-legal acts have been 
committed.  
The final outcome of the deliberation can take many forms. The official 
could be praised for their actions and willingness to do what was necessary to protect 
the nation as a whole. Alternatively they may be put on trial and if found guilty face 
full legal punishment. Gross notes two main categories of ratification or rejection. 
One is legal; the other is political and social.
338
 Legal forms of ratification include 
discretion on the part of prosecutors who could decide not to bring charges against 
the state official, executive clemency, or an Act of Indemnity by parliament which 
would either shelter the official from legal punishment or legalize the illegal act 
committed by the official.
339
 Political and social ratification can take a variety of 
forms. The offending official could be awarded a medal for their conduct. 
Alternatively they could be ostracized by society for violating fundamental 
principles of the society. Gross cites the case of British Air Marshal Arthur Harris as 
an example of political and social ostracizing of an offending official. Harris was 
responsible for the saturation bombing of Germany during WW2. While his actions 
were deemed necessary they were also seen as morally reprehensible and hence not 
to be celebrated.
340
  
Gross claims that the process of ex post deliberation and ratification or 
rejection of an official’s action poses significant limitations on the potential abuse of 
extra-legality. So much so that officials may even be over-encumbered by the 
burden. The process of ex post deliberation curtails abuse of extra-legality because 
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the ratification it can bestow on an official is ‘prospective and uncertain.’ Ensuring 
that possible “ratification follows rather than precedes, [extra-legal] action,” the 
ELM “raises both the individual and national costs of pursuing an extra-legal course 
of action…”341 Gross presumes that officials will be so worried about not their 
actions not being ratified that they will be far less likely to resort to extra-legal action 
in the first place. And if they feel they must they will use the minimum amount 
possible, thereby minimizing the severity of any future punishments, be they legal, 
social or political. However, without a guarantee that officials will publicly disclose 
their actions the process of ex post ratification rings hollow.  
Additionally, A.V. Dicey, who Gross draws on for his model of prospective 
and uncertain ex post ratification, notes that empirically speaking, “the expectation… 
that parliament will pass an Act of Indemnity ‘has not been disappointed.’”342 Even 
so ex post ratification poses significant limitations on state officials, Gross claims. 
Officials will be uncertain as to the scope of the indemnification or ratification of 
their actions. Perhaps they will be spared criminal prosecution but not civil suits. Or 
perhaps their own nation will not prosecute them but international courts might.
343
 
The point of ex post ratification is to generate uncertainty on the part of the state 
official before they act. Even if their actions are usually excused Gross hopes that the 
uncertainty of ex post ratification will be enough to limit the use and abuse of extra-
legal action. 
The ELM model does not fully move beyond Schmitt’s problematic of the 
exception. It removes any form of democratic, political contestation from sovereign 
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decisions regarding the declaration of an emergency or what should be done in 
response to it. Gross believes that officials can be trusted to act as moral individual 
sovereigns. This individual responsibility is further complicated by the fact that 
Gross grants state officials unlimited power when acting extra-legally. This renders 
extra-legal action very close to the reading of Schmitt’s sovereign that Gross is 
trying to argue against.  
The most profound flaw with the ELM is its lack of democratic contestation 
over sovereign decision-making. Gross’s model places sovereign decision-making in 
the hands of individuals even more than Schmitt’s theory.  Sovereign, extra-legal 
constituent power is a fundamental aspect of liberal-democratic regimes. As such it 
should not be removed from the process of deciding whether or not a state of 
emergency should be declared. Relying on state officials to act without democratic 
oversight is just as harmful to democratic governance as the enactment of emergency 
laws which have a tendency to become normalized. In both cases the ‘normal’ legal 
order, as Gross understands it, is violated by an uncontested political decision that 
law has no place in an emergency. 
Dyzenhaus – The Legality Model 
Dyzenhaus argues that a substantive conception of the rule of law can help 
prevent attempts by the executive and legislature to govern outside of law via the 
creation of spaces in which the rule of law does not apply. For Dyzenhaus these legal 
voids come in to two forms: grey holes and black holes.
344
 A black hole is a legally 
produced void which explicitly excludes the rule of law. In a grey hole the rule of 
law is also absent however a thin façade of legality has been put in place. In a grey 
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hole it appears as though the state is acting legally even though substantive legal 
protections are not in place.
345
 Since Dyzenhaus acknowledges that the rule of law is 
a genuine choice during an emergency he does not argue that grey or black holes 
cannot be created. He even goes so far as to argue that “it is quite consistent with 
such an aspirational conception [of the rule of law] to hold that there can be a zone 
of illegality, a space where arbitrary power and not law rules.”346 A zone of illegality 
is consistent with Dyzenhaus’ conception of the rule of law so long as whoever is 
attempting to create the black hole, be it the executive or the legislature, provides a 
rationale which is compatible with the fundamental principles of the rule of law. In a 
situation such as that the judiciary should defer to executive judgment.
347
 
Dyzenhaus’ conception of the rule of law in liberal democratic regimes is 
highly normative, especially when the issue is whether or not to respond to 
emergencies with the rule of law. His understanding of the rule of law is that “the 
idea of legal order, government in accordance with the rule of law, is an aspirational 
ideal, an attempt to make law serve justice.”348 The rule of law is an ongoing and 
always incomplete project in which all branches of government productively 
cooperate.
349
 I agree with the principle behind this claim. We should understand the 
rule of law as always in a process of renovation. However, I disagree with 
Dyzenhaus that a substantive conception of law, as he understands it, can be useful 
for regulating attempts by state officials to wield emergency powers. I will develop 
this point below. Liberal democratic governments, whether they are based on a 
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written constitution or not, should always attempt to ensure that all state action is 
regulated by law. Whether or not governments will always govern through law is 
another matter. 
The “Legality model… insists that the values of the rule of law are not to be 
compromised. It also preserves the separation between the exceptional and the 
normal. It holds that to the extent that political power can be successfully subjected 
to the discipline of the rule of law, it should be.”350 These ideas “function not as an 
assumption but as an ideal; at most… a regulative assumption… one adopts for 
political reasons.”351 The idea that state power should be subject to the rule of law is 
certainly worth considering but it may be the case that Dyzenhaus’ account is too 
prescriptive. Indeed he states that the empirical record largely supports Schmitt’s 
theory rather than his own. While Dyzenhaus’ theory cannot be discounted purely 
because reality has not lived up to its ideal there are serious theoretical points which 
need to be addressed. 
The Legality model is based on the normative assumption that “a substantive 
conception of the rule of law that is appropriate at all times.”352 Whether or not a 
state acts in accordance with the rule of law is a matter of politics. However, there 
are no situations in which the rule of law is not or should not be able to function. 
This is true even when the texts of emergency legislation, if they exist, do not say 
anything specifically useful for a situation or even when the legislation is “obviously 
unhelpful.”353 On this account, it is possible for all branches of government to 
respond to a time of crisis through the rule of law. This is because the rule of law 
                                                          
350
 Dyzenhaus, ‘The State of Emergency in Legal Theory’, p. 83-84 
351
 Dyzenhaus, ‘The State of Emergency in Legal Theory’, p, 84 
352
 Dyzenhaus, Constitution of Law, p. 58 
353
 Dyzenhaus, Constitution of Law, p. 8 
141 
 
contains fundamental principles and values which judges and other state officials can 
draw upon. Even if their actions do not meet the letter of the law, they can conform 
to those substantive principles.  
Dyzenhaus’ “conception of the rule of law is substantive: the rule of law is 
the rule of fundamental constitutional principles which protect individuals from 
arbitrary action by the state.”354 The most important of the principles are the liberty 
and equality of all citizens. He argues that these fundamental principles of the rule of 
law pose genuine constraints on “those who wield public power in a way that 
protects the interests of the individuals subject to those decisions.”355 These 
principles of the rule of law are more important than the legislation based on them. 
They form an “interpretive backdrop” for judges and officials.356 In tough cases 
when the rule of law is under stress and the texts of law may or may not be helpful 
these fundamental principles act as a guide for the actions of state officials and 
particularly to judges if and when they are given the opportunity to assess the 
legality of state responses to declared emergencies. 
The Legality model presents to strategies for ensuring that a government can 
uphold a substantive notion of the rule of law even while responding to a situation it 
has declared to be an emergency. They are the assumption of constitutionality and 
maintaining a version of Kelsen’s Identity Thesis.  Both strategies are prescriptive in 
nature. Dyzenhaus contends that “One must… hold in place the assumption that the 
government is bound to govern in accordance with the rule of law, what we might 
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think of as the assumption of constitutionality.”357 Here Dyzenhaus is not making an 
ontological claim regarding the relationship between the state and law; he is arguing 
that we should treat the state as bound by law even though that is not necessarily the 
case. While this assumption appears to function positively it is unclear why officials 
would abide by it when it would serve to limit their actions during times when they 
feel that a state is facing an existential crisis.  
 The assumption of constitutionality is supported in Dyzenhaus work by the 
normative claim that “one needs to maintain Hans Kelsen’s Identity Thesis: the 
thesis that the state is totally constituted by law.”358 Notice again that Dyzenhaus 
does not rest his argument on an ontological foundation. Maintaining the identity 
thesis is a choice which must be made by state officials. Following A.V. Dicey, 
Dyzenhaus further claims that “when a political entity acts outside the law, its acts 
can no longer be attributed to the state and so they have no authority.”359 Here 
Dyzenhaus’ argument is both prescriptive and ontological or rather he has a 
preferred ontology of the relationship between the state and law but he does not 
claim that his vision must be true. The state should only be recognized as such when 
its actions conform to the rule of law. And here the rule of law must be understood as 
the rule of fundamental substantive principles of legality and not as a set of norms 
created by a pre-given set of procedures regardless of substantive content, as in 
Kelsen’s work. Authority and truth make law but if a political entity wishes to be an 
authority it must subject itself to the rule of law.
360
 Dyzenhaus contends that if there 
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is no authority to legitimately act outside of law the problems created by the 
prerogative and extra-legal power can be avoided.    
Yet he also concedes that the legislature or the executive may create black 
holes within the rule of law and further that judges may or may not have the ability 
to resist the creation of such legal voids.
361
 Dyzenhaus argues that judges are bound 
by a duty to uphold the rule of law project even if they are not legally capable of 
doing so. They should use whatever means they have at their disposal which may be 
as minimal as making public statements that the state is attempting to act outside of 
law. Judges should always treat the state an entirely constituted by law, especially 
when adjudicating the legality of practices during a crisis. On the one hand, 
Dyzenhaus accepts the ontological claim that the state and law are separate and, on 
the other, to argue that we must treat them as mutually constitutive of one another.  
  Judges play an important though by no means central role in 
Dyzenhaus’ model. Judges have “a constitutional duty to uphold the rule of law 
even, perhaps especially, in the face of indications from the legislature or the 
executive that they are trying to withdraw from the rule-of-law project.”362 
Dyzenhaus devotes considerable space within his The Constitution of Legality to 
studies of cases in which judges either upheld the rule of law in a time of stress or to 
the dissents from cases in which the rule of law was not upheld, when the possibility 
that it could have was not taken up. Judges however do not necessarily play the 
central role in the rule of law project. In common law countries where parliament is 
supreme and can make any law it likes and where judges may not have the ability to 
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review legislation judges may be reduced to the role of “weatherman.”363 As 
weathermen, judges are reduced to merely alerting the public that the government 
wishes to free itself from rule of law constraints and that their liberty may be in 
jeopardy. Dyzenhaus’ legality model takes a minimal stake in regulating the abuse of 
emergency powers. His focus on the ability of judges to simply alert the general 
populace that the state or state officials are governing outside of law does little 
develop genuine constraints on abuse of powers. 
The Legality model holds that a space beyond law should not be postulated 
by liberal legal theory. Indeed the Legality model is premised on the idea that a 
space beyond law need not and should not exist. Furthermore Dyzenhaus goes so far 
as to deny that constituent power is a fundamental element of liberal-democratic 
governance that liberal legal theory needs to address. He claims that for liberal legal 
theory “the question of constituent power simply does not arise.”364 The political 
then, does not exist outside the boundaries of law as it does in Schmitt’s thought. 
Only those who seek to undermine the liberal rule of law postulate the existence of a 
space beyond law according to Dyzenhaus.
365
 This version of liberal legal theory has 
a self imposed blindness to even the question of what may lie outside the boundaries 
of law. This blindness is not based on an ontological account of the relationship 
between law and what lies outside it. Dyzenhaus is making a prescriptive claim that 
liberal legal theory should treat law as all encompassing in order to ensure that all 
state actions are governed by law. As shown in chapter two such blindness is 
unacceptable. Decisions regarding states of emergency are made in a context of 
political contestation. Denial of a space of constituent power and politics betrays a 
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lack of democratic thinking in Dyzenhaus’ approach. This is particularly problematic 
because the fundamental and substantive values on which Dyzenhaus’ conception of 
the rule of law is based are ‘evaluative concepts’ which are equally subject to 
disagreement and political contestation. 
It is unclear in Dyzenhaus’ work how a set substantive fundamental values 
and principles which “are not to be compromised,” can function as an ‘interpretive 
backdrop’ for judges and state officials engaged in a rule of law project.366 Concepts 
like security, order, liberty and equality are ambiguous. As Schmitt’s work makes 
clear such concepts are empty of content until they are decided upon during specific 
instances of their application. As such they are subject to political contestation. Any 
interpretation by a judge would be an act of politics.  
By presenting certain values as fundamental principles the Legality model 
attempts to remove them from political contestation. In a state committed to an 
agonistic and radical notion of democracy these principles as well as their 
interpretation and application should be open to debate. The Legality model then 
attempts to limit political contestation. However, it cannot account for which 
principles are to be marked off as fundamental and which are open to legitimate 
contestation. It creates a conceptual opposition between using fundamental principles 
and values of law as a basis for ensuring order and legality during a time of declared 
emergency and the democratic necessity of open and legitimate contestation of those 
values and principles.  
Dyzenhaus does not make it clear how a liberal-democratic regime can allow 
for these values and principles to be openly contested and at the same time serve as 
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the foundation of legality and legitimate authority. When those values and principles 
are contested the state must make a determination as to what is considered a 
legitimate object of contestation. It must also determine what means of contestation 
are considered legitimate. Such decisions concern legal order as a whole. Thus, 
neither the legal order itself nor any values and principles which can be considered 
fundamental can serve as the entire basis for making those decisions. 
Quarantining or prioritizing certain values and principles at the expense of 
others and political contestation would be a political act. There is no way to utilize 
substantive values and principles without making decisions about how far legitimate 
contestation can be pursued. A political decision will have to be made as to how far 
contestation may proceed. And further decisions will be made and remade as judges 
attempt to utilize those values and principles as they adjudicate state responses to 
times of declared crisis. It is only through the process of adjudication that those 
values and principles will be concretized within the legal order. Judges, in the 
Legality model, will partake in the politics of law whereas they are presented as 
bringing to light an inner morality of law. This inner morality of law can only exist 
in and through political contestation over its content, definition and characteristics.  
The Legality model does not escape the problematic of the exception set forth 
by Schmitt. It acknowledges that “power may triumph over law.”367 However, it 
excludes the possibility of theorizing how power accomplishes this by its denial of 
sovereign, constituent power. While the Legality model attempts to eradicate the 
political its influence is still present. In acknowledging that power may triumph over 
law Dyzenhaus is contradicting his claim that the question of constituent power is 
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one that liberal legal theory does not need to address. The political sits just outside 
the Legality model threatening to disrupt it at any moment. Rather than merely trying 
to dismiss the question of constituent power the legality model needs to confront it 
head on. It is anti-democratic to assume that constituent power is not a question of 
legal theory. The Legality model is overly liberal in its denial of the existence and 
influence of constituent power. Without the consent and approval derived from ‘we 
the people’ it is hard to see how any state can be legitimate even if it is constrained 
by the rule of law.   
The Gross-Dyzenhaus Debate 
The prescriptive models elaborated by Gross and Dyzenhaus share a bias 
towards liberal legality at the expense of democratic participation in sovereign 
decision-making practices. The lack of any theorization of the ability of citizens and 
political groups to have an impact on emergency politics is a severe deficiency in 
both their theories. Focus on elites and paying only lip service to democratic 
participation creates problematic lack of attention to democratic theory in their 
work.
368
 Dyzenhaus simply denies that liberal legal theory needs to pay any attention 
to the question of constituent power. However, as I argued in chapter two, 
constituent power is a fundamental element of liberal-democratic regimes. 
Furthermore, that constituent power is split and engages in political contestation over 
sovereign decisions. The lack of democratic theory is just as stark in Gross’s ELM 
model, especially since it relies so heavily on public and democratic deliberation for 
ex post ratification of extra-legal acts. The legitimacy of any ex post facto judgment 
rests in the fact that it is made by a sovereign people in whose name the act was 
committed.  
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Both theorists focus on the role of elites in emergency politics, Dyzenhaus on 
the role of judges, Gross on state officials. They address the issue of emergency 
powers from a “top-down view of the law.”369 Both are concerned with the actions of 
state officials, whether they are responding to emergencies in a spirit of legality or 
acting extra-legally. The effect of this perspective according to Campbell is to 
“diminish the importance of legal claims-making” by those affected by emergency 
powers.
370
 Campbell’s point reminds Gross and Dyzenhaus that law is a double 
edged sword and further that ordinary citizens and social groups may play a large 
role in how emergency regimes are carried out in practice. Gross and Dyzenhaus’ 
work is not thereby invalid, but its scope is limited. Gross’s ELM model in particular 
especially because it depends so heavily on participation from society at large. 
Certainly he acknowledges and defends participation on the part of society but he 
does not elaborate enough the ways in which average citizens could engage with 
emergency regimes aside from participating in the process of ex post ratification. 
Campbell’s criticism also holds for Dyzenhaus’ work. Dyzenhaus is so concerned 
with the role of judges and legislators that he largely ignores political actors outside 
the state. A broader perspective could enrich both scholars work. 
Both scholars do make brief remarks to the effect that institutional safeguards 
can never fully protect society from abuse of emergency powers by state officials. A 
citizenry that is on guard and ready to fight for their liberties is the best defense 
against the widening scope of emergency regimes. However neither scholar lends 
much conceptual or theoretical weight to such statements.  Those comments have 
more polemical and rhetorical significance than anything else. Both Gross and 
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Dyzenhaus “start from a conceptual framework in which only law has value that is 
simultaneously normative and institutional.”371 As noted above, they rely on 
Kelsen’s Identity Thesis, that the state is entirely constituted by law. This means that 
both consider law as the only legitimate means for limiting the scope and potential 
abuses of emergency powers. They disagree merely “over how law should regulate 
the exercise of emergency powers…”372 The idea that law may not be the only or the 
best means for regulating emergency regimes is excluded from their theories. Indeed, 
their work excludes the possibility of extra-legal political contestation over sovereign 
decision-making.  
Conclusion 
Both models uphold the norm/exception binary. Gross’s reliance on his 
assumption that emergencies call for extraordinary government responses and his use 
of the notion of a catastrophic case replay the approach to emergency politics taken 
by theorists of dictatorship. However, his ‘Extra-Legal Measures’ model provides 
even less constraint on actions taken by state officials than Rossiter’s model of 
constitutional dictatorship. Dyzenhaus acknowledges that the distinction between 
normal and exceptional times is politically determined. Unfortunately his theory 
excludes any possibility of theorizing how those determinations are made or 
contested. In order to move past the norm/exception binary liberal legalism will have 
to accept the notion of sovereign, extra-legal, political power in order to theorize 
emergency politics in a way that opens space for democratic practices.  
The prescriptive models developed by Gross and Dyzenhaus to limit 
emergency powers are ultimately not practical responses to Schmitt’s problematic of 
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the exception. We need to move beyond their work because it inadequately theorizes 
the democratic aspects of emergency politics. Their works largely exclude the 
possibility of popular participation and contestation in sovereign decision-making 
processes by attempting to eliminate the possibility of any legitimate extra-legal 
power. Democratic contestation cannot be properly theorized without accepting the 
idea that there is a sphere of political contestation and sovereign decision making 
that takes place outside of law. Emergency politics cannot and should not be trapped 
within legal order.  
Ironically, Dyzenhaus argues that at the end of the day the best resource for 
preventing the abuse of emergency powers and the slide into legal black holes is a 
vigilant populace.
373
 However, his focus on substantive values underlying legality 
and judges as weatherman makes this possibility more difficult. As does his position 
that sovereign power cannot and should not exist outside of legal order. Extra-legal 
sovereign power is essential for democratic control over emergency powers because 
it is a space in which political contestation over sovereign and emergency decisions 
can take place. Liberal-democracy requires a notion of the people as an extra-legal 
sovereign and implies the possibility that they, as well as elected officials and 
institutional elites, have a stake in processes of emergency decision-making. This is 
the case even though ‘the people’ are constitutively split with various groups 
engaged in continuous political struggles against one another. Dyzenhaus’ and 
Gross’ theories do not adequately account for this possibility. They deny the extra-
legal, political space of contestation over sovereign decisions. 
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Chapter 5 – Against Exceptionalism in Emergency Politics 
Introduction 
 The previous chapters of this thesis have demonstrated that theories of 
emergency politics which rely on any version of the norm/exception binary are ill-
suited to opening spaces for democratic practices in emergency politics. A new 
approach will need to be developed. This chapter evaluates two attempts to move 
beyond the norm/exception binary in emergency politics. Nomi Lazar attempts to 
show that the ethical norms of governance are the same in emergency as well as 
ordinary times. Bonnie Honig argues that agency, decisions, and emergencies are in 
fact deeply embedded within various paradoxes at the heart of liberal-democratic 
regimes. She also argues that emergencies should be understood as manifestations of 
political contingency. I strongly agree with the general aim of their approaches. 
While both theorists work is useful for beginning the move away from 
exceptionalism each project has major flaws which need to averted in order to 
continue. Lazar’s work does not remove the norm/exception binary but rather 
transposes it to the realm of ethics. Bonnie Honig’s work does not fully succeed 
because she attempts to place Rousseau’s paradox of politics as the fundamental 
paradox of liberal-democracy. The paradox of politics however cannot account for 
the political and the forms of contestation it generates. 
Ethics Against Exceptionalism 
Lazar begins her argument by pointing out that “[o]verwhelmingly, 
emergencies and emergency powers are treated with reference to this dichotomy 
between norms and exceptions…”374 She claims that “a theoretical framework for 
thinking about emergencies grounded in the norm/exception dichotomy is 
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empirically and ethically suspect. This is true regardless of whether one accepts or 
rejects exceptions to norms.”375 This is because the norm/exception dichotomy and 
the general discourse of exceptionalism dominant in literature on states of 
emergency hinder attempts to theorize emergency politics by creating a false 
dichotomy where none exists. I would add that such a theoretical framework cannot 
hope to account for the ways in which states of emergency are deeply embedded 
within liberal-democratic regimes.  
The scope of Lazar’s project is modest as she only aims to investigate 
“…how could emergency powers, which impose order through constraint of these 
features [division of powers, and the preservation of rights and freedoms], ever be 
justly constituted and exercised?”376 On her account emergency powers are not 
antithetical to liberal norms and values; on the contrary, they can and must be 
reconciled. She argues that emergencies do not need to be characterized as 
exceptions and that emergency powers are also not exceptional. Furthermore, she 
contends that rights derogations, an all too common feature of emergency 
governance, occur all the time in order to maintain the regime.
377
 For instance a 
person convicted of a crime is stripped of their civil rights then they are incarcerated 
and put in prison. 
I concur with Lazar that the norm/exception dichotomy and the discourse of 
exceptionalism severely limit any understanding of emergency politics and 
specifically the deep connections between the processes of declaring an emergency, 
political contingency and liberal-democracy. My criticisms of Agamben, Dyzenhaus, 
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Gross and modern usages of the roman dictatorship have shown how the 
norm/exception dichotomy confuses attempts to theorize emergency politics. 
Therefore it is necessary to undermine and remove exceptionalism from our 
understanding of emergency politics. However, Lazar’s critique of exceptionalism is 
emergency politics and her attempt to develop an alternative do not succeed. Rather 
than remove the norm/exception binary she transposes it from the realm of politics 
and law to the realm of ethics. 
Against Exceptionalism – Decisionist and Republican 
According to Lazar, “[e]xceptionalism is grounded in the claim that the usual 
norms cease to apply in emergencies.”378 It “is a doctrine fundamentally 
incompatible with democratic accountability,” because it exempts individuals from 
the norms and accountability of democratic governance.
379
 This is a familiar claim. 
The notion of unaccountable individuals is clearly present though in early modern 
political thought. However, it must be added that the necessary association of 
exceptionalism with one individual is not a necessary feature of emergency politics. 
Individuals need not be the only agents associated with emergency powers. Schmitt’s 
work demonstrates that any decision-making processes can be wielded by a variety 
of agents be they individuals, groups or formal institutions. 
Exceptionalism can be divided into two distinct categories according to 
Lazar, decisionist and republican. Machiavelli and Rousseau are classified as 
republican while Schmitt and Hobbes are labeled decisionist. What is common to 
both types of exceptionalism is that they “exempt government from accountability” 
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during emergencies.
380
 Accountability of political leaders is a central feature of 
liberal-democracy and as such cannot be sacrificed in times of emergency. For this 
reason both types of exceptionalism must be rejected. There is, however, a crucial 
difference between them. Republican exceptionalism “exhibits a bifurcated ethics of 
emergency whose parts I term ‘existential’ and ‘quotidian.’ Existential ethics relate 
to founding or preserving a state while quotidian ethics govern life within a state… It 
is not a question of when existential ethics apply but of who may apply them.”381 In 
contrast, “Decisionist exceptionalism… is of a more fundamental kind insofar as 
existential conditions are not governed by existential ethics.”382 Republican 
exceptionalism, on Lazar’s account, allows an individual to switch between 
‘existential’ and ‘quotidian’ sets of norms when confronted with an emergency. Even 
during a declared emergency some norms are in operation, they are just not ordinary, 
everyday norms. Decisionist exceptionalism, by contrast, frees the individual from 
all legal, ethical and moral forms of restraint and accountability. 
Decisionist 
There are a number of problems with Lazar’s account of exceptionalism. The 
categorizations are based on specific readings of those thinkers which are by no 
means uncontroversial or widely accepted. As shown in chapter two, Schmitt’s work 
provides resources for theorizing emergency politics without the norm/exception 
binary, provided we read Schmitt against himself. Categorizing Machiavelli as a 
republican who subscribes to an exceptionalist notion of emergency politics is also 
problematic. As I will show in the next chapter, Machiavelli’s work is useful for 
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conceptualizing emergency politics without exceptionalism. He argues that 
emergencies are manifestations of political contingency and should be governed by 
ethics which serve the end of creating regimes based on justice. 
Lazar’s reading of Schmitt is similar to that of Agamben, Gross and 
Dyzenhaus. She focuses on a narrow reading of Schmitt which necessitates “[a]n 
absolute sovereign [who] is the antidote to the liberal democratic incapacity to 
confront the political as the fundamental distinction between friend and enemy, the 
incapacity to decide who the enemy is.”383 Furthermore: 
 “The political decision, whose protagonist is the sovereign dictator, cannot be made in 
accordance with any further norms, or else it ceases to be a political decision. The nature of the 
decision is and must be existential. Hence, the Schmittian sovereign dictator cannot be understood as 
a figure who weighs and balances competing norms or as someone who acts with the aim of 
preserving some ideal of furthering some beautiful goal.”384  
It is definitely not the case that the sovereign has no goal towards which s/he is 
striving. Sovereign decisions are always politically determined having as their goal 
the preservation of a specific formation of political and legal power. Lazar herself 
notes this when she argues that the sovereign’s “central task is the preservation of the 
state.”385 Sovereign decision-making processes are necessary because liberal-
democratic legal norms are not always able to provide enough guidance. 
Additionally, extra-legal sovereign power is needed to make reflective decisions on 
legal order as a whole.  
Schmitt’s sovereign is not necessarily unrestrained primarily by legal norms. 
He is elusive on this point when he says “the exception is different from anarchy and 
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chaos, order in the juristic sense still prevails even if it is not of the ordinary kind.”386 
On my reading, Schmitt’s sovereign has the option of whether or not to operate in a 
legal void. The dictator decides that there is an exception but also what must be done 
about it. Schmitt did hold the view that the sovereign was unconstrained by law, but 
his theory leaves open the possibility that this need not be the case. Furthermore, 
Schmitt makes no specific mention of moral or ethical norms. He contrasts the 
exception specifically to legal norms. To claim then, as Lazar does, that Schmitt’s 
account of the exception and emergency powers can be reduced to a godlike 
sovereign is not attentive enough to the tensions and ambiguities within Schmitt’s 
own texts. 
Republican 
Lazar rejects republican exceptionalism but argues that Rousseau’s 
distinction between existential and quotidian ethics should be retained. Her rejection 
of Rousseau is based on her reading of his concept of the Legislator. As Lazar reads 
him the legislator is “outside the normal order, is given powers of creation, and is 
charged with the preservation and happiness of his people. This Legislator is 
extraordinary in another, related sense. He is permitted to engage in sketchy 
activities by virtue of his capacity as founder.”387 This reading of the legislator is 
one-sided and misses a crucial aspect characteristic; the legislator may be an 
imposter.
388
 Thus, ‘his people’ should be circumspect about trusting him and his 
actions. Furthermore, any actions will be subject to popular consent. Lazar’s reading 
of Rousseau emphasizes only one aspect of the Legislator. It renders him very close 
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to her reading of Schmitt’s sovereign. Both exist outside the normal order and both 
are allowed to commit ‘sketchy’ acts in order to save the regime. Her take on 
Schmitt’s and Rousseau’s position on individuals who exist at the boundaries of or 
just outside of the legal order are not so different.  
I agree with Lazar that exceptionalism needs to be removed from the way we 
understand emergencies and emergency politics. However, her account of 
exceptionalism is incoherent. Her categorization of thinkers as decisionist or 
republican is not attentive enough to alternate readings of their work. Additionally, 
she misses resources within Schmitt’s texts which I argue aid in the project of 
removing exceptionalism from emergency politics.  
A Bifurcated Ethics of Emergency Governance  
Political ethics are and should be operational in all circumstances, even 
emergencies, on Lazar’s account. She claims that exceptionalism can be removed 
from emergency politics by retaining Rousseau’s distinction between quotidian and 
existential ethics. Exceptionalism can be removed from emergency politics “by not 
allowing existential ethics to suspend the moral weight of quotidian liberal ethics.”389 
“Existential ethics are concerned with the existence of a functional regime. They 
concern conditions such as those at the moment of a state’s creation, or moments at 
which its continuation is in question. Quotidian ethics constitute the substance of the 
structure and apply to the everyday tug of war of policy and politics.”390 The 
difference between the two is that “…existential ethics invoke different and possibly 
higher order criteria to create or preserve the order.”391 On this account, existential 
                                                          
389
 Lazar, States of Emergency in Liberal Democracies, p. 88 
390
 Lazar, States of Emergency in Liberal Democracies, p. 23 
391
 Lazar, States of Emergency in Liberal Democracies, p. 23 
158 
 
ethics and quotidian ethics are both equally constitutive of liberal-democratic 
regimes and both are worth preserving.  
If both types of ethics and the values they help secure are of equal weight 
they will inevitably conflict.
392
 Recognition of conflict caused by the equal weight 
does not lead to moral and political relativism. Rather, it leads to “a descriptive kind 
of pluralism.”393 Liberal-democracy can be characterized by interplay between 
principles and values which liberal rights and institutions attempt to secure. 
Emergency powers are one means to secure those fundamental principles and values 
which may or may not be the best option depending on the situation. Securing the 
state as well as liberal rights are processes which happen simultaneously on a day-to-
day basis. She argues that “[i]f enforcing and upholding order can coexist with rights 
every day, these varying kinds of values can coexist in emergencies too.”394 This sets 
up a situation in which “preserving the state in no way eclipses liberal political 
obligations.”395 The interplay between the principles and values of order and liberal 
rights generates pluralist contestation over which principle or values are more 
important in any given situation.  
Both sets of ethics “are concerned with political order.”396 Political order 
embodies, or is constituted by the quotidian ethics of its respective regime type.
397
 
Order also refers to the ability of a state to maintain order, regardless of its content. 
She asserts that “[w]hen a state is threatened its capacity to maintain order is 
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threatened also, but because this ordering function has a moral character intrinsically 
connected to the rights and civil liberties it derogates, we have a second order 
obligation to preserve the state’s capacity to fulfill its function.”398 For Lazar this 
means that order and the ethics that safeguard it are necessary in any situation, not 
just emergencies. As such it does not make sense to differentiate between normal and 
exceptional situations. The same ethics should be considered in all cases.
399
  
However, the existential ethics which preserve order as such take priority over 
quotidian ethics.  
The concrete difference between existential and quotidian ethics confuses 
Lazar’s work. It would be very difficult to make a definitive or even a useful 
distinction between them. Also, any distinction would be politically determined. 
Thus, contestation over whether a situation required the application existential or 
quotidian ethics would be a core element of emergency politics. As such, the 
distinction cannot be relied upon as a resource for constraining emergency powers.  
This is particularly evident in the case of rights derogations. Lazar attempts 
to reconcile liberalism and emergency powers by demonstrating that rights 
derogations are compatible with liberal values. For Lazar “liberal principles… are 
not coextensive with the political ethics that animate liberal democracies in 
general.”400 Thus, derogating rights privileges existential ethics concerned with 
maintaining a state’s ability to preserve rights over quotidian ethics which concern 
the rights themselves. As mentioned above, rights derogations occur all the time in 
liberal-democratic regimes. Convicted criminals lose a plethora of rights when they 
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are sentenced to a prison term. This would suggest that in cases of criminal law 
derogations embody quotidian ethics. However, if a state were to change the way 
rights are derogated or stop derogating certain rights this could be argued to concern 
existential ethics. For instance, whether or not a state uses capital punishment 
concerns both day to day criminal cases as well as an existential core value of a 
liberal-democratic regime. A strict separation between existential and quotidian 
ethics cannot be maintained.  
The differentiation between existential and quotidian ethics transposes the 
norm/exception binary from the realm of political and legal order to that of ethics. 
The move to ethics does not remove the binary. Nor does Lazar’s work push beyond 
exceptionalism. Rather it contends that when state officials determine that they are 
threatened by a ‘genuine emergency’ they should turn to a set of ethics which allow 
them to derogate the rights of citizens and use emergency powers which may not be 
entirely controllable. Officials are forced to choose between a set of ethics in a 
manner very similar to the way the norm/exception binary forces them to choose 
between the application or suspension of legal order.  Why attempt to distinguish 
between them when each has equal weight, particularly in times of emergency? I 
agree with Lazar that liberal rights and the principle of order will conflict. However, 
there is no need to attempt to bifurcate the ethics of governance which guide the 
actions of state officials depending on the situation they think they face. Forcing that 
choice re-installs the norm/exception binary at the heart of emergency politics.  
 Relying on order as an underlying political value which can be secured via 
different sets of ethics is dubious. Any attempt to define a situation as requiring 
existential over quotidian ethics will be politically determined. Order is an 
‘evaluative’ concept, in Schmitt’s sense of the term. As such it has no content on its 
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own. Political actors determine what constitutes order through sovereign decision-
making processes which involve competing ethical obligations as well as political 
contestation. Determining which set of ethics is appropriate will also be subject to 
fierce political struggle. This problem cannot be resolved by tying order to justice. 
Lazar contends that order and justice are values can be furthered by “a variety of 
formal and informal means.”401 But this formulation simply adds another evaluative 
concept, justice, which must be politically determined by sovereign decision-making 
mechanisms. Thus, Lazar’s work remains somewhat trapped in Schmitt’s 
problematic of the exception. Her attempt to differentiate ethics which apply more in 
emergencies than everyday situations relies on differentiations which are necessarily 
politically determined.  
A Topography of Emergency Powers 
 Theorizing on emergency politics desperately needs an understanding of 
“emergency powers in terms of their continuities with everyday institutions...”402 
Though Lazar’s attempt to remove exceptionalism from emergency politics does not 
succeed she does use another concept which is much more useful. She posits a 
“topography of emergency power,” “a landscape of formal and informal power and 
constraint which officials inhabit.”403 Formal power is made up of institutions, laws, 
offices and procedural norms while informal power is mainly characterized by the 
agency of those people who activate those institutions and offices while animating 
laws and procedures. A topography of emergency powers blend the rule of law and 
rule of humans, highlighting how each is embedded in the other. If governance is 
always a combination of law and agency, formal and informal power then nothing 
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much can change in the event of an emergency. Such a position disconnects agency 
from its usual association “with arbitrariness… [as] opposed to the rule of law.”404 
Such a topography eliminates the norm/exception dichotomy with respect to 
responses to emergencies. It also focuses attention on the intricacies of governance 
and the politics of governance at the core of liberal-democratic regimes. As such, a 
topography of emergency powers should be retained as an analytical concept. 
Ultimately it could allow for a deep investigation of the connection between 
emergency and liberal-democracy. Lazar sees the potential when she argues that “the 
whole political context is relevant, not just the emergency itself. How do a particular 
jurisdiction’s everyday institutions make an emergency more of less likely?”405 
Unfortunately, those are the crucial questions which Lazar’s text does not adequately 
answer. A better approach to this topography can be developed in part through the 
work of Bonnie Honig. Though her attempt to move beyond exceptionalism, as well 
as Schmitt’s problematic of the exception, is unsatisfactory.  
Towards A De-Exceptionalized Emergency Politics 
Honig shares my critique of top-down theories of emergency politics 
exemplified by Gross and Dyzenhaus. States of emergency cannot be reduced to the 
tactics of a small group or even one high ranking state official. Additionally, 
focusing on the rule of law closes down possibilities for democratic participation and 
contestation during declared emergencies. She also finds those theories which 
reinforce the extraordinariness of emergency situations and powers useful to an 
extent but also insufficient for diagnosing and analyzing the problems surrounding 
states of emergency and liberal-democracy. Equally, abuse of emergency powers 
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cannot be fully contained or counter-acted by individuals demanding that their 
human and constitutional rights be upheld. This does not mean for Honig that such 
work is to be discarded, far from it. She writes,  
“Human rights lawyers win victories too valuable to dismiss on behalf of clients caught in 
the security net of the American war on terror. But these victories, won against executive 
power, reaffirm the central identification of the executive branch with sovereign political 
power even while they also attenuate some of its strength. That view of sovereignty tends to 
immobilize popular political action, accents a sense of dependency by ordinary people on the 
prowess of professionals, and hides from view the many capillaries of sovereign power that 
run through the regime and on which executive branch power is deeply dependent. Also 
hidden: the paradoxical dependence of the rule of law on the rule of man, the law’s 
dependence on administrative and judicial discretion as well as on forms of popular political 
action that engage in agonistic struggle with legal structures and institutions.”406  
Honig is not in total opposition to those theories, such as Dyzenhaus’ and Gross’, 
which focus on legal restraints on emergency powers. But she is keen to stress that a 
focus on executive emergency powers, legal constraints of those powers, and 
demands for upholding rights do not exhaust the problem presented by emergency 
politics. Other elements and actors are at involved and Honig’s work seeks to 
demonstrate the importance of these less visible aspects of emergency politics. 
 In order to shed light on these less visible aspects of emergency power Honig 
argues that it is necessary to remove emergency politics from the exceptional and 
extraordinary contexts in which it has been trapped. In essence, she argues, we need 
to “de-exceptionalize the exception.”407 Honig develops two lines of argument in 
support of such a de-exceptionalization. One is to counter Schmitt’s work on 
emergencies or the exception as he named them. To this end she unconvincingly 
argues for an alternate understanding of the miracle as metaphor for the exception. 
She presents an alternate reading of the metaphor of miracle in political theology but 
does not sufficiently explain why the metaphor is needed at all. Next, Honig 
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demonstrates that the ‘decision on the exception’ which Schmitt argues is central to 
the declaration of emergencies and the functioning of legal order is in fact more akin 
to ordinary administrative discretion which is enacted by a plethora of state officials 
in very everyday situations, not simply in declared emergencies. The second line of 
argumentation places the exception and emergency politics in the larger contexts of 
administrative governance, the paradox of politics (as described by Rousseau and 
Connolly), and “ordinary democratic politics.”408 For Honig emergency politics do 
not constitute extraordinary situations distinct from normal, everyday politics. The 
norm/exception binary which guides so much work on states of emergency is flawed 
in that it de-contextualizes emergency politics and removes them from those contexts 
in which they are only one moment or form. Furthermore, emergency politics can 
only be understood when seen as moments of larger struggles over governance. 
Honig argues that, “[e]mergency settings only aggravate and accentuate the ways in 
which we retrench from the more life of democracy to the ‘mereness’ of mere life. 
Thus, the standpoint of emergency casts into sharp relief issues of long-standing 
concern to democratic theory and action.”409 A more complete understanding of 
emergency politics can only be developed once it is re-inserted into the contexts it 
inhabits, particularly the paradox of politics. 
 I agree with the general point that the understanding of states of emergency 
has been removed from its ordinary contexts and been forced into an artificial realm 
of extraordinariness and exceptionalism. I further agree that what is needed is a full 
de-exceptionalization of the exception, or rather a de-exceptionalization of 
emergency politics. However, I disagree with Honig over how such a de-
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exceptionalization can be accomplished and which arguments should be deployed. 
The remainder of this chapter will demonstrate that an alternate conception of the 
metaphor of the exception as miracle is unnecessary because any recourse to political 
theology and miracles is unnecessary when attempting to understand the exception. 
Honig’s criticism moves too far away from Schmitt. It relies on the narrow reading 
of Schmitt argued against in chapter two and does not contextualize his work on the 
exception within the larger scope of his late Weimar work. Finally, this chapter will 
take issue with Honig’s privileging of Rousseau’s paradox of politics as the 
fundamental paradox of democratic politics and emergency politics. The paradox of 
politics is useful but cannot explain with enough detail precisely how liberal-
democratic regimes are deeply implicated in situations which can be defined and 
responded to as states of emergency.  
The Miracle of Metaphor? 
Against Schmitt’s analogy of the exception to the miracle in Christian, 
particularly Catholic, theology, Honig presents Franz Rosenzweig’s conception of 
miracle, which is based on Judaism. She argues that Rosenzweig’s miracle offers a 
better ‘orientation’ to emergency events. Furthermore, the perspective it opens up 
allows citizens to be more receptive to the dependence of sovereign powers on the 
people. However, Honig’s presentation of Rosenzweig’s miracle can have only 
possible prescriptive value. It is one understanding of the exception as miracle 
among many and is ultimately unnecessary. Honig does not argue why any recourse 
to political theology is necessary for emergency politics. 
 Honig claims that Schmitt uses the metaphor of the miracle to ground his 
theory of the exception. Political theology she argues is the method Schmitt used “to 
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secure political sovereignty, something he thinks modern constitutionalism fails to 
do.”410 By presenting the exception as analogous to the miracle Honig claims that 
Schmitt was trying to naturalize his understanding of the exception against other 
possible interpretations. She writes, “In Schmitt’s political theology… theology’s 
concepts are treated as if they possess clear and univocal meanings - we know what 
miracle is - such that they can serve as the ground for unclear or contested political 
concepts we are unclear about: the state of exception.”411 Schmitt was not always so 
clear and unambiguous when analyzing the miracle in politics and theology. In 
chapter five of The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes, a text Honig 
does not discuss, Schmitt faults Hobbes for allowing a differentiation between 
private belief in miracles and public confession that one believes.
412
 He is well aware 
that there is intense debate in both political and theological circles over the meaning 
and status of miracle and the exception. Honig acknowledges this point as well, 
using the miracle as a metaphor for the exception allows Schmitt to comment on two 
debates at once.
413
 However, his comments and position on the matter are very 
underdeveloped. He even notes that “[a] detailed presentation of the meaning of the 
concept of the miracle in this context will have to be left to another time.”414 His 
rhetorical strategy is weak at best and off-handed at worst.  
The function of the miracle in Schmitt’s work is not to ground or secure 
political sovereignty. It does not rely, as Honig claims, on the miracle that the 
metaphor performs in securing a solid foundation for political sovereignty. It is an 
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explanatory metaphor. As argued in chapter two of this thesis, Schmitt’s theory of 
the exception does not rely greatly on political theology or the miracle as metaphor 
for the exception. Schmitt’s political concepts are thoroughly secularized, this-
worldly concepts. There is no miracle of metaphor in Schmitt’s work.  
Nonetheless, Honig posits an alternate metaphor for the exception. She turns 
to Rosenzweig’s account of miracles in Jewish theology to “pluralize the particular 
political theology on which Schmitt’s account is based and from which it draws 
sustenance.”415 On Rosenzweig’s account, as presented by Honig,  
“[t]he miracle is not, pace Hume, about contravention of everyday patterns of existence or 
laws of nature. It is a sign of divine providence that is experienced as such and that opens us up, both 
to providence and to the everyday. It allows or solicits us to experience the everyday as miracle… it 
calls us to experience the apparently steadfast as contingent and as could have been otherwise.”416  
This conception of miracles is, according to Honig, far more productive than 
Schmitt’s for seeking out democratic potentialities which occur during moments 
when sovereign power is active and confronts the people as such. It is easy to see 
how Rosenzweig’s account could be mobilized to demonstrate “the dependence of 
the so-called state of exception upon democratic energies and to mark its 
vulnerability to democratic action and resistance.”417 Indeed, Honig’s position is that 
we can accept the miracle as metaphor for the exception but come to very different 
conclusions when we understand miracles differently from Schmitt.
418
 Yet, while 
Rosenzweig’s miracle may provide a better orientation to sovereignty in emergency 
situations, Honig does not explain why it is necessary that we turn to Rosenzweig or 
any conception of the miracle. Indeed, this line of argumentation takes up 
                                                          
415
 Honig, Emergency Politics, p. 87 
416
 Honig, Emergency Politics, p. 97 
417
 Honig, Emergency Politics, p. 87 
418
 Honig, Emergency Politics, p. 87 
168 
 
prescriptive political theory. Her turn to Rosenzweig is a polemical move designed 
to loosen the grip the narrow reading of Schmitt’s work. Honig is arguing that we 
can turn to this new metaphor, this new orientation towards emergency, not that we 
must.  
Honig does demonstrate that Rosenzweig’s version of the miracle can 
provide resources for democratic participation within emergency politics.
419
 From 
Rosenzweig’s vantage point, “the decision testifies to an unsettling encounter with 
that which disrupts the binary of ordinary –extraordinary. Sovereignty looks more 
contestable than in Schmitt and Agamben, more democratic, more fraught, more 
fragile.”420 Certainly that is a very appealing understanding of miracles. However 
she makes essentially the same argument earlier in Emergency Politics with her 
presentation of Rousseau’s paradox of politics and the lawgiver/charlatan’s reliance 
on popular receptivity, which is discussed below.  
The question still remains of why any recourse to miracles or political 
theology is necessary at all for theorizing emergency politics. As I have argued, 
miracles and political theology are unnecessary for Schmitt. Honig does not provide 
a convincing explanation as to why they are necessary in the form of Rosenzweig 
presents them in. Certainly Honig’s reading of Rosenzweig on miracles could be 
taken up during struggles over emergency powers but it can only be one option 
among many. However, without a justification for why the miracle as metaphor for 
the exception is essential to the understanding of emergency politics Rosenzweig’s 
miracle holds only prescriptive rather than diagnostic value. The miracle as a 
metaphor for the exception is unnecessary. Honig never explains precisely why we 
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need any metaphor of the miracle or any political theology when diagnosing and 
analyzing emergency politics. The theory of the exception or emergency politics in 
general does not need any sort of relation to political theology or the miracle, 
Schmitt’s or Rosenzweig’s. Schmitt’s theory of the exception does not rely on it and 
Honig’s turn to Rosenzweig can only offer a possible alternative conception of the 
miracle as a resource for re-orienting our perspective on the exception.  
Discretion and Decision in the Administrative State 
The second critique Honig develops of Schmitt work concerns his 
understanding of decision. She charges that Schmitt collapses all forms of human 
interpretation and application of law into the moment of a decision on the exception. 
Schmitt, on her reading, presents decision as a moment when law is suspended in 
favor of an unconstrained sovereign. She argues that “within the rule-of-law settings 
that Schmitt contrasts with decisionism, something like the decisionism that Schmitt 
approvingly identified with a dictator goes by the name of discretion and is identified 
(approvingly or disapprovingly) with administrators and with administrative 
governance.”421 Furthermore, “This way of thinking about decisionism takes 
emergency politics out of its exceptionalist context and sets it in the context of larger 
struggles over governance…”422 Her critical strategy is “to recontextualize the 
decision, to demote the ‘decision’ from the extraordinary sovereign prerogative to 
more ordinary forms of administrative discretion upon which the rule of law is in any 
case dependent.”423 She does not deny that in some instances an emergency situation 
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may be decided upon and responded to by a sole individual wielding effectively 
unconstrained power.  
However, this is not always the case, especially when decision is simply one 
form administrative discretion may take. “To say that the state of exception 
privileges decision need not mean that all powers redound to a single unaccountable 
sovereign dictator… Nor… need it necessarily mean that sovereignty is unified in 
and by way of the singular decision.”424 Honig folds decision into the larger concept 
of administrative discretion. Decision is present at all times in legal order, not only in 
those moments when legal order must be suspended in the name self-defense. This 
means that emergency politics are in no way extraordinary. They are bound up in 
everyday administrative governance. The circumstances that can generate emergency 
responses may have an element of the extraordinary about them but the politics they 
engender are simply moments in or articulations of everyday struggles over 
administrative governance. 
Decision as discretion is not antithetical to administrative governance nor, 
Honig argues, is it in opposition to the rule of law as such. Law requires people to 
interpret, implement and apply it. Honig reads Schmitt’s presentation of decision as a 
moment of sovereignty breaking through the static crust of law, whereas she views 
decisions and discretion as the human element that animates law and which law 
cannot do without. However, law does not implement or apply itself. It is up to those 
state officials, lawyers and activists to apply and implement the law, and to contest 
those applications and even the meaning of laws themselves. Honig notes that the 
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methods used to animate, preserve and apply the law may also be used to “undo the 
law.”425 All of these methods require actors to interpret the law.  
The rule of law is not a machine that runs itself. Attempts to deny the human 
elements of law actually end up threatening it. The rule of law in liberal-democratic 
regimes grounds its legitimacy in the fact that the rule of law a form of democratic 
self-rule. Prioritizing the regularity, generality and predictability of the rule of law 
minimizes its democratic underpinnings, closing down prospects for democratic 
participation and politics in times of crisis.
426
 Just as decisions are not antithetical to 
administration - the rule of law and decisionism are not separated by a strict 
dichotomy. Indeed, without decision and discretion the rule of law would cease to 
function and lose legitimacy as an instrument of democratic self-rule.  
Honig’s argument that decision is an element of wider processes of discretion 
does not contradict Schmitt if his later Weimar work is taken into account. Her 
critique is based primarily on Political Theology.  However, Legality and Legitimacy 
does contain a notion of discretion as an element of legal order, particularly in 
situations defined as emergencies. His notion of the supra-legal premium on legality 
necessarily involves elements of discretion. As discussed in chapter two he argues 
that “…the mere possession of state power produces an additional political surplus 
apart from the power that is merely normative and legal, a supralegal premium on 
the lawful possession of legal power… that lies beyond any normative 
consideration.”427 This supra-legal premium is most clearly evident when evaluative 
concepts such as ‘emergency’, ‘security’ and ‘order’ are in need of concrete 
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interpretation and application. Such terms are underdetermined and cannot be simply 
applied by state officials or a sovereign agent. Discretion is necessarily implied 
because the decisions on how such concepts are to be applied lie outside ‘normative 
considerations’. This implies a human element of the rule of law. Discretion is also 
evident in the decision on the exception. Schmitt contends that “…not every 
extraordinary measure, not every police emergency measure or emergency decree, is 
necessarily an exception.” 428 A sovereign agent must choose between the concepts 
of emergency and exception. They must interpret a given situation and decide which 
concept to apply. The rule of law cannot make such a distinction in advance.  
 Thus Honig’s critique of Schmitt’s concept of decision is not incompatible 
with his work. On the contrary it adds more depth to his analysis. My reading of 
Schmitt presented in chapter two also argues that the element of decision/discretion 
within the rule of law need not imply that ‘all powers redound to a single 
unaccountable sovereign dictator’ or that ‘sovereignty is unified in and by way of the 
singular decision’. I argued precisely the opposite position. Schmitt’s work on the 
moment decision needs to be understood in the context of wider struggles of 
individuals and groups to act as sovereign agents. This line of argumentation can be 
furthered by countering Honig’s critique of Schmitt’s account of sovereignty. 
A New Notion of Sovereignty? 
Honig’s alternative conception of sovereignty is compatible with Schmitt’s as 
I read him. On her reading, Schmitt “identifies sovereignty with the power to legally 
suspend law for a time by declaring a state of exception. For Schmitt… the state of 
exception is that paradoxical situation in which the law is legally suspended by 
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sovereign power.”429 As opposed to this narrow reading she argues for a 
conceptualization of popular sovereignty that “is always haunted by heteronomy, 
that the people are always undecidably also a ‘multitude.’”430 Furthermore, Honig 
argues:  
“What if instead of the sovereign as ‘he who decides on the exception’ we thought about 
sovereignty as a set of circuits, contingent arrays of diverse forces and powers…? From such 
a vantage point… sovereignty is not simply that which decides the exception. It is a 
contingent formation that might get relocated or redistributed in contests over whether a state 
of exception should be instituted, in what such a state of exception should consist, and about 
when it should end. When the people… resist or reaffirm or call in all their plurality for the 
institution or end of a state of exception, they reenter the paradox of politics and act as 
sovereign in order to become who they already need to be in order to act as they are.”431  
Finally, she stresses that even a unitary sovereign, such as Rousseau’s lawgiver relies 
on the popular subscription of the masses for their power.
432
 Honig’s sovereignty is 
plural and contested.  
Honig’s correction of Schmitt, that the sovereign is not necessarily the head 
of state or even one person within the state bureaucracy, is right only if one accepts a 
narrow reading of his work. The entirety of Schmitt’s work does not need to be 
discarded in order to develop a more nuanced conception of sovereignty. As 
described in chapter two, within Schmitt’s own work are resources for thinking 
sovereignty differently.  
Schmitt was aware that there is a performative aspect to sovereign. 
Sovereignty is an agency in Schmitt’s work, not a specific agent. Neither is it a 
permanent characteristic of any given individual or group. The sovereign is not 
acting as such until they are able make and enact a decision. Therefore, sovereign 
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power can be enacted by anyone. From this perspective, the sovereign is whichever 
group, institution or individual who is able to have their actions declared sovereign 
during struggles over emergency politics. Political contestation over sovereign 
decision-making renders the concept of discretion all the more relevant. Because any 
state official can attempt to act as a sovereign agent they are able potentially able to 
use their discretion to make sovereign decisions regarding legal order. Thus his 
conceptualization includes a notion of sovereignty as ‘a contingent formation that 
might get relocated or redistributed in contests over whether a state of exception 
should be instituted’.  
Schmitt’s understanding of sovereignty is more useful for conceptualizing 
emergency politics than Honig’s because it can more fully account for democratic 
contestation over decisions regarding declaration of an exception. On Honig’s 
account contestation over sovereign decision-making practices involves citizens who 
are both ‘a people’ and ‘a multitude’; that is, a unified group of political actors and a 
collection of individuals and sub-groups with differing interests. The nexus between 
‘a people’ and ‘a multitude’ is plurality. A multitude attempts to make itself a people 
continuously but, it is always ‘haunted by heteronomy’. This account is insufficient 
because it does not include any notion of the political. What prevents ‘a multitude’ 
from becoming ‘a people’ are the effects of the political. By focusing on plurality 
Honig’s conceptualization of sovereignty cannot account for the political 
contestation over sovereign decision-making processes described in chapter two.  
Including the political also helps explain how sovereign decisions appear, at 
least initially, as claims. Any claim by an agency that it is making a sovereign 
decision will have to be taken up by those to whom it is addressed. Not every person 
or group will necessarily agree with attempts to make sovereign decisions. 
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Contestation is thus assured. Schmitt’s work accounts for Honig’s argument that 
sovereignty involves resisting, reaffirming or calling for decisions regarding states of 
emergency. It also accounts for the ‘democratic energies’ on which sovereign 
decisions rely. 
 Honig’s critiques of Schmitt as well as the alternatives she proposes do not 
undermine his work. On the contrary, they add to his analysis as I have read him. It 
is important to recognize that sovereign decisions can sometimes take the form of 
administrative discretion. Sovereign decisions must also be understood as occurring 
in a context of contestation between political agents vying to have their actions 
recognized as sovereign. Honig’s critique of Schmitt de-exceptionalizes the 
exception no more than the reading of his work presented in chapter two.  
The Paradox of Politics 
Honig’s second line of argumentation places emergency politics at the heart 
of what she, following Rousseau, refers to as the paradox of politics.
433
 This move 
attempts to de-exceptionalize emergency politics by placing them in continuous 
struggle of the people to make and re-make themselves as well as ‘good law.’ 
Additionally, Honig links emergencies to emergence and a ‘politics of becoming’, as 
developed by Connolly.
434
 On this view emergency politics play out on a terrain of 
radical contingency and concern efforts to sustain a regime even as it is constantly 
(re)shaped. While Honig is right to situate emergency politics as embedded in a 
paradox of democracy, the paradox of politics does not provide sufficient 
explanatory power. It focuses attention on how the multitude struggles to make itself 
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a people but it does not explain why and how such struggles come to be experienced 
as threat or emergency.  
Honig proposes that, when diagnosing and analyzing emergencies, we shift 
our attention from the paradox of sovereignty (the unitary sovereign which sits both 
inside and outside the legal order and retains the ability to suspend the order in its 
entirety) to the paradox of politics. This paradox is “a fundamental problem of 
democracy” and consists in the fact that “power must rest with the people but the 
people are never so fully who they need to be (unified, democratic) that they can be 
counted upon to exercise their power democratically. As Rousseau put it, you need 
good men to make good law, but you need good law to make good men. How do you 
break this vicious circle?”435  There are other paradoxes at work in liberal-democracy 
as well, such as: the paradox of new rights, the paradoxical dependence of the rule of 
law on the rule of man, and the paradox of bounded communities.
436
 Honig claims 
that these paradoxes are of use for analyzing emergency politics but essentially they 
are all proxies or variations of the more fundamental paradox of politics. All can aid 
in explicating emergency politics. However, the paradox of sovereignty tends to be 
reified in much of the current literature. In opposition to such unwarranted reification 
Honig argues that we need to “decenter the paradox of the state of exception and see 
it in connection with other paradoxes addressed here…”437 On Honig’s account the 
paradox of politics is the most fundamental problem facing the people in liberal-
democratic regimes.  
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Emergency politics re-enact and re-activate the paradox of politics. Crucially, 
this move allows for a dramatic re-interpretation of emergency. Within the paradox 
of politics emergency is more akin to everyday contingency rather than extraordinary 
circumstance. Honig phrases the shift as such: “The paradox of politics posits 
democracy as always embedded in the problem of origins and survival: how to 
(re)shape a multitude into a people, daily. From the perspective of this paradox, we 
see democracy as a form of politics that is always in emergence in response to 
everyday emergencies of maintenance.”438 This phrase, ‘the everyday emergencies 
of maintenance’ collapses the concept of emergency into the broader categories of 
contingency and indeterminacy which pervade contemporary liberal-democratic 
politics. Everyday ‘emergencies of maintenance’ posit democracy and democratic 
regimes as fundamentally unstable yet always attempting to survive in a condition of 
pervasive contingency. Honig directly acknowledges this move. She writes that “the 
assumed antagonism between democracy and emergency is to some extent undone 
from this angle of vision…”439 I agree with Honig’s point on emergency as 
contingency. States of emergency should, indeed, be understood not as a rupture 
with ordinary politics but as one form or aspect of ordinary politics in liberal-
democratic societies. And Honig is right to argue that embedding emergency in the 
paradoxes of democracy subsume the concept of emergency within the notion of 
contingency. This is a very productive move as it shows emergency politics in 
relation to similar types of conflict in liberal-democratic regimes. I agree with 
Honig’s attempt to place emergencies within the wider context of political 
contingency. This argument will be further developed by turning to the work of 
Machiavelli in chapter six. 
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However, it is not necessary to posit the paradox of politics as the 
foundational paradox of democracy. Honig specifically contrasts the paradox of 
politics with the paradox of constitutional democracy, and criticizes the latter for 
attempting to mitigate or restage the former in an unproductive way. She argues that 
those who attempt to restage the paradox of politics as the paradox of constitutional 
democracy are eliding the problem of the people/multitudes daily engagement with 
the lawgiver/charlatan.
440
 She contends, “This new paradox of constitutional 
democracy is not a conflict that goes to the very heart of democratic politics, which 
impossibly promises both (self-) sovereignty and freedom or, as Emilios 
Christodoulidis puts it, both self-rule and law-rule. Instead, the tense elements of the 
paradox are split into two distinct objects: the constitution represents law-rule and 
the people represent self-rule and these are seen as at odds.”441 Honig claims that the 
paradox of constitutional democracy posits an unnecessary temporal dimension. The 
paradox of politics when transposed into the paradox of constitutional democracy, 
she claims, is thereby recast “as a generational divide.”442 But this argument is 
unconvincing. Constitutions are not only “limits from the past on popular 
sovereignty in the present” or an “unwilled, constraining element of rule” as Honig 
argues.
 443
 The paradox can only be restaged as a generational divide if the 
constitution were not the object of intense political debate, contestation and struggle. 
Certainly Honig would not argue that constitutions are uncontested documents that 
‘rule’ without any input from the people under their jurisdiction. Her argument that 
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the rule of law requires the rule of man as well as administrative discretion to apply 
law confirm this position.  
What the paradox of constitutional democracy does do is place Rousseau’s 
paradox of politics in the context of contemporary liberal-democratic regimes. The 
paradox of constitutional democracy is just useful than Rousseau’s paradox of 
politics. While Rousseau’s paradox addresses ‘the people’s relation to itself as both 
ruler and ruled,’ the paradox of constitutional democracy addresses the exact same 
question but in the context of modern democracy which is characterized by the 
unstable combination and articulation of liberalism and democracy, law and the 
people, liberty and equality, self-rule and law-rule. Emergency politics are embedded 
in paradoxes of liberal-democracy but the paradox of politics should play a central 
role.  
Honig makes a further connection between democracy and emergency by 
linking emergency to the emergence of new rights claims in Connolly’s politics of 
becoming. She argues that “Each new emergent claim can be experienced as an 
emergency by the existing order, by the identities challenged yet again to undergo 
redistribution or revision or to re-experience the contingency at their heart.”444 
During such situations “neither conservatism nor submission is sought. Instead a 
certain reluctance and panic are expected, even hoped for.”445 And finally, “Each 
new right inaugurates a new world. It transforms the entire economy of rights and 
identities, and establishes new relations and new realities, new promises and 
potentially new cruelties.”446 Connolly’s politics of becoming, which Honig follows, 
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embeds emergencies within the identity politics at the heart of liberal-democracy. 
From this vantage point emergencies are merely specific instances of contingency 
which someone has successfully declared to be emergencies and a large proportion 
of the general population has agreed. Indeed, liberal-democracy can be understood as 
a series of emergencies. But only if we conceive of emergencies are situations in 
which the heterogeneous identities and groups which make up ‘the people/multitude’ 
are challenged and re-articulated. We must also add that the people/multitude are 
split by antagonism. 
It is certainly possible for new rights claims to be experienced as emergencies 
by an existing legal order or political regime. But Honig’s account of the paradox of 
politics and new rights claims in a politics of becoming does not explain precisely 
why new rights claims are sometimes experienced as emergency. It is fairly 
mundane to claim that “…popular sovereignty is always haunted by heteronomy, 
that the people are always undecidably also a ‘multitude.’”447 But to definitely link 
such a claim to emergency situations more is needed than to assert that the people 
are always a multitude. What is needed is a theory of how and why the people are 
always a multitude and how that unstable position is intertwined with emergency 
politics, or even aids in the creation emergency situations. 
In order to make such a case Honig would have to develop a theory of 
collective identification which explained why the presence of new rights claims 
directly threaten existing identities or the political, social and legal order itself. She 
does note that “although we… sometimes persecute people because they are foreign, 
the deeper truth is that we almost always make foreign those whom we persecute. 
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Foreignness is a symbolic marker that the nation attaches to the people we want to 
disavow, deport, or detain because we experience them as a threat.”448 This is a 
prescient diagnosis of contemporary nativist politics prevalent in many liberal 
democratic regimes however; Honig does not develop this point and link it to the 
paradox of politics. Yet what is still missing is the element of threat and crisis as 
experienced by identities within the political order.  
The element of threat and crisis can be accounted for when we include both 
the political and the paradox of contestation as developed in my reading of Schmitt. 
The paradox of politics cannot conceptualize the antagonism implied by the political 
and the paradox because it sees the people as also a multitude. It does not see the 
people as being constitutively split into opposed political groups striving for 
hegemonic dominance. As such it misses the key element of political contestation 
involved in emergency politics. Emergency politics are always also hegemonic 
practices. This point will be developed in chapter seven. 
Conclusion 
This thesis is in agreement with Honig and Lazar that emergency politics 
should be understood in the context of the paradoxes at the heart of liberal 
democratic regimes. It further agrees that emergency should not be understood as an 
independent and distinct concept. Emergency is one form or moment of the 
contingency and indeterminacy which permeate and de-stabilize liberal-democratic 
regimes. It is claimed here that while the paradox of politics is certainly at play in 
emergency politics it does not provide enough explanatory power. New rights claims 
may or may not fundamentally challenge any particular identity within the system. 
But if new identities, or even the re-articulation of old identities, is understood as 
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subverting established identities and relations, (as Honig and Connolly understand 
that they do as demonstrated in their discussion of how homosexuals re-scripting 
themselves as gay upsets heterosexuals as much as it does homosexuals), in order for 
that to become an emergency what is needed is a theory of collective identification 
and politics which can account for the presence of mutual antagonism, subversion 
and threat between established identities and emerging rights claims.  
Such a theory of emergency politics will be developed in chapter seven by 
turning to Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of identification in Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy as well as Hans Lindahl on the paradox of constituent-constituted power. 
These works help to identify one component of the paradox of constitutional 
democracy/constituent-constituted power that arises in liberal-democratic regimes 
which is the paradox of contestation or the fundamental instability and contestability 
of the limits of legitimate contestation. It is this paradox which Honig’s focus on the 
paradox of politics does not see. The paradox of politics does not provide the 
precision and focus needed to address how the limits of legitimate contestation are 
set and struggled over. This paradox, in conjunction with the paradox of 
constitutional democracy, is necessary because they explain how it is that new rights 
claims and the politics surrounding the people and the multitude can be experienced 
as a threat and as implicated in, perhaps the cause of emergency situations. 
Before turning to Laclau, Mouffe and Lindahl I will begin to lay the 
foundations for a new approach to emergency politics using the work of Machiavelli. 
He furthers the argument that emergencies are an element of political contingency. 
He also argues that it is possible respond to emergencies while preserving both the 
liberal and democratic aspects of a state. For this to occur though state officials and 
any groups acting as sovereign will need to impose laws on themselves and not be 
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tempted by temporary measures which will likely be more harmful to a regime than 
the crisis that prompted them. 
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Chapter 6 – Machiavelli: Political Contingency and ‘Ordinary Means’ 
Introduction 
 The previous three chapters demonstrated deficiencies in the current 
theoretical approaches to emergency politics. What is needed is a new approach to 
emergency politics One which can ‘de-exceptionalize’ ‘emergencies’ and highlight 
points of democratic contestation within emergency politics by contextualizing them 
within larger political structures and processes in liberal-democratic regimes. I argue 
that the best place to begin constructing the foundations of such an approach can be 
found in the work on Niccolo Machiavelli.  
I take my cue for such an approach from the current re-evaluation of 
Machiavelli’s works.449 Machiavelli is not a teacher of political realism and 
amorality who argued that ‘the ends justify the means’. Nor can he be confined to the 
“Cambridge School” interpretation, associated with Skinner and Pocock, which 
emphasizes the republican elements of his thought.
450
 Rather, his work advocates for 
strong moral, ethical, legal and democratic controls over political actors and actions. 
The controls are especially pertinent to events Machiavelli referred to as accidenti. 
Accidenti are not strictly analogous to contemporary understandings of 
‘emergencies’ but there are strong similarities which ensure the relevant of 
Machiavelli’s work for emergency politics. 
 Machiavelli’s work is useful and relevant to contemporary emergency 
politics in two ways. First, he provides an analysis of the instability and the 
unpredictability of events which he convincingly argues are constitutive elements of 
the political realm. As such, his work can be read as a precursor to modern 
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conceptions of political contingency. Machiavelli presages modern notions of 
contingency through his discussions of two concepts, fortuna and accidenti. Fortuna 
refers to general condition of instability and chance inherent in politics. I will argue 
that fortuna functions at the level of the ontological, the same level as ‘the political’ 
in Schmitt’s work. Thus, fortuna complicates the ‘problematic of the exception’. 
Machiavelli uses the term accidenti to refer to specific events. They can be the result 
anything from changes in fortuna to political antagonism, poor laws or corruption. 
Accidenti will occur; Machiavelli argues that if handled properly they can be used to 
strengthen a constitutional regime, rather than necessitate its suspension. 
Machiavelli’s foreshadowing of contingency helps sidestep the norm/exception 
dichotomy by demonstrating that situations which are considered to be emergencies 
or exceptional circumstances are part and parcel of everyday politics. As such they 
need not and should not be treated as anything out of the ‘ordinary’, a term which 
has strong normative connotations in Machiavelli’s work. 
The second contribution Machiavelli’s work makes to the analysis of 
contemporary emergency politics is his advice concerning the best methods for 
handling changes in fortuna and threatening accidenti. His work evaluates various 
responses within the larger context of creating a just and stable regime in a world 
which is fundamentally unstable, forever changing and occasionally threatening. 
Pocock argues that this is ‘the Machiavellian Moment’, “the moment in 
conceptualized time in which the republic was seen as confronting its own temporal 
finitude, as attempting to remain morally and politically stable in a stream of 
irrational events conceived as essentially destructive of all systems of secular 
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stability.”451 Such moments present no easy solutions. Machiavelli presents them as 
dilemmas that regimes must periodically negotiate. His advice acknowledges that the 
use of force and violence devoid of normative constraints is a possible response. 
However, Machiavelli always contends that the best responses are advanced 
preparation and virtuous actions guided by ethical considerations and laws. 
The goal of politics, on his account, is to create stable, just, ethical, self-
authored regimes based on law that can withstand the threatening events which will 
always arise from a fundamentally unstable political realm. The methods best suited 
to that goal are those which are bound by legal as well as ethical and moral 
restraints. Such methods are inherently bound to the ends they serve. Thus using 
extraordinary, unjust or evil means will spoil and corrupt the ends for which they are 
striving.
452
 This argument is still relevant to contemporary liberal-democratic 
regimes. By heeding Machiavelli’s work we can work towards a new approach to 
emergency politics which understands emergencies as an intrinsic element of the 
realm of politics which must be treated as such. 
 Before proceeding to the discussion of the function of fortuna and accidenti I 
must identify an important aspect of Machiavelli’s terminology. He uses the words 
‘ordinary’ and ‘extraordinary’ as indicators of his political judgments. Ordinary is 
associated with orders and laws, extraordinary with extra-legal, extra-ethical 
methods. As Benner argues out, “The word ordinario has extremely important 
normative connotations in Machiavelli’s lexicon. He consistently uses it for modes 
and conditions of action that support stable human orders.”453 Human orders or 
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ordini have “the sense of constitutional arrangements or devices” and is “closely 
linked to leggi, but differentiated…”454 Ordini has constitutional connotations; it is 
often used in close proximity to words such as leggi, ordinare, and vivere civile. 
Such proximity signifies both their close relationship as well as their importance. On 
the other hand the word extraordinary is used to condemn actions taken illegally 
and/or outside the bounds of ethical and moral standards conducive to creating and 
maintaining just ordini. Whitfield argues that “…outside the ordini we have… lo 
straordinario,”455 which means that “What is ordinario is what is according to the 
ordini; and what is straordinario is the recourse to violence and arms.”456 Benner 
notes that “[t]his antithetical usage implies that whereas ordinario actions can be 
considered as legitimate, the legitimacy of any modes that Machiavelli describes as 
estraordinario is doubtful.”457 Machiavelli predominantly favors ‘ordinary’ to 
‘extraordinary’ methods. He argues that extraordinary methods should only be used 
when a regime is corrupt beyond salvation or when a new regime has not established 
itself, i.e. it is in the midst of a revolution.  Even in such cases the legitimacy of 
‘extraordinary’ methods is doubtful and some ethical standards should still apply. 
The normative and ethical implications of Machiavelli’s usage of ‘ordinary’ and 
‘extraordinary’ are key to understanding his overall argument that ordinary orders 
and methods are superior to extraordinary ones.  
Machiavelli does not elaborate a philosophical or theoretical argument 
concerning the difference between ordinary and extraordinary. Rather he argues that 
a prince or a people may choose to act in either ordinary or extraordinary ways. 
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Therefore he is not arguing that there is a strict separation between the two which 
requires difference actions. He is arguing that ordinary and extraordinary actions are 
two ways of responding to accidenti and drastic changes in fortuna. He favors 
ordinary modes but acknowledges that extraordinary modes might be used, but such 
use is unwise and usually leads to failure or to a corruption of the good ends one was 
fighting for. I will adhere to Machiavelli’s lexicon throughout this chapter as much 
as possible and show that his reflections on ordinary and extraordinary actions are 
still pertinent to emergency politics in liberal-democratic regimes. 
Contingency 
Machiavelli’s account of instability and change in politics is important for 
conceptualizing emergency politics without recourse to the norm/exception binary. 
Writing in the early 16
th
 century he obviously does not explicitly use the term 
contingency. His remarks on political contingency are a precursor to contemporary 
understandings of the concept. There are two specific terms which he deploys when 
speaking about contingency in politics: fortuna and accidenti. What is important 
about Machiavelli’s understanding of political contingency is not the concept itself 
but that he treats drastic changes in fortuna and accidenti which threaten the 
existence of a regime as constitutive of political existence and of action itself. 
Changes in fortuna and grave accidenti will inevitably happen from time to time 
because we live in a world which is fundamentally unstable. Machiavelli treats as 
regular those types of events which are currently defined as exceptional or as 
emergencies. Thus he avoids becoming trapped in the norm/exception binary 
altogether. His work should be read as a deconstruction any notion of normality or 
exceptionality in politics. If everything is constantly changing then nothing can truly 
be said to be ‘normal’ or ‘exceptional’. Rather, politics is a practice which is 
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constantly struggling to create regimes based on normative, ethical and legal 
principles in a context of constant instability and unpredictability.  
Fortuna 
 We begin with Machiavelli’s notion of fortuna because it challenges the idea 
normality or normal states of affairs in politics. Without a conception of normality 
the notion of exceptionality must be seen as highly problematic. The place and 
function of fortuna in the realm of politics, according to Machiavelli, prevents 
regimes from existing in a state of stability in which unexpected events rarely occur 
or do not drastically alter the day to day functioning of a state. Regimes are 
constantly in flux, developing, evolving, and periodically renovating themselves to 
the extent that they cannot be said to exist in a normal state of affairs. Without a 
definitive conception of normality the transition between normal situations and 
exceptional ones becomes all the more problematic, even if the distinction is 
determined politically and/or legally. 
Fortuna is the element of chance in all political affairs. It is also the 
acknowledgement that circumstances will change, sometimes for the better but 
inevitably also for the worse. For Machiavelli politics is a never ending engagement 
with a world that is fundamentally unstable, continuously changing and occasionally 
threatening to the existence of regimes. The realm of the political “is characterized 
by the utmost variability and unpredictability.”458 This variability and 
unpredictability do not consist only in the occurrence of unexpected events. Rather, 
Machiavelli uses fortuna to describe “continual, unstable motion, subject to an 
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unpredictable necessity” of “all human affairs.”459 The political realm cannot be 
characterized as stable or motionless aside from the sudden intervention of changes 
in circumstances. A fundamental characteristic of the political realm is unstable 
motion, not stability periodically interrupted by ‘exceptions’.  
Fortuna in Machiavelli’s work functions at the level of the ontological. The 
same level as does ‘the political’ in Schmitt’s work. Fortuna is thus another 
constitutive element of liberal-democracy as well as the problematic of the exception 
which must always be acknowledged and reckoned with. “The underlying idea here 
is that the ‘matter’ of the body politic is subject to the ravages of time, which… is 
controlled by Fortuna.”460 Thus Machiavelli complicates and deepens the 
problematic of the exception through his argument that any regime is constantly 
changing and that any political action takes places in a realm defined by uncertainty 
and unpredictability. Such conditions make it very difficult to accurately predict the 
outcome of political actions. Machiavelli’s work suggests that this ambiguity should 
mollify any confidence political actors may have when resorting to extraordinary 
measures. 
Machiavelli does not argue that the impact of fortuna leaves regimes and 
political actors powerless to its vicissitudes. On the contrary, “fortuna is the arbiter 
of half of our actions, but also that she leaves the other half, or close to it, for us to 
govern…”461 The other half is a space open to the preparations and actions of 
humanity. Obviously, the exact measurement of how much of human action fortuna 
controls is irrelevant. The key, Machiavelli, argues is that humanity accepts fortuna 
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as a permanent condition in which politics takes place. “The major implication of 
this idea is that humans can never fully control or permanently master events 
because unforeseen and uncontainable accidenti are bound to arise.
”462
 Fortuna 
functions in the background of politics, constantly reminding actors that no matter 
what they do, circumstances will change and they will not be able to fully control 
those changes.  
Fortuna is not a neutral concept for Machiavelli. It can have positive effects, 
but any period of good fortuna will always run out. “The nature of the Fortuna of 
countries is such that it will necessarily affect them adversely from time to time.”463 
In the Florentine Histories he asserts that fortuna is “the friend of our discords.”464 It 
is these inevitably downturns that Machiavelli instructs his readers to prepare for by 
constructing, maintaining and renovating just, ethical, and legal ordini. 
In Machiavelli’s estimation political actors should not adopt a passive 
attitude towards the influence of fortuna. Fortuna may be ‘the arbiter of half of our 
actions’ but neither it, nor accidenti, exerts total control over politics. In 
Machiavelli’s thought “there are no intimations of an irrevocably determined flow of 
events; neither fortuna nor necessità dominate the flow of existence; there are no 
absolute values which men ignore or deny to their inevitable doom.”465 Machiavelli 
uses the concept fortuna to instruct readers that while they cannot completely 
alleviate the effects caused by it, they can and should do their utmost to prepare for 
its inevitable fluctuations. Machiavelli argues that “it is not as if men, when times are 
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quiet, could not provide for them with dikes and dams.”466 Preparations can and 
should be made. The best preparations are strong ordini, meaning laws and 
constitutional orders, which are able to withstand changes in fortuna without 
compromising their ethical and legal foundations. 
Machiavelli warns that even the best preparations will not be enough to fully 
secure a state from all ill effects. As Parel notes, Machiavelli wishes “that humans 
should be active rather than passive. This is not to say that success is guaranteed.”467 
But on the other hand, “often things arise and accidenti come about that the heavens 
have not altogether wished to be provided against.”468 Political actors are left to do 
their best to prepare for changes in fortuna. They may succeed in the long term but 
eventually even their best preparations will fail. In preparing for and responding to 
drastic changes in fortuna political actors must exercise as much virtú as they are 
able to. The struggle between fortuna and virtú may cause frustration for some 
political actors. “They can, however, at least attempt to escape this frustration by 
looking upon political life as a constant struggle against the unforeseen and the 
fortuitous.
469
 Exactly what that virtú consists of and how it should be exercised will 
be elaborated in part two of this chapter. For now we need to note that Machiavelli 
thinks in the long-term when it comes to fortuna.  When it comes to analyzing the 
effect of fortuna and how preparations for changes in it should be made, Machiavelli 
always looks to the long-term. This perspective emphasizes that politics for 
Machiavelli is a never ending struggle with change.  
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In Machiavelli’s lexicon fortuna functions as an indicator that a city or 
political actor is not acting with enough virtú. Fortuna may help for a brief period 
but one’s fortunes will inevitably change sooner or later. Machiavelli states that “he 
who has relied less on fortuna has maintained himself more”470 and that “the prince 
who leans entirely on his fortuna comes to ruin as it varies.”471 Furthermore, 
Machiavelli’s perspective is that “[w]henever he describes an individual or city as 
‘fortunate,’ Machiavelli implies that it relies too much on something other than its 
own virtue.”472 For example, in chapter seven of The Prince Machiavelli attributes 
Cesare Borgia’s precipitous rise and fall to “the fortuna of his father.”473 Though he 
acquired his principality mostly through fortuna, Borgia did all he could to create 
secure foundations for his principality. However the rhetoric of this passage suggests 
that Machiavelli is being rather sarcastic in his assessment of Borgia. In the end, he 
did not act with enough virtú to alleviate the inevitable risks posed by changes in 
fortuna. In the end Borgia lost his principality. By stressing the negative effects of 
fortuna Machiavelli urges political actors to always be vigilant. 
Fortuna is one of the two concepts that comprise Machiavelli’s 
understanding of what is now referred to as political contingency. Changes in 
fortuna are not the only aspects of contingency that political actors must contend 
with according to Machiavelli. Machiavelli argues that accidenti warrant equal 
concern. Whereas fortuna is an ontological condition, accidenti are defined as 
concrete events in his work. This does not mean however that there is a simple 
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causal relation between negative fluctuations in fortuna and the occurrence of 
accidenti. 
Accidenti 
  In addition to fortuna, Machiavelli places great emphasis on the impact of 
what he calls accidenti on a political regime. Together both concepts for the basis of 
Machiavelli’s thoughts on what is now understood as contingency but, as noted 
above, his notion of instability and unpredictability in politics is only a precursor to 
the contemporary understanding of the term. Unlike Fortuna, which is a 
characteristic of the political realm, accidenti in Machiavelli’s thinking are concrete 
events. Accidenti are specific occurrences to which he ascribes very important 
normative, ethical, and legal implications. McCormick claims that “accidenti are… 
fellow phenomenological manifestations of chance or contingency.”474 I argue 
however that McCormick’s formulation should be modified. The two concepts exist 
and operate at different levels within the political realm. Fortuna should not be 
understood as a phenomenological manifestation. It is rather an existential condition 
in which politics take place, it functions ontologically. Accidenti occur and impact 
politics at the level of the ontic, not the ontological. Nor are accidenti always 
causally related to fortuna. As such, they are not necessarily “more useful 
manifestation for students of political science to examine” as McCormick claims.475 
Rather, accidenti occur amidst the conditions described as fortuna. 
The occurrence of accidenti does not always correspond to changes in 
fortuna. One may be experiencing a period of good fortuna only to be besieged by a 
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terrible and grave accident. One example of this is Cosimo De’ Medici’s rise to 
power described in the Florentine Histories. After the death of his father Cosimo 
became a prominent citizen in Florence. He made “many citizens into his 
partisans,”476 thus increasing his status and power. Shortly thereafter however, his 
enemies lead by Rinaldo degli Albizzi conspired against him succeeding in having 
him arrested and exiled.
477
    
I argued above that the notion of continual change described by Machiavelli 
as fortuna challenges the notion of normality or a normal state of affairs in which 
politics takes place. His use of the term accidenti to describe specific, unpredictable 
events is in some ways unfortunate. An accident can only be defined in relation to an 
idea of regular, normal situation. The notion of ‘accidenti’ presupposes normal 
functioning. For an event to be defined as an accident it must be counter posed to a 
conception of a normal functioning of a political regime. As argued above, 
Machiavelli’s work on fortuna challenges this possibility.  The presupposition of 
normality can be removed without dampening the critical force of Machiavelli’s 
thoughts on accidenti. I will retain the term for the purposes of clarity in this chapter 
with the caveat that accidenti need not imply a prior notion of normality. 
Machiavelli includes within the category of accidenti a plethora of 
occurrences which are similar to events which are sometimes currently labeled as 
states of emergency or exception. Accidenti “refer to various irregular (if not 
unpredictable) occurrences that threaten to destabilize the political order.”478 
Examples of accidenti include: natural phenomenon such as plagues, floods and 
                                                          
476
 Machiavelli, Florentine Histories, IV.27, p. 173 
477
 Machiavelli, Florentine Histories, IV.27-29 
478
 Fatovic, Outside the Law, p. 11-12 
196 
 
famine;
479
 wars and foreign invasions;
480
 “plots and conspiracies”481 against princes; 
disunion between the plebs and the Senate; prominent citizens becoming too 
powerful;
482
 and even attempted reform of the Roman Agrarian law.
483
 In a sense, 
accidenti is a catch-all term for any unforeseen event. Accidenti are hard to predict, 
can take various forms, and they are inevitable. The common characteristic of 
accidenti is that they pose a threat of some kind to the existence of the state. Indeed, 
accidenti threaten to destabilize, even bring down, a regime.  
There is a strong similarity between occurrences which Machiavelli describes 
as accidenti those types of events which are currently sometimes defined as 
emergencies or exceptions. McCormick argues that accidenti are equivalent to what 
are currently called exceptions. However, I argue that we should not posit a direct 
equivalence between the two. In instances when Machiavelli ascribes an 
extraordinary quality to events, extraordinary connotes supernatural occurrences.
484
 
In the last chapter of The Prince Machiavelli speaks of “extraordinary things without 
example, brought about by God” such as the raining of manna from the sky and 
water spilling out of a rock.
485
 In one instance he does refer to “extraordinary 
accidenti” in a discussion of the Roman dictatorship but he does not argue that all 
accidenti are extraordinary.
486
 Indeed the phrase never recurs anywhere else in his 
work. Machiavelli may have used the phrase extraordinary accidenti once in the 
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Discourses and the word extraordinary may have extra-legal connotations in his 
lexicon but it would be going too far to equate his concept of accidenti with what are 
currently understood as exceptions.  
Equating accidenti with exceptions or extraordinary situations burdens the 
concept with normative implications Machiavelli argues against. The key difference 
is that while Machiavelli may understand some accidenti as being extraordinary he 
does not argue that they require extraordinary or exceptional responses, rather he 
argues just the opposite. As McCormick points out “By describing political 
phenomena often exclusively in terms of accidenti and by expanding the use of the 
term…, Machiavelli made what was by definition external, extrinsic, and 
insubstantial into the very core of politics and hence the central focus of political 
thought.”487 If Machiavelli places accidenti at the very core of politics then they 
cannot be understood as exceptions. By treating accidenti as inevitable and regular 
occurrences Machiavelli removed their exceptional quality.    
Machiavelli’s notion of accidenti undermines the idea of exceptionality in 
another way. Specifically he argues that accidenti can and inevitably will arise from 
both essential divisions between social groups within a society and from the 
institutional core of the regime itself. He asserts that it is the structure of social 
divisions and the regimes themselves which can and inevitably will be implicated in 
the occurrence of accidenti. I argue that contemporary liberal-democratic societies 
and states are similarly implicated in the occurrence of situations defined as 
emergencies or exceptions. Indeed, they are always implicated to some extent 
because emergencies do not exist prior to being named as such through processes of 
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contestation over sovereign decisions, as discussed in chapter two. Contemporary 
societies must deal with the effects of antagonisms in much the same way as 
Machiavelli’s Florence. Additionally, I will demonstrate that Machiavelli’s 
suggestion that legal and constitutional regimes create accidenti is as true for current 
liberal-democratic regimes as it was for the Roman constitution and Florence.  
McCormick argues that for Machiavelli “accidenti are generally external (or 
at least, if internal, then internally nonessential) phenomena and hence, 
paradoxically, both less reliable and more controllable.”488 I do not disagree with 
McCormick that Machiavelli usually discusses accidenti which are the result of 
either external or internally non-essential causes. However, I strongly agree with 
Machiavelli’s argument that social division/antagonism and the specifics of a 
political regime itself are the terrain on which accidenti emerge and are dealt with. 
This suggestion is more important to take from Machiavelli, not his suggestion that 
accidenti are usually caused by external or internally non-essential forces.  
 Machiavelli is the first theorist of modern politics to realize that social 
antagonisms can and inevitably will be deeply implicated in the occurrence of 
accidenti. He observes that “in every republic are two diverse humors, that of the 
people and that of the great,” whether that republic be Rome or Florence.489 They are 
divided because “the people desire neither to be commanded nor oppressed by the 
great, and the great desire to command and oppress the people.”490 Machiavelli 
recognizes that these divisions are constitutive for societies, the people and the great 
are at irreconcilable odds with one another. These conflicting desires inevitably 
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generate frequent accidenti. He writes, “many accidenti arose in [Rome] through the 
disunion between the plebs and the Senate…”491 And as McCormick acknowledges, 
Machiavelli contends that “Domestic discord means greater susceptibility to 
accidenti internally…”492 This predicament is unavoidable.  
The first accident which occurred in Rome as a result of this disunion 
happened just after the Tarquin kings were expelled. The grandi feared the Tarquins 
and wanted the support of the plebs should the Tarquins act against them. So while 
the Tarquins ruled Rome the nobility acted humanely towards the plebs. Once the 
Tarquins were expelled however the great no longer had use for the plebs and 
because they wish ‘to command and oppress the people’ they turned on the plebs and 
“began to spit out that poison against the plebs that they had held in their breasts, and 
they offended it in all the modes they could.”493 Thus disunion caused violence and 
civil strife. Another accident which occurred because of the disunion between the 
plebs and the grandi was the result of attempted reform of the Agrarian Law. The 
grandi were able to take a much larger share of conquered lands than the plebs. 
When the brothers Gracchi attempted to reform this law “it inflamed so much the 
hatred between the plebs and he Senate that they came to arms and to bloodshed, 
beyond every civil mode and custom.”494  
Machiavelli does not argue that the disunion between the people and the great 
should be fixed or overcome. On the contrary, the disunion is an existential fact 
which must be continuously negotiated and the tensions it generates allowed to vent 
                                                          
491
 Machiavelli, Discourses, I.2, p. 14 
492
 McCormick, ‘Addressing the Political Exception’, p. 895 
493
 Machiavelli, Discourses, I.3, p. 15 
494
 Machiavelli, Discourses, I.37, p. 80 
200 
 
through properly instituted laws.
495
 In this he is a precursor to theories of antagonism 
which posit societies as being constitutive split by various political groups. 
Machiavelli’s work is the beginning of a genealogy of antagonism in political 
thought which includes theorists such as Marx, Gramsci, Schmitt and Laclau and 
Mouffe. Machiavelli’s position on antagonism is very similar to Schmitt’s notion of 
‘the political’. Both posit irreconcilable political conflict as an essential feature of 
any society. For Machiavelli it is inevitable that these divisions will lead to accidenti 
which may threaten the existence of the state. Indeed, he argues that the conflict over 
the Agrarian Law ultimately lead to the downfall of the Roman Republic.
496
 On 
Machiavelli’s account, “Society is… a battlefield in which there are conflicts 
between and within groups.”497 As chapter two pointed out, conflicts created by 
social antagonism are an issue contemporary liberal-democratic regimes must face 
just as Rome or Renaissance Florence. To sum up Machiavelli’s position in current 
terminology, situations which may be defined as exceptional or as emergencies can 
occur on the terrain of social antagonism. It is the substance of the relationship itself 
which can sometimes lead to the type of events which are currently labeled as states 
of emergency.  
 Machiavelli uses an ancient analogy to describe the disunion between the 
people and the great. He describes antagonism as “diverse humors,” referencing the 
ancient technique of describing society as a human body.
498
 Parel argues that 
Machiavelli’s use of ‘humors’ to describe social divisions is incompatible with 
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modern political studies.
499
 He also contends that humoral divisions cannot be 
translated into class conflict. Class conflict functions dialectically while humoral 
divisions are natural and cannot and should not be overcome.
500
 Thus he denies the 
attempts by Lefort and Gramsci to assimilate Machiavelli’s writing on the great and 
people to the discourse of Marxism and class struggle. Parel however misses the 
point. Machiavelli’s key contribution is not that he conceptualized social divisions as 
necessarily humoral in nature. Machiavelli also rightly argues that disunion cannot 
and should not be overcome. It is that he recognizes that social antagonisms are 
constitutive of societies and that these antagonisms are a key terrain on which 
accidenti occur. How we conceptualize and understand these antagonisms will vary 
throughout the centuries. Additionally, Machiavelli’s analysis of antagonism does 
not need to be assimilated to class struggle to have any relevance for theorizing 
emergency politics in liberal-democratic regimes. To trap Machiavelli’s insights on 
social antagonism within the ancient metaphor of bodily humors would 
unnecessarily remove any contemporary relevance of his work. But if we take the 
initial insight but allow for changes to the conceptualization of antagonism we see 
that Machiavelli is still very relevant. Social antagonisms exist in every society and 
they will inevitably have an impact on existential crises from time to time, however 
we conceptualize them. What is important is to take from Machiavelli these insights 
not the metaphors he uses to conceptualize them.  
Machiavelli’s second crucial claim regarding accidenti is that they can be 
generated by the regime itself. He argues that “in everything some evil is concealed 
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that makes new accidenti emerge.”501 His suggestion is that “accidenti are generated 
by the very core of a regime, spawned by its very essence.”502 One example of this 
phenomenon are the “accidents [that] arose through the creation of the 
Decemvirate.”503 The Decemvirate were created to devise laws which would temper 
disputes between the people and the nobility they soon began abusing their power by 
holding “the state with violence” and to favor certain noble youths, turning them into 
partisans.
504
 Obviously current liberal-democratic regimes are not subject to 
historically similar types of accidenti. But, as Schmitt well knew, and as I argue in 
this thesis, the institutional structures of liberal-democratic regimes are a terrain on 
which accidenti can occur. In the case of Schmitt’s work it was conflict over 
sovereign decisions and decision-making processes as well as the tension between 
equal chance and the supra-legal premium on legality. What we need to retain from 
Machiavelli is that these accidenti are not extraordinary happenings. They stem from 
the core of the regime itself, just as antagonisms are a constitutive aspect of societies. 
That means that they are not exceptional, rather they are everyday events. 
 Machiavelli makes a further point regarding accidenti which needs to be 
retained. He argues that accidenti, whether they be caused by an invading army, a 
flood, social antagonism or ill-formed state institutions, can be good for a republic. 
They can be put to productive use if responded to and managed correctly. Accidenti 
can be even more helpful when they cause a regime to return to its beginnings and 
renew itself.
505
 The expulsion of the Tarquin kings mentioned above, for instance, is 
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evaluated by Machiavelli as an accident “which made the republic more perfect.”506 
Disorder ensued after the departure of the Tarquins but was soon quelled by the 
creation of the Tribune of the plebs. The Roman citizens used the accident in order to 
repair their regime. Without the Tarquins there was no means for the plebs to check 
the insolence of the great. The Tribunes provided that buffer. Limiting the 
threatening and dangerous effects of an accidenti while putting it to good use at the 
same time is by no means guaranteed.   
 Machiavelli’s concepts of fortuna and accidenti challenge the idea that 
political situations can be definitively categorized either as normal or exceptional. 
His work on political contingency collapses the notion of exceptional or 
extraordinary events into the idea of normality and ‘normal’ politics such that both 
terms lose their conceptual coherence. For Machiavelli fortuna and accidenti are 
fundamental components of the political realm. Contrary to the predominant 
discourse of emergency politics, normality and exceptionality are not discrete 
categories.  As McCormick argues, “In a very simple way, Machiavelli is quite 
radical. He speaks of politics extensively-almost exclusively-in terms of that which 
is conventionally considered remote. And he speaks of preventing, forestalling, or 
putting to good use that which is normally thought to be unpredictable or 
uncontrollable.”507 Furthermore, he advises that it would be foolish to believe that a 
state or an individual, even one given exceptional powers, could ever fully control 
fortuna or the negative effects it can have on regimes. Harboring the belief that 
fortuna can be fully managed is one aspect of the belief that extraordinary measures 
can control extraordinary circumstances. This is a drastically different understanding 
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of emergency politics and politics in general from those theories that assume or rely 
on a notion that there exist normal and exceptional times.    
I argue that it is necessary to adopt Machiavelli’s position when confronting 
emergency politics. In those theories which rely in one way or another on the 
norm/exception binary the assumption is that normality is the predominant state of 
affairs. ‘Normality’ is only periodically interrupted by brief occurrences which are 
defined as crisis or emergencies by powerful political elites. The assumption that 
such occurrences are brief plays a large role in justifying extraordinary and 
exceptional measures that are supposedly temporary in duration. But in what can a 
‘normal’ state off consist if the political realm and political regimes are constantly in 
flux? The distinction between normal and exceptional breaks down when regimes 
are understood as continuously engaging with changes in fortuna. Normality is a 
highly problematic concept when it is imposed on a political realm which views 
continuous fluctuations of fortuna as a fundamental, ontological characteristic. 
Contrary to many contemporary thinkers, this does not mean that the norm is 
becoming the exception or that it always has been. In those theories contingent 
events occur, but contingency is not all encompassing. In normal times contingency 
is assumed to have minimal effect on a regime. On the other hand, for Machiavelli, 
fortuna and accidenti are always acting on regimes and influencing the outcomes of 
political actions. Those situations which are today sometimes characterized as 
exceptional are on Machiavelli’s account part and parcel of regular, everyday 
political engagement.   
Managing changes in fortuna as well as the inevitable occurrence of 
accidenti is no easy feat according to Machiavelli. On his account, the best approach 
is to create, maintain and periodically renovate good ordini. Acceptable 
205 
 
constitutional and legal regimes can only be built and maintained with ‘ordinary’, 
lawful methods. Indeed, Machiavelli argues in favor of methods for creating just 
regimes which are decidedly un-‘Machiavellian.’ He does not unambiguously 
advocate extraordinary measures. Rather he presents the best methods for governing 
ordini through problems which will arise in the process of constructing, maintaining 
and renovating them. 
The Ends and Means of Emergency Politics 
 In the face of continuous changes in fortuna and the inevitability of accidenti 
Machiavelli advocates an approach based on ethics and laws. The contingency and 
unpredictability of the political realm itself calls for varied, nuanced responses. 
Indeed, Machiavelli argues that extraordinary or exceptional means never need to be 
used, even if the accident which requires them may be defined by political elites as 
extraordinary. The use of ordini and ordinary means is a far superior strategy for 
confronting fortuna and accidenti. He contends that political actors should always 
act with virtú. Virtú, an ambiguous and notoriously difficult concept to translate into 
English, “refers to specifically human capacities to respond in appropriate ways to 
natural, supernatural, or man-made constraints.”508 Machiavelli’s main concern is to 
instruct political actors on the ways to act virtuously even in the face of accidenti. 
This section will first establish that Machiavelli’s work does stress the ethical aspects 
of all political action. Secondly, it will discuss in detail Machiavelli’s preference for 
ordinary as opposed to extraordinary forms of political action.  
Machiavelli’s ‘Political’ Ethics 
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Machiavelli is often accused of separating politics from morality and ethics 
such that politics is a fully autonomous realm of human action. Additionally, he is 
often cited as an early, if not the first, theorist of what is today known as 
realpolitik.
509
 On this reading of his work, political action can only be judged by the 
extent to which it efficiently and effectively secures power. Moral and ethical 
considerations must, and should, be left aside. This is not the case however, and a 
growing body of literature demonstrates that a closer reading of his work reveals 
Machiavelli to argue in support of just, ethical and legal methods for creating and 
maintaining a state, especially in when confronting accidenti.
510
  
Morality and ethics are not autonomous from politics in Machiavelli’s 
thought. On the contrary, politics is given an ethics and morality all its own.  Isaiah 
Berlin argues that Machiavelli does not separate politics from morality; rather he 
makes an even more fundamental separation. “What Machiavelli distinguishes is not 
specifically moral, from specifically political values…”511 Rather, Machiavelli 
separates Christian from secular, pagan values. Political ethics and morality fall into 
the latter category. His conception of pagan ethics and morality that is distinctly this-
worldly. “Ethics so conceived – the code of conduct, or the ideal to be pursued by 
the individual – cannot be known save by understanding the purpose and character of 
his polis: still less be capable of being divorced from it, even in thought.”512 
Machiavelli argues that this separation is necessary because Christian ethics are 
incompatible with the types of political actions needed to found, secure and renew an 
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earthly regime. He argues that “Our religion has glorified humble and contemplative 
more than active men. It has placed the highest good in humility, abjectness, and 
contempt of things human…”513 Recall that Machiavelli advocates an active rather 
than a passive approach to changes in fortuna. Christian ethics simply do not teach 
one an ethics which will allow them to act with virtú. Virtú is a this-worldly trait. 
Machiavelli does not argue that Christian morality and virtue and ethics are bad in 
and of themselves, he just does not believe you can build a well-ordered regime 
based on them. And it is “impossible to combine Christian virtues… with a 
satisfactory, stable, vigorous, strong society on earth.”514 He opts for pagan virtues 
because he wants virtuous individuals to build, maintain and periodically renovate 
well-ordered regimes. For Machiavelli there is an ethics and morality of politics, that 
can only be understood and practiced in relation to politics, and that indeed depends 
on politics. But they are not separate from one another and certainly not autonomous 
domains which are at odds with one another.  
Violence is an integral element of Machiavelli’s political ethics. However, 
Machiavelli never unambiguously praises its use. On the contrary, he almost always 
advises that any use of violence for political ends will do more harm than good in the 
long term. On the issue of violence Berlin reads Machiavelli as a hard-nosed realist, 
ready to use whatever means necessary to effectively secure power and stability in a 
regime. Rulers must be prepared to be ruthless just as “to be a physician is to be 
professional, ready to burn, to cauterize, to amputate; if that is what the disease 
requires.”515 Berlin, following Sheldon Wolin, contends that Machiavelli believes in 
a permanent ‘economy of violence’ – the need for a consistent reserve of force 
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always in the background to keep things going...”516 This ‘economy of violence’ 
allows for the use of violence and ruthlessness whenever the Prince or renovator of a 
regime finds it necessary. Crucially, Berlin argues that for Machiavelli the use of 
such methods is not exceptional or extraordinary at all. “The pagan world that 
Machiavelli prefers is built on recognition of the need for systematic guile and force 
by rulers, and he seems to think it natural and not at all exceptional or morally 
agonizing that they should employ these weapons whenever they are needed.”517 
Granted such methods “are called for only by extreme need; yet political life tends to 
generate a good many such needs, of varying degrees of ‘extremity.’”518 I agree that 
political life is characterized by the ever-presence of dangerous and potentially 
existential threats to a regime but Berlin is mistaken that Machiavelli condones the 
use of violence as a normal course of political action. If Machiavelli believed that the 
constant use of force was necessary he would have referred to its application as 
ordinary. He does not however. Indeed he describes such the use of violence, fraud 
and guile unregulated by ethics and law as extraordinary. Given the normative 
connotations of the word extraordinary in Machiavelli’s lexicon it can hardly be 
argued that he fully endorses its use as a normal and ordinary tactic of governance. 
On the other hand, Berlin does acknowledge some limitations on the use of 
violence.  He argues that on Machiavelli’s account “Where a society is relatively 
sound… it would be quite wrong to practice violence for violence’s sake, since its 
results would be destructive of social order, when the purpose of government is to 
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create order…”519 What Berlin fails to see is that because the use of violence is 
regularly spoken of by Machiavelli as an extraordinary action, he does not conceive 
of it as a normal aspect of political action. For most regimes violence, fraud and 
guile are definitely extraordinary means which contravene ordini and are therefore to 
be discouraged. Violence is not a normal aspect of pagan, this-worldly ethics. 
Furthermore, Berlin acknowledges that law plays a role in limiting the use of 
violence. “You may be violent and use your power to overawe, but you must not 
break your own laws, for that destroys confidence and disintegrates the social 
texture.”520 Exactly how a ruler may use violence without breaking their own laws is 
not explained by Berlin. Nor does he provide textual support for this position. As I 
will demonstrate below the relationship between force and law in Machiavelli’s 
thought is more nuanced than this. Force and law are bound up with one another. 
Berlin’s reading of the scope of what Machiavelli’s ethics allow is broad. 
Violence is not a normal or ‘ordinary’ aspect of political ethics for Machiavelli. 
Usually it is referred to as an extraordinary method. He certainly never advocates the 
use of extraordinary methods for responding to accidenti. Berlin argues that for 
Machiavelli we all live “under the perpetual shadow of carefully regulated 
violence.”521 I agree that violence has a presence in Machiavelli’s thought and in his 
conception of ethics, law and society. But Berlin’s reading of ‘carefully regulated’ in 
Machiavelli is mistaken. He does not acknowledge the full extent of the regulation 
that Machiavelli proposes.  
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Only in certain times is recourse to violence ever justified, and even then 
Machiavelli is cautious about its use. Those are times when ordini and leggi 
effectively do not exist: the founding of a regime before laws are made or when a 
regime is so corrupt that the laws are not enforced and do not function. During the 
founding of a regime Machiavelli advocates the use of extraordinary violence.
522
 He 
states that Romulus was right to kill Remus. But Machiavelli also notes that he 
immediately set up the Senate and sought council from them. This suggests that 
extraordinary violence is only justified when it is used outside the confines of ordini. 
If that is the case then the violence loses its extraordinary character altogether. 
Machiavelli does endure its use though. Althusser rightly notes that Machiavelli 
“speaks the language of the armed force indispensable to the constitution of any 
state…”523 But such violence is inappropriate once the regime is constituted. Once 
regime is in place, its ordini and legge established, extraordinary and violent 
methods must be avoided at all costs.   
The Superiority of Ordinary Means: Against Extraordinary Methods 
Machiavelli problematizes the use of extraordinary methods, arguing that 
they rarely work, we don’t know in advance if they’ll work, and it’s hard if not 
downright impossible to find someone who can use them for only good purposes 
without abusing them in any way. He contends that “In a republic, one would not 
wish anything ever to happen that has to be governed with extraordinary modes. For 
although the extraordinary mode may do good then, nonetheless the example does 
ill; for if one sets up a habit of breaking the orders for the sake of good, then later, 
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under that coloring, they are broken for ill.”524 Machiavelli describes dictatorship as 
an ordinary institution which can allow a regime to avoid the use of extraordinary 
methods. 
 Against Dictatorship 
Machiavelli describes dictatorship as an ordinary institution compatible with 
mixed regimes. Recourse to a dictator is by no means an extraordinary mode. 
However, Machiavelli is circumspect when recommending its use. On the one hand, 
he writes that dictators “always did good to the city” and that “without such an order 
cities escape from extraordinary accidenti with difficulty.”525 The role of the dictator 
is to respond to accidenti for which even the ordinary laws of the city are felt to be 
inadequate. “Those [accidenti] that cannot [be met with legal responses] may be 
dealt with by the institution of a dictator. Only as a last alternative does Machiavelli 
introduce the extra-constitutional ‘prudent man.’”526 Furthermore, Machiavelli 
argues that “it was impossible for him to escape his limits and to hurt the city.”527 
These limits, similar to those discussed in chapter two, were appointment by the 
public order, strict time limits on his term, authority to resolve an accident but not to 
change the state, and finally the non-corrupt nature of the people which could 
effectively check his power. On the other hand, Machiavelli, at least implicitly, 
recognizes some problems with dictators. He knows that Caesar caused the downfall 
of the Roman republic from the office of dictator. And he argues that the office is not 
dangerous to a republic while dictators are publicly appointed. But he never 
discusses how it may be possible to ensure that all dictators are properly appointed.  
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I part ways with Machiavelli on the issue of the ordinary and praiseworthy 
nature of the dictatorship. While dictatorship may have made sense and worked in 
the Roman republic and a similar institution may have functioned well in Venice 
during Machiavelli’s time I argue that it is inappropriate for contemporary liberal-
democratic regimes. While there are many analogies between Machiavelli’s mixed 
regime and liberal-democratic regimes the compatibility of dictatorship is not one. 
As argued in chapter one of this thesis, the dictatorship is incompatible with liberal-
democracy because it is impossible to create institutional restraints which will 
prevent abuses of the office. Also, the notion of dictatorship itself relies on an 
uncritical understanding of the norm/exception binary. Furthermore, it is difficult if 
not impossible to know for certain the dictator appointed is truly virtuous and will 
use the powers of the office only for the good of society. Machiavelli “has… 
admitted that the appearance of great leaders is always a matter of pure good 
Fortuna...”528 Given the unpredictability implied by fortuna, it is highly improbable 
that a regime will be able to find a virtuous dictator at the moment a grave accidenti 
occurs. The regime would be left in the predicament of appointing less than virtuous 
citizen as dictator, relying only on the institutional limitations of the office to prevent 
abuses. Because institutional limitations are unreliable, the larger lesson to take from 
Machiavelli’s work suggests that the best response to accidenti are ordinary legal 
and constitutional institutions. Liberal-democratic regimes, similarly to 
Machiavelli’s mixed regimes, should not to have recourse to dictators but rather to 
find resources within the regime to ‘absorb’ situations defined as emergencies or 
exceptions. 
Necessary Virtú and Ordinary Politics 
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 Machiavelli does not advise the use of extraordinary modes for dealing with 
accidenti. Indeed, he takes the exact opposite position emphasizing “the legal over 
the extra- or supralegal means of defending a regime.”529 He argues that “when these 
ordinary modes are not there, one has recourse to extraordinary ones, and without 
doubt these produce much worse effects than the former.”530 One example of this is 
the rise and fall of Francesco Valori in Florence.
531
 Valori was extremely ambitious 
and soon enough became “like a prince of the city.”532 There were no ordinary 
modes at that time for restraining his power so the people could not vent their 
frustration against him peacefully. Valori had nothing to fear except extraordinary 
modes such as armed insurrection. To defend against this he gathered supporters to 
his faction which would defend him. Machiavelli laments that this situation was 
allowed to reach a boiling point until violence ensued. “If one had been able to 
oppose him ordinarily, his authority would have been eliminated with harm to him 
alone; but since he had to be eliminated extraordinarily, there followed harm not 
only to him but to many other noble citizens.”533 In this example we see the 
constitutive divisions of the city not being able to be vented because there were no 
laws in place which would allow it to do so. The accident could have resulted in 
harm to only Valori but, because extraordinary methods had to be used, it resulted in 
harm to many people. Planning ahead by putting in place a law which would have 
allowed for public accusations against prominent citizens such as Valori would have 
allowed the conflict to vent itself ‘ordinarily’. 
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A second reason Machiavelli does not advise the use of extraordinary 
methods is because it is very difficult to accurately foresee their effects. He write 
that “many times things well advised do not have a good outcome and things ill 
advised have a good one; and if wicked advice is praised for a good outcome, one 
does nothing but inspire men to err, which results in great harm to republics because 
bad advice is not always successful.”534 A good example of this is the Pazzi 
conspiracy detailed in Book VIII of the Florentine Histories. The Pazzi wanted to 
check the rise to power of Lorenzo de’ Medici. Francesco Pazzi argues that the best 
course of action would be the assassination of both Lorenzo and Giuliano de’ 
Medici. His advice is followed and the Pazzi along with their conspirators attempt to 
kill the Medici brothers in church. This is a case of bad advice producing bad effects. 
The assassination fails and in the aftermath the entire city breaks out into partisan 
violence.
535
 Extraordinary modes for removing powerful citizens immediately 
resulted in more violence, death and harm than was created by Lorenzo de’ Medici. 
Francesco Pazzi himself is actually wounded in the assassination attempt. 
Machiavelli’s point could not be clearer. As Benner notes “Extraordinary modes are 
unregulated by laws and invariably produce disorder, even if they sometimes appear 
to be a necessary evil.”536 Ordinary methods are superior to extraordinary ones when 
confronting accidenti such as a conflict generated by the antagonism between 
conflicting groups within a society.  
Machiavelli’s preferred approach to confronting accidenti and managing 
fluctuations in fortuna is for political actors to impose further constraints on their 
actions. These constraints are ethical, legal and amenable to the larger goal of 
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creating just regimes. Machiavelli’s account of situational necessities runs counter 
that traditionally found in political theory.  
Necessity is often invoked in discourses of emergency politics to explain the 
conditions which actors to resort to exceptional or extraordinary methods. The most 
famous of expression of this idea is the phrase ‘necessity has no law.’ For instance, 
torture is often justified on the grounds that the situation, such as a ticking time-
bomb scenario left the torturer with no other choice as we saw in chapter four. 
Without resorting to torture, the suspect would not have given up information which 
allowed for the bomb to be diffused. In this line of thinking necessity is a device 
used to circumvent criticism and discussion of the appropriate methods for 
responding to a given situation.  
Machiavelli uses the term necessità to describe constraints imposed on 
political actors by a given situation. He too recognizes that necessity can function as 
an external constraint on action. While necessity is usually associated with 
emergency or exceptional situations, Machiavelli understands necessity as operating 
in all circumstances, emergency or otherwise. Benner notes that “Machiavelli’s 
reflections suggest that adequate conceptions of necessità do not focus only on 
extraordinary constraints. On the contrary, prudent agents should take the ordinary 
and natural or reasonable constraints that confront them every day as seriously as 
necessities that arise in extremis.”537 Thus necessities form another element of 
contingency in Machiavelli’s thought. They operate at all levels of politics and 
political action. They are certainly not restricted to extraordinary situations. Benner 
notes that “the conditions that Machiavelli describes as estraordinario are never 
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natural or reasonable, nor does he speak of ‘extraordinary necessities.”538 As 
discussed above, the word extraordinary has normative connotations for Machiavelli. 
As such, he does not classify any necessities, violent or otherwise as extraordinary. 
They are ordinary constraints which must be attended to but, one always has a choice 
of how to respond to them, regardless of the character of the necessity which 
happens to occur.  
Crucially, necessities never fully determine the responses of political actors. 
Though the Machiavelli’s conception of necessities may include violent events he 
never argues that violence imposes ultimate or exceptional necessities on political 
actors. Virtuous political action when responding to accidenti, according to 
Machiavelli, is to plan ahead for such events by building, maintaining and 
periodically renovating just orders. Virtú is dealing with accidenti ‘ordinarily’ by 
imposing self-authored laws and orders. “His most virtuoso agents are not those who 
seize the occasion given by necessità to justify ‘extraordinary’ actions, but those 
who labor even in ‘quiet times’ to found and maintain quite ordinary, regulative 
orders.”539 Machiavelli commends the founders and builders of states when they 
create a strong set of laws to order the new regime. He argues that virtue can be 
recognized in “the ordering of laws.”540 Even if such laws are not perfect they can be 
enough to make good use of accidenti such that “by the occurrence of accidenti 
[they] become perfect.”541  
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Laws are a form of self-imposed and self-authored necessità which actors use 
to constrain themselves. When they are more constrained they are less vulnerable to 
the threats of grave crises. As Benner argues “[s]elf-imposed necessities are the best 
guarantee of human orders and the optimal expression of virtú; and self-imposed 
necessities in the form of leggi e ordini involve ethical constraints or obligations, not 
the arbitrary or lawless use of force.”542 Self-imposed necessities in the form of laws 
should always regulate the use of force on Machiavelli’s account. McCormick points 
out that, “The complexities of the mixed regime itself are such that it may absorb 
many of the kinds of accidenti that the political realm will thrust upon it.”543Actors 
which show virtú are not the ones who eschew law in times of crisis like Francesco 
Pazzi Francesco Valori. A virtuous actor is one who always supports ordinary, legal 
methods of dealing with accidenti, such as Niccolo da Uzzano “to whom 
extraordinary ways were distasteful.”544 
Laws and ordini are two forms of necessità which are particularly suited to 
absorbing or venting accidenti which arise from political antagonism. Machiavelli 
argues that “every city ought to have its modes with which the people can vent its 
ambition, and especially those that wish to avail themselves of the people in 
important things.”545 The lesson to take from this is that democratic states also need 
legal order. Without legal constraints on political action antagonisms can get out of 
control and turn violent. “Irresponsible agents may think that the only way to deal 
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with enemies is to eliminate them with violence.”546 The surest way to prevent 
violence emanating from antagonisms is to regulate it with ‘ordinary’ laws.  
Machiavelli always advises the use of legal means of dealing with accidenti 
instead of the unrestrained use of force and violence because for him law and force 
are intricately bound up with one another. Though this is not initially apparent in his 
most famous remark on the subject. He writes “you must know that there are two 
kinds of combat: one with laws, the other with force. The first is proper to man, the 
second to beasts; but because the first is often not enough, one must have recourse to 
the second.”547 But Machiavelli goes on to say that “the one without the other is not 
lasting.”548 This seems to suggest that force and law, man and beast are not 
completely separate. Rather they are mutually entwined.  Machiavelli does not argue 
that one must use either force or law. As Benner puts it “[t]he opposition between 
force and law is classic sophistry: the necessity to use force in no way reduces the 
necessity to use laws to regulate it. Readers who fall in to the sophistical trap and 
unreflectively identify force with bestial ways fail to see that force can and should be 
regulated by human laws.”549 And as Machiavelli’s examples of extraordinary modes 
have shown, use of force unregulated by law leads to more harm and disaster than 
was threatened by the crisis.  
Conclusion 
Machiavelli’s work on contingency conceptualized as Fortuna and accidenti 
help us re-imagine emergency politics as part and parcel of everyday politics. The 
political realm is one in which new and unplanned for events are always and 
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inevitably will always occur. “The most important implication of his approach is that 
one need not adhere to authoritarian or neoabsolutist positions...” to respond to such 
exigencies.
550
 Political life then is the creation of regimes based on ordini and leggi 
which are just. Order and justice are one concept for Machiavelli. Regimes cannot be 
well ordered if they are unjust. “For Machiavelli, laws and institutions that lack 
giustizia are always disordered. Order and justice are not two discrete values that 
sometimes come into conflict so that one must choose which to put first. Since order 
depends on justice, justice must always come first, even when this seems to some 
observers to threaten what they take to be order.”551 As such security and justice do 
not constitute a binary. Security means more than physical security. In a sense 
Machiavelli is a precursor to Honig’s call for defending the ‘more life’ of 
democracy, not just the ‘mere life’ of democratic citizens. It is because Machiavelli 
conceptualizes politics in a way that undermines the notions of both normality and 
exceptionality that he can build a case for constructing regimes which, as an 
‘ordinary’ part of their functioning can ‘absorb’ events defined and acted upon as 
states of emergency without needing to break their own laws and orders.  
Nowhere does Machiavelli use the word politics as a noun.
552
 In all but one 
usage the word politico appears as an adjective for the word vivere, the verb ‘to live’. 
This suggests that for Machiavelli political life is a constant engagement with 
fortuna and accidenti. At the center of a vivere politico in his opinion are ordini, just 
orders based on law.
553
 The conclusion we can draw from the close association of 
accidenti, fortuna, ordini, and vivere politico is that for Machiavelli the goal of 
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political life is the creation of ordini in a world characterized by drastic changes in 
Fortuna and the inevitability of possibly threatening accidenti. As Whitfield argues, 
“vivere politico, it will be found that this, which was the opposite of a potestà 
assoluta or tirannide, is no other than a vivere civile e libero, based on ordini and 
leggi.
554
 Political life is the struggle to create regimes based on justice in a 
continually changing world. The next chapter will analyze how the problems of 
contingency, antagonism, and managing accidenti manifest themselves in liberal-
democratic regimes as well as suggest ways to encourage politics to focus on vivere 
politico. 
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Chapter 7 - The Aliens Within 
 
“Physically speaking, we cannot separate. We cannot remove our respective sections 
from each other nor build an impassable wall between them. A husband and wife 
may be divorced and go out of the presence and beyond the reach of each other, but 
the different parts of our country cannot do this. They cannot but remain face to 
face, and intercourse, either amicable or hostile, must continue between them.”  
Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, 
March 4, 1861 
 
Introduction 
 The previous chapter demonstrated Machiavelli’s argument that political 
regimes and conflicting ‘humours’ in society are deeply implicated in what he called 
‘accidenti’, which I argued were very similar to situations that are today referred to 
as ‘states of emergency’. Machiavelli, however, was analyzing what he called 
‘mixed regimes’, which are similar to liberal-democratic regimes but obviously the 
differences must be accounted for. This chapter takes up Machiavelli’s suggestions 
and contends that his insights are applicable to liberal-democratic regimes. The 
processes and structures involved in constructing and maintaining a democratic 
polity also implicate that polity in situations which are sometimes defined as ‘states 
of emergency’. 
The thesis of this chapter is that situations presented or defined as ‘states of 
emergency’ are a constitutive aspect of any democratic polity and politico-legal 
regime. They are an ‘ordinary’ aspect of constructing, maintaining and even 
renovating a regime. As such the concepts of emergency and normality lose their 
coherence, or at least must be understood differently. They are better understood as 
contestations over fundamental values, principles and contingently constructed 
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foundations; not extraordinary and temporary events. Liberal-democratic legal orders 
and the political communities that legitimize them are deeply implicated in the 
occurrence of ‘states of emergency’. This does not mean that they are in a permanent 
‘state of emergency’. Rather the opposite is true. Liberal-democratic regimes are 
always engaged in struggles over fundamental values and interests as well as how 
groups are included and articulated within a given society. As such a ‘state of 
emergency’ should be understood as a type or form of the contingency that liberal-
democratic regimes must constantly engage with. Ernesto Laclau argues that “states 
of emergency are an integral part of the political construction of the social bond.”555 
Liberal-democratic regimes are at least partially responsible for creating the elements 
which may threaten them and cause a situation which the regime defines as a ‘state 
of emergency’. This chapter details how and why this is the case. 
These claims are defended via the work of Hans Lindahl, Bert van 
Roermund, Bernhard Waldenfels, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. In similar and 
overlapping ways these scholars investigate the problem of constructing and 
maintaining liberal-democratic regimes. The work of Lindahl/van 
Roermund/Waldenfels and Laclau/Mouffe are two different yet theoretically 
compatible ways of understanding one problem - the effects of social division on 
liberal-democratic regimes. Lindahl/van Roermund/Waldenfels approach the 
problem from a legal perspective while Laclau and Mouffe theorize it from the point 
of view of the political and hegemony. The work of Lindahl, van Roermund and 
Waldenfels is broadly compatible with that of Laclau and Mouffe. They are 
addressing the same problem, how to constitute political and legal unity in 
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democratic societies. Both approaches focus on power in processes of inclusion and 
exclusion which are necessary for the constitution of any political regime. 
The work of Laclau and Mouffe is crucial because they understand 
constitutive divisions and exclusions not as internal or external to society but as the 
limit of a social space such that society does not exist with any sense of full 
positivity or finality.
 556
 This demonstrates why political contestation and conflict are 
a permanent feature of liberal-democratic regimes. Their work is also useful in 
understanding why some excluded elements remain innocuous but others may 
become virulent and challenge the politico-legal regime that they inhabit. Mouffe is 
also useful for conceptualizing the limits of pluralism and pluralism contestation. I 
will argue that the limits of pluralist contestation are the terrain on which situations 
which are sometimes labeled ‘states of emergency’ occur.  
Lindahl and van Roermund, following Waldenfels, demonstrate that the 
process of constructing and maintaining a politico-legal regime necessarily excludes 
certain values, interests and groups from the democratic polity. These values, 
interests and groups are not completely removed from the social space. They remain, 
sometimes peacefully but sometimes they can be or are perceived to be threatening. 
These scholars also demonstrate that the processes of constructing and maintaining a 
liberal-democratic regime are never finalized. A regime is never fully or finally 
constructed, it is always forced to continuously engage with contingency. Lindahl, 
van Roermund and Waldenfels do not say much specifically on ‘states of 
emergency’. Lindahl, however, does provide one clue for re-thinking them. He states 
in a footnote that “a more complete analysis of the structure of the state of exception 
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would need to deal with the problem of political reflexivity.”557 Accounting for the 
reflexive nature of democratic polities highlights the exclusions necessary for 
constructing a democratic regime and helps to comprehend why a regime may come 
to see some excluded elements as a threat to its existence which requires the use of 
emergency measures. 
Unity – Hegemonic and Normative 
Hegemonic 
Machiavelli argued that conflicts between the grandi and the popolo were one 
of the main causes of accidenti in Florence. These conflicts were constitutive; they 
could only be regulated and vented, never fully extinguished. The same is true in 
liberal-democratic regimes, though the grandi and the plebs are no longer the main 
antagonists. The theory of Laclau and Mouffe provides a useful perspective for 
analyzing and conceptualizing why conflicts are constitutive of, as well as how they 
continually undermine liberal-democratic regimes. They develop several concepts 
which are particularly useful in this task.  
For Laclau and Mouffe political unity is conceptualized as hegemonic unity. 
Hegemony on their understanding is “a political type of relation, a form… of 
politics”.558 Hegemonic formations are constructed via articulatory practices.559 
Articulatory practices attempt to structure, or suture, elements within a social space, 
converting them to moments. Elements are political groups, fundamental principles, 
values and interests which exist within a social space. When they are sutured to a 
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hegemonic formation they are referred to as moments.
560
 The process of constructing 
and maintaining a hegemonic formation begins with plurality or an excess of 
possibilities and meaning.
561
 From this plurality certain elements are selected and 
sutured together to compose the hegemonic formation. However this process cannot 
be conceptualized as merely the combing of elements which exist in a social space. 
Certain elements must be excluded from the hegemonic formation in order for it to 
have any coherence and unity. For Laclau and Mouffe this process is necessarily 
ongoing and can never be finally completed.
562
  
Laclau and Mouffe postulate constitutive divisions within society as 
necessary for the construction of unity. They argue that “Every ‘society’ constitutes 
its own forms of rationality and intelligibility by dividing itself; that is, by expelling 
outside itself and surplus of meaning subverting it.”563 The exclusions necessary to 
give coherence to a hegemonic formation also ensure that any formation will always 
be contingently articulated, open to contestation and alteration over time. As such, 
negativity is essential to any form of political unity.
564
 They note that “A hegemonic 
formation… embraces what opposes it, insofar as the opposing force accepts the 
system of basic articulations of that formation as something it negates, but the place 
of negation is defined by the internal parameters of the formation itself.”565 Some 
elements must remain as elements without being sutured within the hegemonic 
formation. The decision as to which elements will be articulated as moments and 
which will be left as elements is made by powerful actors within the hegemonic 
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formation. Certain groups, values, principles and interests are excluded because they 
are seen as subversive from the perspective of the hegemonic formation. As such, 
exclusion and division are necessary because “it is on the basis of its own limits that 
a formation is shaped as a totality”.566 They describe these constitutive divisions as 
antagonisms. 
 Antagonism is a constitutive divide created by at least two groups opposing 
one another as they attempt to construct and maintain their own political identity and 
regime. Antagonisms postulate the limits of a given social space, “antagonism, as a 
witness of the impossibility of a final suture, is the ‘experience’ of the limit of the 
social. Strictly speaking, antagonisms are not internal but external to society; or 
rather, they constitute the limits of society, the latter’s impossibility of fully 
constituting itself.”567 As Laclau formulates it “A notion of constitutive antagonism, 
of a radical frontier, requires… a broken space.”568 Hegemonic formations cannot be 
defined permanently in a state of crisis of emergency because they are necessarily 
incomplete and contingently articulated.  
 Hegemonic formations in many western, liberal-democratic countries are 
relatively stable. Even the financial crisis of 2008-2011 did little to remove neo-
liberal capitalism from its position of dominance. Additionally, there are very few 
political movements that advocate overthrowing liberal-democracy as a legitimate 
form of government. On the other hand, hegemonic formations are constantly 
evolving and sometimes the relations between moments weaken. If the structure 
becomes too weak it may begin to fall apart. Laclau and Mouffe describe such a 
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situation, following Gramsci, as an organic crisis.
569
 In an organic crisis excluded 
elements are able to subvert the relations between moments to the point that they 
collapse. I argue that such a situation could be experienced and defined as a state of 
emergency by powerful actors within the hegemonic formation. Because they 
initially decided which groups, values and principles were to be excluded in order to 
construct the hegemonic formation in the first place they would experience the 
weakening of relational bonds as an existential crisis. As such, an organic crisis is a 
crisis from their perspective. It is not a neutral determination of states of affairs 
which all groups or individuals within a society would agree with, particularly if they 
belonged to excluded groups or identified with excluded values and principles. A 
‘state of emergency’ can only be described as an emergency from the vantage point 
of those invested in the maintenance of a hegemonic formation as it existed before 
the articulation began to break down. If this is the case then any declaration of 
emergency needs to be understood not as an objective assessment, but as a political 
tactic on the part of powerful elites within a hegemonic formation. Since hegemonic 
formations are contingently articulated an organic crisis is an ever present 
possibility. It need not necessarily be defined as or experienced as a ‘state of 
emergency’.  
Normative  
This analysis is further supported by the work of Waldenfels, Lindahl and 
van Roermund. They describe a similar process of inclusion and exclusion at work in 
the construction and maintenance of liberal-democratic regimes. Their initial 
problematic is how a plurality of individuals and social groups can be welded 
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together into a unified polity which rules over and governs itself. The first step is 
revising a widely accepted definition of democracy as the identity of the rulers and 
the ruled. This means that the rulers and the ruled in a democratic society are the 
same people, the terms ‘rulers’ and ‘ruled’ are co-referential.570 Recall that Schmitt 
defends this definition of democracy. Lindahl and van Roermund contend, on the 
other hand, that a polity is unified around a notion of collective selfhood.
571
 The 
former notion of unity understands identity as sameness, what Paul Ricoeur called 
idem-identity. The latter notion understands identity as ipse-identity, identity as 
selfhood in which a people rules over itself. This understanding of collective 
selfhood entails that the unity will understand itself, speak and act in the first person 
plural perspective. It also means that it can reflect on itself as an actor. Lindahl and 
van Roermund refer to this as a reflexive notion of unity and identity for a 
democratic polity.  
Two implications follow from this formulation of a democratic polity as a 
collective self. The first is that the members of the group understand themselves to 
be a unity that will act collectively. Secondly, any actions taken from the first person 
plural perspective are done for the sake of the collective as a collective self.
572
 
Collective selves engage in what Bratman calls ‘shared intentional activity’.573 It 
follows that if in a democratic regime a collective self is acting by and for itself then 
any conceptualization of democracy must include a notion of constituent power. It is 
this constituent power which legitimizes and acts through the state, the constituted 
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power. This point raises two important questions: how is a constituent power unified 
initially and maintained over time? And how exactly does it speak and act as a 
collective subject through a constituted power, a legal order? 
 Schmitt maintained that a constituent power needed to be homogenous in 
order to constitute and maintain itself. The people themselves needed to have 
something essential in common on which they could base their unity and on which to 
enact a constitution via a political decision. Lindahl and van Roermund accept the 
need for ‘a people’ to share something in common but they disagree with Schmitt 
over what this common interest is. For them it certainly need not be any essential 
characteristic like racial, ethnic or national similarity. Rather, Lindahl argues that a 
constituent power begins “as the constitution of a political unity through a legal 
order… Someone must seize the initiative to determine what interests are shared by 
the collective and who belongs to it.”574 This act of seizing the initiative, positing the 
boundaries of who is and is not included in the community, and defining the shared 
fundamental interests and values cannot be ex ante legitimated by the democratic 
polity. The act of positing initial core values and boundaries must always come first.  
On their understanding democracy is a political system in which all acts done 
in the name of the collective must be legitimated by constituent power. This means 
that the act which creates a democracy can never be legitimate or ‘legal’ from the 
perspective of the legal system it posited. Sovereign power is indispensable.
575
 Yet 
the requirement for legitimacy derived from constituent power remains. On 
Lindahl’s reading a constituent power is formed by an individual or a small group 
seizing the initiative and acting as a legitimate constituted power. The first act of 
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instituting a constituent power must present itself as acting with legitimacy grounded 
in the constituent power it creates through its seizing of the initiative. However, 
seizing the initiative does not necessarily succeed. It can only be retroactively 
legitimated if individuals identify with the polity, its boundaries, interests and core 
values. Because constituted power comes first, a constituent power can only react to 
individuals and groups attempting to speak and act in its name and from a first 
person plural perspective. As such, there exists “a fundamental passivity at the heart 
of political unity.”576 Constituent power can only respond to and retroactively 
legitimize (or not) the actions of individuals and small groups claiming to act in its 
name. Constituted power acts in the name of the constituent power then must wait to 
see if that action is taken up and retroactively legitimized. This means that when 
someone seizes the initiative they “can only originate a community by representing 
its origin.”577  
We now see how Lindahl and van Roermund understand the paradox of 
politics. Honig, following Rousseau, understood the paradox as a question of which 
comes first, good law which makes good people or good people who make good 
law? In other words, which must come first constituent or constituted power? 
Lindahl and van Roermund’s reading of the paradox is that constituted power comes 
first but only if it successfully creates the constituent power on which it legitimizes 
its initial action. 
Before addressing the structure of representation and attribution of individual 
acts to the collective it is necessary to establish that law is the symbolic form of the 
unity of a collective self in a democratic polity. Constituted power can be primarily 
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understood as legal order. Following Kelsen Lindahl argues that “…democracy 
functionalizes political unity by making of it the unity of a legal order. More 
precisely, the functional unity of the people is the unity of a legal order, a normative 
unity.
578
 This is necessary because any society is rife with division, conflict, and 
antagonism as Machiavelli argued. There is no common ground or experience which 
can function as a substantial basis for unity. Modern liberal-democratic states solve 
this problem by making legal order function as point of symbolic and institutional 
unity of divided societies. Moreover, “On the other hand, law conditions the political 
world of democracy in the sense that legal or state order is also the unity wherein 
division, thus political majorities and minorities, can ensue. In other words, a legal 
order not only determines the (normative) unity of a people, but constitutes the locus 
of political conflict and division.”579 Legal order sits uncomfortably between 
attempting to fix political unity and allowing for and even encouraging contestation 
and conflict. This means that division and contestation are internal to liberal-
democratic regimes. Such internal division and contestation which can emerge from 
liberal-democratic legal orders are one of the terrains from which crisis situations 
sometimes labeled as ‘states of emergency’ can arise. Here Lindahl and van 
Roermund are in agreement with Machiavelli’s suggestion that accidenti can 
emanate from within a political regime itself.  
The ability of legal order to unify a divided society is further complicated by 
the logic of representation. A logic of representation is essential to a democratic 
polity understood as a reflexively oriented collective self. Certainly the collective 
self, the ipse-identity cannot actually act itself. “As Waldenfels put it: ‘(…) it is 
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impossible for a we to say ‘we’. Saying ‘we’ is done by spokesmen, who are more or 
less directly authorized to speak…”580 In other words, “each particular act, as a legal 
act, ‘represents’ or symbolizes the political unity to which it belongs…”581 The unity 
necessary for constituent power only exists through its representations. Lindahl 
argues that the collective self only exists in the form of self-attributive acts by 
individuals.
582
 Essentially, an act is an action of the collective self if it can be 
attributed to the collective self, i.e. if everyone who constitutes the collective self 
would have acted in the same way or agrees that the action was legitimately carried 
out. As Lindahl argues, “The common good remains forever absent… an empty 
normative signifier that provides no normative orientation whatsoever. And as the 
common good is the way of conceiving of the people as a unity, to argue that the 
common good is only accessible through its particularizations is to assert that unity 
is necessarily a represented unity.”583 These representations rely on attributing the 
acts of individuals to the collective. The consequence of this is that constituent and 
constituted power do not have direct access to one another.
584
   
This structure of representation creates contestation in two ways. First, 
because any legal act which claims to be done in the name of the collective must be 
retroactively legitimized all such claims are contestable.
585
 The democratic unity, or 
sections of it, could in some way refuse, or attempt to refuse, to legitimate any given 
action made on its behalf by a particular individual or even a state official. For 
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instance, anti-gay marriage activists in California recently tried to force a high court 
judge to recuse himself in a case determining the legality of gay marriage because he 
was gay. The activists felt that his lifestyle choice and hence his particular legal 
actions could not represent and act in the name of what they claimed was the 
common good – banning gay marriage in the state. Secondly, this contestability of 
acts of political representation is complicated by the fact that modern liberal-
democratic regimes delay indefinitely final decisions on self-attribution. As Lindahl 
notes, “the democratic Rechtsstaat is the form of political organization that suspends, 
up to a point, the initial and subsequent closures in view of determining anew what 
interests are shared by a community and who is an interested party thereto.”586 
Liberal democratic regimes institutionalize conflict and contestation. A democratic 
polity always exists in a mode of questionability because it forever delays final 
decisions on whether and how particular actions represent the reflexively oriented 
constituent power necessary to legitimize democratic governance. This means that 
liberal-democratic regimes are constantly engaging with their own contingent and 
contestable foundation. A final decision on whether or not a particular statute or 
action of a state official represents and actualizes fundamental values and interests is 
always delayed. As such those fundamental values and interests are forever 
contestable but, as Lindahl argued, only up to a point. 
 Certainly most actions of a state are legitimized by at least a portion of the 
population. The legitimacy of a police officer issuing a citation for speeding on the 
motorway is not usually questioned. The process of constructing and maintaining a 
democratic political community, mediated by the representational relationship 
between constituent and constituted power, does generate and concretize what are 
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considered to be fundamental values, interests and a normative orientation by a large 
portion of the polity. This obviously entails the construction of a specific normative 
viewpoint with boundaries. As Lindahl points out, “constituent power—refers to the 
capacity to institute legal meaning, and this means to generate a normative point of 
view from which individuals can understand and identify themselves as members of 
a legal community.”587 In order to establish this normative viewpoint and posit 
boundaries a democratic polity, because it is reflexively structured, must choose to 
include certain values and exclude others. Unity requires closure and closure is 
dependent on exclusion. “Closure is indispensable for normative orientation by the 
members of a community; in its absence, they would not know how they ought to 
behave.”588 Alternately, a unity which allowed for infinite possibilities would be no 
unity at all.  
“For to assert that representation concretises political unity is to acknowledge that 
every representation of the common good includes and excludes values. Ineluctably, 
representation is an ambiguous achievement. On the one hand, exclusion is a positive feature 
of representation: closure is a necessary condition for the disclosure of a common or public 
space. On the other hand, the operation of normative inclusion and exclusion implies that 
representation always brings about a normative reduction: the disclosure of the common 
good as concretised in ‘this’ or ‘that’ value necessarily involves a normative closure of the 
good.” 589  
According to Lindahl there is no escape from this dynamic, some exclusions will be 
necessary. In order to effect closure a democratic polity must posit a normative 
viewpoint against which representational acts can be judged. On this point Lindahl 
and van Roermund agree with Laclau and Mouffe. Closure brought about through a 
process of inclusion and exclusion must take place to give a liberal-democratic 
regime unity and coherence. 
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Furthermore, the democratic polity will understand the values it includes as 
its own values, which are on its side of the boundary it has posited. As Lindahl 
argues, “any and every legal order embodies a particular set of values,” what it 
considers to be its own values.
590
 A democratic polity is constantly engaged in a 
process of constructing and maintaining its own social and representational space 
which actualizes its own values and notion of the common good. Hence, a collective 
self must always look out over the boundaries of the political and legal order it sets 
for itself. As Waldenfels notes, “When a collective self is drawing a boundary in 
order to constitute itself it places itself inside the boundary. It becomes “an inside 
which separates itself from an outside and thus produces a preference in the 
difference.” 591 This preference in the difference is crucial because it helps to explain 
why a democratic regime or polity would feel threatened by the presence of values, 
interests and groups which are not its own. Any interest, value or group which does 
not fully belong to the collective self, the constituent power, is potentially a threat 
simply because it implies that the regime could be ordered differently.  
Lindahl and van Roermund, following Waldenfels, develop a detailed 
analysis of the elements excluded by the process of constructing a reflexive 
democratic polity. The following section will analyze what they term, following 
Waldenfels, the ‘alien’ as well as what Lindahl refers to as a-legality. The alien is 
any excluded group, value or normative principle excluded from the viewpoint of a 
constituent power. A-legality is a possibility for subverting legal order and making 
visible its contingent foundations. Turning to a closer analysis of these two concepts 
will further the argument that liberal-democratic regimes and polities are always 
                                                          
590
 Lindahl, ‘Authority and Representation,’ p. 4 
591
 Waldenfels, Phenomenology of the Alien, p. 15 
236 
 
engaged in contestation and struggle over their most fundamental values, interests 
and normative principles. 
Exclusion, A-Legality, the Alien and Antagonism 
 Before discussing how the presence of excluded elements implicates liberal-
democratic states in situations which could be defined as ‘states of emergency’ I 
need to stress that a-legality and alienness or the presence of alien elements within a 
liberal-democratic legal order do necessarily cause ‘states of emergency’. My 
argument is that they are generated structurally. They are the site and perhaps the 
form of situations and events which may be defined as ‘states of emergency’ by state 
officials but do not in and of themselves produce a crisis. They may however 
challenge the existence of the regime. This challenge need not necessarily have to 
manifest as a crisis which requires emergency measures. The elements excluded 
from a polity can exist benignly, become virulent or exist in any state between the 
two. Which excluded elements result in the declaration of an emergency must be 
determined historically and contextually.  
A-Legality 
Because law is the symbolic form of unity in a democratic regime “the unity 
of a collective self manifests itself in an interlocking web of legal behavior.”592 But 
human behavior cannot always be categorized definitively as either legal or illegal. 
Lindahl argues that “human behaviour does not only fall snugly on either side of the 
divide between legality and illegality…”593  Behavior which does not fit neatly into 
the legal binary demands a response from a legal order. “…lawmaking is responsive 
to something that demands a normative, no less than a factual, qualification… 
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Something demands legal qualification, in the broad sense of a determination of who 
ought to do what, where and when. As such, legislation responds to a question about 
legal boundaries, hence to a question about the unity of a legal order.”594 
Accordingly, any new or ambiguous behavior forces a legal order decide if it is legal 
or illegal. Lindahl argues that a third form of behavior exists. Human behavior, he 
argues, “can call into question the ways in which legal orders draw the distinction 
between legality and illegality. This political manifestation of plurality… is a-
legality.”595 Illegal acts violate a norm; a-legal acts show how the norm could be set 
and applied differently, or how the legal order could exist without that particular 
norm. A-legal acts are “acts [that] contest a legal order by intimating a possible 
legality of illegality, and a possible illegality of legality.”596 There is no strict line of 
demarcation between the two. Sit-ins at white only lunch counters by black activists 
during the American Civil Rights movements were il-legal and a-legal in that they 
violated segregation laws while at the same time demonstrating how society could be 
differently ordered. As such, a-legality is an ever present aspect of legal contestation. 
Additionally, the acts which seize the initiative to found a constituent and constituted 
power are always a-legal. As they precede the distinction between illegality and 
illegality as drawn by the democratic polity they must remain a-legal.  
Anyone in a democratic polity can enact a-legal behavior. Even immigrants 
illegally crossing a border show how membership of a polity could be differently 
decided. A-legality is manifested in any act that challenges the distinction between 
legality and illegality as drawn by the polity from its preferential normative 
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viewpoint.
 597
 “A-legality reveals possibilities that are, to a lesser or greater extent, 
possibilities as a legal collective’s own possibilities; but this is also to say that a-
legality confronts a collective with possibilities that escape it to a greater or lesser 
extent - possibilities that are not its own.
”598
 These possibilities are generated in part 
by the exclusions made and remade during the process of constructing and 
maintaining the democratic polity with its specific normative viewpoint. Those 
values, interests and norms which were and are excluded yet remained become 
manifested, embodied and enacted in acts of a-legal behavior. The inclusions and 
exclusions carried out by a polity are never finally settled. As such, they remain 
contingent and precarious. “A-legal acts lay bare the contingency of a polity.” 599 I 
argue that a-legal acts are also manifestations of that contingency upon which all 
democratic polities are founded. Finally, it should be noted that the difference 
between illegal and a-legal acts is not objectively determinable.
 600
 “[c]hallenges to 
legal order are, qua challenges, variable combinations of threats to and possibilities 
of collective selfhood.”601 This means that a polity always has a choice in how to 
frame and understand a challenge as well as how it should be best responded to. 
Classifying an action or behavior as a-legal is always determined politically. 
Because a-legality is in part the product of exclusions made by the polity, the 
responses a polity can make to a-legality are not limitless. As noted above, a unity 
cannot remain open to infinite possibilities. “[L]egislative acts display a finite 
responsiveness to what challenges legal boundaries, which means that they frame 
                                                          
597
 Lindahl, ‘Border Crossings by Immigrants,’ p. 117 
598
 Lindahl, ‘A-Legality,’ p. 49 
599
 Lindahl, ‘Border Crossings by Immigrants,’ p. 128-129 
600
 Lindahl, ‘Border Crossings by Immigrants,’ p.131 
601
 Lindahl, ‘Border Crossings by Immigrants,’ p. 131 
239 
 
human behavior in such a way that it provokes the collective self with a finite 
questionability.” 602 The limits of questionability must always be politically 
determined. Law and legality are usually responsive to demands made on them. 
When someone questions the boundaries of a legal order by sitting in at a white only 
lunch counter the legal order decides whether it will continue to deem such an 
activity illegal or whether it can be incorporated within the legal order as legal. As 
Lindahl notes “legislation is responsive because it establishes retroactively whether 
and how behavior is a-legal.”603 Yet legal responsivity is finite. The options are not 
unlimited but neither are they fixed ex ante. Indeed, “the responsiveness of 
legislative acts is never merely subordinate to what calls for legal qualification, 
never a fixed reaction to a pre-coded stimulus.” 604 This means that arguments 
concerning the necessity of using emergency measures in certain situations are false. 
A democratic regime can respond in any number of ways to a-legal acts which 
demand legal response. It never need necessarily turn directly to emergency 
measures. This position effectively counters the notion of a ‘law of necessity’ and 
the notion that necessity knows no law. As such making a decision between illegality 
and a-legality may induce or provoke large scale political struggle, depending on 
how legal and political elites choose to respond to it. Lindahl notes that although a-
legality is ever present “there is no all-encompassing measure of (il)legality that 
could guarantee an orderly encounter between what calls for legal qualification and 
the legal qualification thereof.”605 This is partially due to the fact that liberal-
democratic regimes allow for and foster contestation of their most basic values and 
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processes, the rules of the game, so to speak. On the other hand, while a democratic 
polity has options, it must also set limits on how it can respond.  
How are those limits determined given that they are the product of a specific 
normative viewpoint which has no access to an external, objective standpoint? For 
Lindahl, “the commitment to a common purpose that determines whether a collective 
can be ‘taken seriously’ also determines which contestations of that commitment can 
be ‘taken seriously’ by the collective. Every reflexively structured legal order hides a 
blind spot which bursts the reciprocity of the hoary principle of (constitutional) 
dialogue: audi alteram partem.”606 Essentially, Lindahl is arguing that limits must be 
determined politically; specifically by the amount of support a given a-legal behavior 
can muster taking account of the specific normative viewpoint of a polity and limits 
its responsiveness. “The interpretation of behavior as a-legal is bound up with an 
authoritative assessment about what normative possibilities are the collective’s own 
possibilities.”607 I contend that ‘states of emergency’ can arise from a-legal acts 
which are beyond the polities own limits and possibilities, rather they may induce 
situations which can be defined as ‘states of emergency’ if they are determined to 
posed a significant threat. However, the key point is that they present a legal order 
with a behavior or action which is beyond its scope to incorporate either as legal or 
illegal behavior. One such situation would be an act which is defined as ‘terrorist’ a 
polity. 
While it is impossible to objectively determine the limits of a legal order’s 
response to a-legality, Lindahl argues that we can recognize behavior that a polity 
has determined is beyond its possibilities for legal response. Lindahl argues that 
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terrorism is the name given to acts which a legal order cannot respond to by 
categorizing as either legal or illegal. “By qualifying an act as terrorist, legal 
authorities deny that it can be the index of another legality, claiming, instead, that it 
is the expression of sheer illegality.” 608 In other words, the limit of a-legality is 
called terrorism. Acts of terrorism are deemed by the legal order as behavior or 
action which fall outside the scope of legitimate and acceptable response. As such 
legal order does not acknowledge that the terrorists or the act committed can have 
any normative claim on itself whatsoever. Waldenfels argues that “When a word 
such as ‘terrorism’ is used, as though it were merely an innocent descriptive term, 
what is often at stake is demonizing delinquents or – less spectacularly, but no less 
effectively – raising the own ‘way of life’ to the status of a general standard for all. 
Justice thus transforms itself into a hidden instrument of combat.”609 ‘Terrorist’ acts 
are responded to with emergency measures in many circumstances. The definition of 
an act as ‘terrorist’ and any subsequent declaration of a ‘state of emergency’ are 
tactics of political combat. At this point a tension arises because liberal-democratic 
regimes are open to conflict over the boundaries of the legal order and the polity, as 
well as the contingent foundations of both. However, a polity must defend its 
distinction between legal and illegal by defining certain acts as outside that 
distinction, as acts that can’t be accounted for and responded to from within the 
system itself. Not doing so would jeopardize the unity and coherence of the system 
as such. 
There is another aspect of terrorism which adds to its inability to be 
responded to. It “reaches a polity from without… even when those whom a legal-
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political order qualifies as terrorists are its own citizens.”610 Terrorism is always in 
some sense understood as an external threat. Terrorist acts are alegal acts which a 
democratic politico-legal regime deems beyond comprehension and certainly beyond 
integration within the society in any way. The preceding analysis, on the other hand, 
suggests that ‘terrorist’ acts are always also internal to the regime they are 
committed against. ‘Terrorism’ is an effect of a political and legal regime defining its 
own boundaries and setting limits to what it considers legitimate tactics of political 
contestation. Every democratic regime must define for itself what is outside. Lindahl 
and van Roermund conceptualize this outside of society as alienness.  
The Aliens Within 
Lindahl and van Roermund, building on Waldenfels’ phenomenology of the 
alien, develop a structural analysis of the excluded elements and how they relate to 
the precariously unified political community. Waldenfels labeled these elements 
Fremden, the alien or strange depending on the translation. The alien is not “simply 
what is different.”611 It is distinguished from a polity from the perspective of that 
polity. As Waldenfels notes: “In the final analysis, the alien concerns me. The 
division into own and alien… stems from a process of self-differentiation.”612 This 
point is in agreement with Laclau and Mouffe’s argument that a hegemonic 
formation must exclude elements which it views as subversive. The alien is that 
which is intentionally excluded in the process of constructing a reflexive political 
unity. That The alien is the product of the necessary closure required for any form of 
political unity. The alien is “’at odds’ with the vantage point, i.e., the basic truth 
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(principle, value, act) that grounds the order.”613 The alien is created by a democratic 
polity yet it remains as that which challenges the polity and exposes its contingent 
foundations.  
We can further define the alien by distinguishing it from what is foreign. A 
foreigner or a foreign object is someone or something which is out of place. It fits 
within a known legal or political category yet it happens not to be there at that very 
moment. It can be returned to its proper place at any point in the future.
614
 Alienness, 
on the other hand, is inaccessible to the political and legal categories of a given 
democratic polity. Not only is the alien out of place, it has no rightful or legal place. 
The alien is “literally extra-ordinary” because the politico-legal regime has no access 
to it other than through its exclusion.
615
 In this sense, ‘terrorists’ are alien, though not 
all aliens need be defined as ‘terrorist’. 
This exclusion is not necessarily a physical or even final exclusion. Van 
Roermund notes that the alien arises “at the edges” and in the “fissures” of the 
order.
616
 Because they are not necessarily physically removed, the alien are elements 
which are excluded from the collective self, the ipseity, yet they are not necessarily 
excluded from the legal order. Indeed, they may be subject to the legal order, 
politically excluded while legally ‘included’. To use Laclau and Mouffe’s terms the 
alien is not included in the hegemonic formation though it remains within a given 
social space. As van Roermund notes, that which is excluded by a legal order, the 
alien, “lingers on as a factual network of political states of affairs, in which some 
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knots are more dominant than others, while still others do not even register.”617 I 
argue that groups such as a communist party are alien to liberal-democratic regimes 
yet they are still subject to the legal orders of those regimes.  
The boundary between the own and the alien is not clearly demarcated. As 
Waldenfels argues, “The boundaries between that which is governed by rules, that 
which remains open, and that which is against rules are more or less 
indeterminate.”618 There is no binary distinction between inside and outside. The 
reflexive democratic polity acting by and for itself “does not enter the world as a 
light in the darkness; rather, it responds to a twilight zone of meaning in which it 
finds itself.”619 On the other hand, the alien does not necessarily speak clearly. The 
alien makes a demand which the democratic polity must respond to. Such a demand 
challenges the polity “to explore (thus to revise) the twilight zone marked by 
predicates like ‘ordinary’, ‘disorderly’ and ‘extraordinary’.”620 The boundaries 
between the own and the alien are porous.  
How does a polity decide which groups, interests, values and normative 
principles will be placed on the outside of a porous boundary? van Roermund 
contends that the act of self-inclusion [of a polity] excludes those parts of the world 
that would in any way challenge, threaten, or question the collective self.
621
 This 
means that the alien is not simply what is different. It is distinguished from the 
vantage point of the normative viewpoint that makes the distinction and decides to 
exclude the alien in the first place. The alien is that which the polity decides is 
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against the fundamental interests of its collective selfhood. Waldenfels argues that it 
is possible for an alien element to crack the ground of legitimation and force a 
democratic regime to confront its contingent foundations.
622
 It is this structure that 
Lindahl has in mind when he argues that any democratic polity is always in a 
constant ‘state of emergency’ because it is challenged by values, interests and groups 
it has marginalized in order to create and maintain its own identity.
623
 I contend that 
challenges by alien elements can produce situations which a politico-legal regime 
defines as a ‘state of emergency’.  
Waldenfels encapsulates why the alien is experienced as a threat to the 
existence of a regime.  
“The alien can inspire curiosity and imagination, it can even enlighten us about ourselves – 
all this must be granted. Yet as soon as the alien breaks into the Arcanum of freedom and reason, it 
trips the ‘chaos’ alarm. Freedom and reason take up their arms. They fight because otherwise they 
would need to give up on themselves. But, inevitably, alienness leads to hostility, which only 
escalates, with each involved party becoming more and more committed to their belief that they alone 
have right on their side… Assumed to be coming from the outside, the alien is expected to carry its 
identification at all times as if it were an intruder.”624  
Alienness is hostile because it reaches into and challenges the core elements of any 
democratic polity. Although this hostility seems almost unintentional, the result of 
curiosity rather than malevolent intent. Yet Waldenfels still insists that alienness is 
“always also marked by insecurity, threat, and incomprehension. These very factors 
are distributed in unequal fashion, depending on who determines the social and 
linguistic rules of the game, i.e., who ‘has the say’.”625 Alienness, then, is marked by 
insecurity and threat. But it is the collective self, the democratic polity which does 
the marking. This point speaks to the deep implication of liberal-democratic regimes 
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in events they define as ‘states of emergency’. In order to constitute themselves, 
regimes mark off an outside and exclude elements they deem to be contrary to their 
core values, principles, interests and groups. Then, as Waldenfels suggests, the 
regimes experience that which they excluded as a threat to their own existence. 
Furthermore, “Every attempt at mastering the alien leads to a violent rationalization 
which attempts in vain to rid the self and rationality of their contingency and 
genesis.”626 But such a goal is impossible. As convincing as Waldenfels account of 
the alien is, there still appears to be something missing. He does not fully account for 
the possibility that the alien actually is hostile to the democratic polity and its 
politico-legal regime. He acknowledges that the alien may remain “virulent in its 
exclusion”.627 Here we can re-introduce Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of antagonism 
to further explain why some alien elements can be experienced as threatening to a 
regime. 
Antagonisms, as understood on Laclau and Mouffe’s account, are very 
similar to alienness when Waldenfels states that “Alienness does not proceed from a 
division, but consists in a division.”628 Recall that Laclau states that an antagonism 
can be characterized as “a broken space.”629 What is crucial about antagonism, that 
the concept of alienness does not fully account for, is the relationship the polities on 
either side of the divide. Though structurally similar to alienness antagonisms have a 
characteristic which alienness does not. An antagonistic relationship is not 
characterized, like alienness, purely as exclusion and inclusion over a threshold. 
Antagonism “must be conceived not as an objective relation of frontiers, but as 
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reciprocal subversion of their contents.”630 Reciprocal subversion assists in 
explaining why a democratic polity could experience the alien as threat, hostility and 
the onset of chaos. The alien is not just what has been politically excluded. The alien 
is actively trying to undermine the polity so that it can create its own politico-legal 
regime. A polity views the alien as threatening because “in the case of antagonism… 
the presence of the ‘Other’ prevents me from being totally myself. The relation arises 
not from full totalities, but from the impossibility of their constitution.”631 There will 
be groups, values and interests that are outside the polity, the hegemonic formation, 
which do not share the normative viewpoint, the ‘preference in the difference’ as 
Waldenfels calls it, but that are subject to the legal order. Furthermore, they may be 
either attempting to dominate a current legal order as it is or to overthrow the order 
and create a new one from scratch.  
Such a condition does not necessarily lead to those situations which may be 
defined as ‘states of emergency’. “This does not mean of course that such a relation 
is necessarily one of friend/enemy, i.e. an antagonistic one. But we should 
acknowledge that, in certain conditions, there is always the possibility that this 
we/they relation can become antagonistic, i.e. that it can turn into a relation of 
friend/enemy. This happens when the ‘they’ is perceived as putting into question the 
identity of the ‘we’ and as threatening its existence.”632 Alienness and antagonism 
may lead to an existential threat for a hegemonic formation, but not necessarily so. It 
depends on how political and legal elites decide to respond. However, the notion of 
antagonism is still essential because it posits mutual subversion between a polity and 
what it excludes, not simply the exclusion. This is what ensures the permanent 
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contestation of the contingent and precarious foundations of a polity as well as the 
legal order which is in turn grounded on the polity. It also ensures that some 
situations or actions will be defined as ‘states of emergency’ by state officials. The 
very process of constructing a liberal-democratic polity creates the groups, interests, 
and values that will always challenge it.  
I contend that the presence of alienness and antagonism supports 
Machiavelli’s claim that conflicting social humours are implicated in situations 
which are defined by powerful political elites as ‘states of emergency’. Machiavelli, 
Waldenfels, van Roermund, Lindahl, Laclau and Mouffe conceptualize the divisions 
present in any society. All recognize that those divisions cause friction and strife 
within a society. As will be discussed below van Roermund, Lindahl, Laclau and 
Mouffe share the insight that when conflicts are properly regulated violence can be 
contained and conflict can actually be beneficial for society and not necessarily lead 
to crisis which can be defined as ‘states of emergency’. 
The Excluded Elements Remain Within  
What becomes of the values, interests and groups that are excluded from the 
normative point of view, and hence the reflexively oriented constituent power? 
Lindahl argues that “the values excluded by political representation do not simply 
vanish into thin air. They are marginalized, that is to say, they remain at the fringes 
of a polity, embodied in forms of behavior that retain the potential of subverting the 
representations of the common good positivised in the legal order.”633 The presence 
of these excluded elements means that political community exists in a mode of 
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questionability, innovation, rupture and responsiveness.
634
 We could also say that the 
presence of alien elements ensures constant engagement with contingent 
foundations. As noted above, marginalized groups and values do not disappear; they 
remain with the potential to subvert politico-legal order. Additionally, the process of 
inclusion and exclusion is by no means peaceful or orderly. As Waldenfels argues 
“This process of marginalization does not take place in peaceful agreement. Margins, 
of whatever kind, whether marginal phenomena, marginal groups, or ‘marginal 
nations’ arise by something being forced to the edge where the light no longer 
reaches it. This exclusion is not done without disturbance and danger.”635 What does 
it mean to marginalize certain values, interests, interests or groups? These excluded 
and marginalized values, interests and groups do not simply disappear from the 
consciousness of the polity or fade into obscurity. As Lincoln stated in his first 
inaugural address, “intercourse, either amicable or hostile, must continue.”636 
Excluded values, interest and groups remain within a given social space even though 
they are excluded from the political community. Communist literature and a 
communist party may and do exist in countries which have enshrined individual 
property rights at the core of their legal system. Thus the unity is always 
contingently and precariously established. It is always challenged by excluded 
elements, which, just by their presence, challenge the existence of the polity in some 
way. As Lindahl notes, “the operation of inclusion and exclusion condemns legal 
order to an irredeemable contingency.”637 The contingency of a regime is made 
visible and contested by excluded elements, in Laclau and Mouffe’s sense of the 
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term. Furthermore, these excluded elements and the challenge they may pose are 
created by and therefore intrinsic to liberal-democratic regimes. Contestation of 
contingent foundations by excluded elements are a terrain on which situations arise 
which could be defined as a ‘state of emergency’ by political and legal elites.  
Lindahl argues that because of the presence of these excluded values, 
interests and groups that:  
“with varying degrees of intensity, a polity always finds itself in a ‘‘state of 
emergency’’; a ‘state of normality’ is a borderline case that a polity can only 
approach, without ever attaining… the representational act that gives birth to a 
polity inevitably creates the conditions for its possible revolutionary overthrow and 
replacement by a new polity. The contingency of a polity and its contestability are 
two sides of the same coin.”638  
I concur that normality and emergency are in some sense borderline cases for any 
liberal-democratic regime and polity. Any liberal-democratic regime is attempting to 
reach a state of what it defines as normality. However, because the process of 
constructing normality necessarily involves excluding elements, and those elements 
do not disappear but remain to challenge the precariously constructed ‘normality’, 
normality as such can never be achieved. It is clear that ‘normal’ is conceptually 
impossible. We must also add to this the fact that what is called normal is actually 
the process of concretizing, sedimenting and maintaining a specific normative 
viewpoint which embodies particular values, interests and groups. Because of the 
particularity of the normative viewpoint we can conclude with Waldenfels that 
“normal itself is a polemical term… “639 Normal is never neutrally or objectively 
determined. Rather, normality is always informed by particular groups, values, 
interests and fundamental normative principles. If the initial act of positing a 
democratic polity necessitates positing the fundamental values of a normative 
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viewpoint then normal is always politically determined. Further, it means that any 
defense of a ‘normal’ situation is a defense of what powerful political and legal 
actors claim is normal. As such any attempt to define a situation as an emergency 
and to mobilize emergency measures is political and should be responded to as such. 
Contestation of such claims is built into the structure of creating and maintaining a 
reflexive democratic regime. This seems to uphold Machiavelli’s suggestion that 
political regimes and conflicting groups within society, humours as he called them, 
play a key role in situations which are sometimes defined as ‘states of emergency’.  
If the permanent situation of a liberal-democratic society is that the existence 
of the community and the politico-legal order is always challenged because that 
which it excludes in the process of unification always remains to show that the order 
could be differently constructed, the term emergency begins to lose its coherence. In 
contrast to traditional and mainstream theories of emergency which understand the 
concept as a temporary occurrence, emergency must be understood constitutive 
feature of any liberal-democratic polity. But this does not mean the ‘the exception 
has become the norm’ or that the ‘state of emergency’ is permanent. It means just the 
opposite, that ‘normality’ includes elements which continually threaten its existence 
simply through their mere presence. ‘Normal’ politics always involves contestation 
over the identity of the polity as well as the norms it sets for itself. As such ‘states of 
emergency’ are better conceptualized as contestation of contingent and precariously 
constructed politico-legal orders. The situations from which ‘states of emergency’ 
are declared are no different from ‘ordinary’ contestation over contingent 
foundations and hegemonic articulations. Lindahl is right to assert that contingency 
and contestation are two sides of the same coin. Emergency and normality are not 
states in which a regime can exist in. Rather they are better understood as polemical, 
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political notions used to conceptualize engagements with contingency. It is all the 
more crucial to take this position given that emergency measures are increasingly 
used by liberal-democratic regimes. Rather than engaging in legitimate, ‘ordinary’ 
political contestation, powerful elites are turning to emergency measures as a 
political tactic for conserving their own regimes, their own contingent hegemonic 
formations which institutionalize their preferred groups, interests, values and 
principles. 
Institutionalizing conflict – Antagonism, Agonism and Law 
Liberal-democratic legal orders foster and institutionalize a-legality as well 
as contestation emanating from aliens which they experience as antagonistic. Lindahl 
argues  
“that democracy links legitimacy to a certain interruption of attribution, an 
interruption that suspends, up to a point, the inaugural act of attribution, in view of 
determining anew who is a party to the community and what are the interests that join its 
members… democracy is the political form that seeks to renew – up to a point – this genetic 
condition of political community, institutionalizing the possibility of novel acts of bringing 
about the constitution of a collective self. Democracy does not abolish the ambiguity of ‘self-
attribution’; it preserves this ambiguity, elevating it to the principle of political action.”640 
Lindahl’s point is that the form of the politico-legal order always allows contestation 
over the boundaries as well as the fundamental values, principles, and interests of a 
democratic polity. By interrupting attribution liberal-democracy postpones forever 
the final decision on who ‘we’ are, what ‘our’ fundamental values and interests are, 
and who is allowed to challenge us and how they may carry out that challenge.  
Contestation is understood as a positive element of society. As such, liberal-
democratic regimes are careful not to completely stifle conflict. On the contrary, 
Lindahl argues that “innovation and rupture are… positively elicited by democratic 
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states under the rule of law.”641 He further argues that “the rule of law does not 
neutralize democratic politics: it spells out the institutional conditions for ‘political 
action of a subject’, of a people as a unit in action.”642 And as Waldenfels points out, 
“Beyond all actual conflicts, the possibility of conflict itself requires regulation.”643 
It is important for conflict to be regulated by institutions such as law so that basic 
ground rules for legitimate contestation can be set.  
Mouffe takes a similar position when discussing the limits of pluralism. She 
argues that “a pluralist liberal democratic society does not deny the existence of 
conflicts but provides institutions allowing them to be expressed in an adversarial 
form.”644 The goal of an agonistic model of democracy is to allow for contestation 
but also to limit and contain it so that it does not violent and corrosive. Indeed, 
Mouffe argues that “modern pluralist democracy – even a well ordered one – does 
not reside in the absence of domination and of violence but in the establishment of a 
set of institutions through which they can be limited and contested.”645 Mouffe’s 
position is similar to Machiavelli who argued that a healthy society allowed 
confrontations between conflicting humors to play out within well constructed and 
maintained orders. Contestation is a good thing, but it must have its limits. Agonism, 
understood as healthy regulated conflict in which opponents recognize one another 
as adversaries and not as enemies, is preferred to antagonism since “antagonistic 
conflicts are less likely to emerge as long as agonistic legitimate political channels 
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for dissenting voices exist. Otherwise dissent tends to take violent forms…”646 When 
contestation is adversarial and both sides agree on the rules of the game “conflicts 
and confrontations, far from being a sign of imperfection, indicate that democracy is 
alive and inhabited by pluralism.”647 
Similarly, van Roermund argues that the quality of liberal-democracy “is 
dependent on how convincingly the irrepresentability of the people is 
institutionalised in political, socio-economic and cultural forms.”648 I agree with 
these formulations. Liberal-democracy institutionalizes the conflict created by the 
structure of representation and the creation of aliens which necessarily occurs during 
the process of constituting a political unity. All political unities constitute themselves 
by excluding some interests, values, groups from the ‘we’ they create. Liberal-
democracy is unique in that it recognizes those exclusions and institutionalizes 
contestation over how they were made, what they mean, how they function and 
whether or not they should continue. It is certainly advantageous but the drawback is 
the continuous presence of groups that want society to be organized differently and 
have a legally guaranteed to right to fight to make it so.  
The limits of pluralism – Renewal up to a point 
Liberal-democratic regimes attempt to allow for legitimate conflict over 
fundamental values, interests and normative viewpoints and protect themselves from 
what they define as ‘states of emergency’ at the same time. Legitimate contestation 
and contestation deemed illegitimate which may lead to the declaration of a ‘state of 
emergency’ are generated by the same processes and structures within a liberal-
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democratic regime. The difference between legitimate and illegitimate is a decision 
from the normative, hegemonic viewpoint. Such a decision may well need to be 
made, but it is always informed by particular political groups, values and normative 
principles.  
Lindahl is careful to note though that democratic regimes only allow 
contestation ‘up to a point’. As noted above, ‘terrorism’ was a limit case for a-legal 
acts. Additionally, Mouffe argues that:  
“The pluralism that I [Mouffe] advocate requires discriminating between demands 
which are to be accepted as part of the agonistic debate and those which are to be 
excluded. A democratic society cannot treat those who put its basic institutions into 
question as legitimate adversaries. The agonistic approach does not pretend to 
encompass all differences and to overcome all forms of exclusions… Some 
demands are excluded, not because they are declared to be ‘evil’, but because they 
challenge the institutions constitutive of the democratic political association. To be 
sure, the very nature of those institutions is also part of the agonistic debate, but, for 
such a debate to take place, the existence of a shared symbolic space is 
necessary.”649  
The main question then is, ‘how do we decide when that point is reached? How do 
we know which demands, values and/or interests are to be excluded? Recall that 
these decisions are always taken from a normative viewpoint which is not shared by 
all those who are subject to the legal order. From this perspective events that are 
deemed ‘states of emergency’ are situations in which the dominant powers in a 
society decide that the polity, as they have constructed it, is under too much threat, 
too much of a challenge. The problem is sometimes those individuals and groups 
who are challenging the polity have a legal and constitutionally protected right to do 
so. Essentially determinations of normality and emergency concern situations in 
which dominant groups or state officials decide that the ‘point’ has been reached and 
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their opponents are no longer playing the game fairly. Such determinations are 
political as much as legal, moral and ethical.
650
 
If we agree that “Rivalry and violence, far from being the exterior of 
exchange, are therefore its ever-present possibility. Reciprocity and hostility cannot 
be dissociated and we have to realize that the social order will always be threatened 
by violence,” we need not also agree that the ‘state of emergency’ is permanent.651 
Rather such a position recognizes that politics is a struggle to limit violence while 
respecting the rights of everyone to struggle for the type of society they want. If we 
also agree that liberal-democratic regimes and societies are implicated in and even 
help to foster and encourage contestation of their most fundamental values and 
principles, it becomes clear that declarations of a ‘state of emergency’ are a political 
tactic of hegemonic elites in liberal-democratic regimes. 
Conclusion 
I argue that it is more analytically useful to understand situations defined as 
‘states of emergency’ as embedded in the larger context of the limits of pluralism. 
The limits of pluralist contestation are heavily influenced, even decided, by the 
dominant polity from their particular normative viewpoint. Decisions concerning 
normality and emergency are polemical weapons used by dominant groups to limit 
contestations over the contingent foundations of their own polities, their collective 
selfhood. As such, normality and emergency or exceptionality have no neutral or 
objective conceptual value. By allowing for the distinction and even agreeing that a 
situation is normal or in crisis is already to take the position of one group in the 
conflict. Such a move should be resisted. The first step to countering the increased 
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use of emergency measures in liberal-democratic regimes is to refuse to take the 
position of those who declare that a ‘state of emergency’ is in existence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
258 
 
Conclusion 
The problematic of the exception can never be finally solved or resolved.  It 
can however be continuously renegotiated through radical democratic political 
contestation.  I have argued that emergency politics should be inscribed within the 
wider context of hegemonic practices at the limits of contestation.  Such a politics 
must be aware that any attempt to declare a state of affairs as exceptional or normal 
is a hegemonic tactic.  When in scribed with wider hegemonic politics we no longer 
need to rely on the norm/exception binary.  Indeed, exceptionalism can be eliminated 
from emergency politics such that it can be referred to as a problematic of the limits 
of contestation. 
 The norm/exception binary needs to be removed from theorizations of 
emergency politics because it closes down possibilities for radical democratic 
political contestation.  Attempts to define a situation as exceptional by powerful 
political elites are also a claim that politics must be foreclosed until they decide that 
the exigency has been resolved and a ‘normal’ state of affairs has resumed.  Such 
claims halt projects aimed at radical democratic politics in liberal-democratic 
regimes.  They also lead to what Derrida calls “self-destructive, quasi-suicidal, 
autoimmunitary processes”652  The increasing reliance of liberal-democratic regimes 
on claims of exceptionality and emergency powers are harming those regimes as 
much as the exigencies which political elites claim demand exceptional responses. 
 I argued that reading Schmitt’s Weimar work against itself allows us to 
theorize sovereign exceptions and decisions as politically contested concepts.  
Additionally, sovereignty must be understood as the attribution of sovereign power 
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to agents who have been able to make sovereign decisions.  Schmitt’s work also 
points to a paradox of contestation inherent in liberal-democratic regimes.  This 
paradox is crucial for theorizing emergency politics because emergency powers limit 
the scope of legitimate contestation in liberal-democratic regimes.  The paradox of 
contestation as well as a politicized notion of decisions on exceptionality are the 
contours of emergency politics.  
 A new approach to emergency politics is needed in order to prevent liberal-
democratic regimes from succumbing to suicidal autoimmune practices.  I laid the 
foundation for this approach by deploying the work of Machiavelli, Lindahl and 
Laclau & Mouffe.  Machiavelli’s work demonstrates that we cannot rely on a notion 
of normality when theorizing emergency politics.  The political realm is 
characterized by continual change and unexpected exigencies.  There is no need to 
resort to extraordinary measures when engaging with the political realm.  Rather, we 
should seek to build regimes which can absorb accidenti and changes in fortuna. 
 Liberal-democratic regimes will be better able to absorb the effects of 
contingency when they conceptualize emergency politics as hegemonic politics.  
Political contestation will need to be limited.  The construction of exclusions needed 
to limit contestation will produce the antagonisms and ‘aliens’ which can be 
experienced as the presence of existential threats to a regime.  The politics of those 
exclusions and limitations should not be eliminated by trapping them within the 
norm/exception binary.  Rather, liberal-democratic regimes should approach them as 
instances of radical democratic contestation.   
Liberal-democratic regimes are permanently exposed to the possibility of 
political violence and existential threats.  There is no method to permanently protect 
260 
 
them from “what comes or happens.”653  Derrida, in agreement with Machiavelli, 
reminds us that situations defined as exceptional their effects seem to come from the 
inside.
654
  And as I have shown emergency politics are embedded within the basic 
structures and fundamental paradoxes of liberal-democratic governance.  Confining 
such openness within a discourse of exceptionalism leaves political theory blind to 
the possibility of a radical democratic politics of emergency. 
Without a radical democratic theory of emergency politics liberal-democratic 
regimes are more likely to continue to rely on practices of “suicidal autoimmunity.” 
655
  Autoimmune practices are tactics of emergency governance such the suspension 
of legal order, the curtailment of civil liberties, and the use of unregulated state 
violence.  Autoimmune practices always do more harm than good.  They always 
“end up producing, reproducing, and regenerating the very thing [they] seeks to 
disarm.”656  The best way to deal with events or groups defined as existential threats 
is to strengthen those elements of a regime that we wish to protect – political 
freedoms, the rule of law, separation of powers, and political contestation which is 
aware of its exclusionary effects.  This is the danger of approaching emergency 
politics from the perspective of the norm/exception binary.  It is used to justify 
‘exceptional’ or extralegal measures that only serve to reproduce the violence they 
are trying to counteract.  Emergency measures exceptional powers always destroy 
the liberal-democratic regimes they are trying to protect.  
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Theorizations of emergency politics should be under no illusions that 
openness to the antagonism and allowing democracy to flourish while it perceives 
itself as being under attack may be dangerous.  “…it’s ultimately true that 
suspending or suppressing the immunity that protects me from the other might be 
nothing short of life-threatening.”657  However, the alternative is worse.  What is at 
stake in emergency politics and what we are in danger of losing through suicidal, 
autoimmune responses to emergencies is “the inherited concept of democracy… 
[that democracy] welcomes the possibility of being contested, of contesting itself, of 
criticizing and indefinitely improving itself.”658  We are also in danger of losing a 
notion of self-reflexive political agency required for radical democratic politics.  
Autoimmunity “consists not only in compromising oneself [s’auto-entamer] but in 
compromising the self, the auto – and thus ipseity.”659  The possibilities for self 
critique and self improvement are severely curtailed when a regime defines itself as 
enveloped by exceptional circumstances.  Such a determination only serves to limit 
legitimate contestation and put self improvement on hold, indefinitely, until the 
politically determined ‘emergency’ has passed.   
This scenario can be avoided by further developing a radial democratic 
theory of emergency politics.  The structures of liberal-democratic governance can 
absorb the effects of political contingency as well as encourage hegemonic 
contestation of their most fundamental values and principles.  Developing this 
approach will be no mean feat.  Yet, it is necessary if liberal-democratic regimes are 
to flourish. 
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Publication 
The Aliens Within: Antagonism, Radical Democracy and ‘States of Emergency’ 
Under revision for Contemporary Political Theory 
Introduction 
Against the prevailing view in political and legal theory today that the 
exception has become the norm, this paper contends that the exception has not 
become the norm and that the state of emergency is not permanent. It defends this 
position, ironically, by agreeing in part with the analysis that leads Hans Lindahl to 
claim that democratic polities are always in a state of emergency. I agree with the 
analysis but contend that it leads us to the conclusion that the notions of normality 
and exception/emergency lose their conceptual coherence. I claim that emergencies 
are better conceptualized not as aberrations but as ‘ordinary’ struggles with 
contingency and indeterminacy at the limits of pluralism. The exception has not 
become the norm; rather the norm has always included elements of the exception.  
According to Lindahl, democratic polities are constantly engaged in 
contestation over their founding and fundamental values, principles and core 
identity. Such contestation is generated in part by the process of creating and 
maintaining a democratic political community, ‘We the people’. During the process 
of self constitution democratic polities exclude values, principles, and identities 
which do not go away or stay outside but remain to challenge the existence of the 
polity. These excluded elements are ‘alien’ and can be antagonistic, in Laclau and 
Mouffe’s sense of the term, to the regime. The alien is a constant reminder that the 
polity could be constructed differently. Every polity prefers what is its own, as 
opposed to what it has excluded as alien. Thus democracies are always engaging in 
struggles over the nature of their contingently constituted and precariously 
maintained existence. Liberal-democratic regimes go as step further by 
institutionalizing procedural rules for such contestation. Liberal-democratic regimes 
attempt to remain neutral to the goals of any political party so long as they follow the 
rules of contestation.  
However, they can only allow political contestation of contingent foundations 
and fundamental values up to a point. There are and must be limits of contestation. 
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These limits will be determined politically from the perspective of the democratic 
polity which founds the regime. As such, all democratic regimes are radical in the 
sense that they are constantly attuned to and struggling over their contingent nature 
and the limits they set to contestation and struggle. But because they set limits to 
such contestation while attempting to remain neutral, radical democracy is a false 
promise of liberal-democracy. 
This paper defends these claims via the work of Hans Lindahl, Bert van 
Roermund, Bernhard Waldenfels, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. In similar 
ways these scholars investigate the problem of constructing and maintaining liberal-
democratic regimes. Lindahl and van Roermund, following Waldenfels, demonstrate 
that the process of constructing and maintaining a regime necessarily excludes 
certain values, interests and groups from the democratic polity which they create. 
The work of Laclau and Mouffe is useful in understanding why some excluded 
elements remain innocuous but others may become virulent and challenge the 
politico-legal regime that they inhabit.  
Constructing a democratic polity 
Lindahl and van Roermund’s initial problematic is how a plurality of 
individuals and social groups can be welded together into a unified polity which 
rules over and governs itself. The first step is revising a widely accepted definition of 
democracy as the identity of the rulers and the ruled. This means that the rulers and 
the ruled in a democratic society are the same people, the terms ‘rulers’ and ‘ruled’ 
are co-referential.
660
 Lindahl and van Roermund contend, on the other hand, that a 
polity is unified around a notion of collective selfhood.
661
 The former notion of unity 
understands identity as sameness, what Paul Ricoeur called idem-identity. The latter 
notion understands identity as ipse-identity, identity as selfhood in which the people 
rules over itself. This understanding of collective selfhood entails that the unity will 
understand itself, speak and act in the first person plural perspective. It also means 
that it can reflect on itself as an actor. Lindahl and van Roermund refer to this as a 
reflexive notion of unity and identity for a democratic polity.  
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There are two implications of this formulation of a democratic polity as a 
collective self. The first is that the members of the group understand themselves to 
be the unity that can and will act collectively. Secondly, any actions taken from the 
first person plural perspective are done for the sake of the collective as a collective 
self.
662
 Collective selves engage in what Bratman calls ‘shared intentional 
activity’.663 It follows that if in a democratic regime a collective self is acting by and 
for itself then any conceptualization of democracy must include a notion of 
constituent power. It is this constituent power which legitimizes and acts through the 
state, the constituted power. This point raises two important questions: how is a 
constituent power unified in the first place and maintained over time? And how 
exactly does it speak and act as a collective subject through a constituted power, a 
legal order? 
 Schmitt maintained that a constituent power needed to be homogenous in 
order to constitute and maintain itself. The people themselves needed to have 
something essential in common on which they could base their unity and on which to 
enact a constitution via a political decision. Lindahl and van Roermund accept the 
need for ‘a people’ to share something in common but they disagree with Schmitt 
over what this common interest is. For them it certainly need not be any essential 
characteristic like racial, ethnic or national similarity. Rather, Lindahl argues that a 
constituent power begins “as the constitution of a political unity through a legal 
order… Someone must seize the initiative to determine what interests are shared by 
the collective and who belongs to it.”664 This act of seizing the initiative, positing the 
boundaries of who is and is not included in the community, and defining the shared 
fundamental interests and values cannot be ex ante legitimated by the democratic 
polity. The act of positing initial boundaries and core values must always come first.  
Democracy is a political system in which all acts done in the name of the 
collective must be legitimated by constituent power. This means that the act which 
creates a democracy can never be democratic or ‘legal’ from the perspective of the 
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legal system it posited. Sovereign power is indispensable.
665
 Yet the requirement for 
legitimacy derived from constituent power remains. The first act of instituting a 
constituent power must present itself as acting with legitimacy grounded in the 
constituent power. On Lindahl’s reading a constituent power is formed by an 
individual seizing the initiative and acting as a legitimate constituted power. 
However, seizing the initiative does not necessarily succeed. It can only be 
retroactively legitimated if individuals identify with the polity, its boundaries, 
interests and core values. Because constituted power comes first a constituent power 
can only react to individuals and groups attempting to speak and act in its name and 
from a first person plural perspective. As such, there exists “a fundamental passivity 
at the heart of political unity.”666 Constituent power can only respond to and 
retroactively legitimize (or not) the actions of individuals and small groups claiming 
to act in its name. Constituted power acts in the name of the constituent power then 
must wait to see if that action is taken up and retroactively legitimized. This means 
that when someone seizes the initiative they “can only originate a community by 
representing its origin.”667 In other words, constituent power cannot come before 
constituted power. On Lindahl and van Roermund’s reading, constituted power 
comes first but only if it successfully creates the constituent power on which it 
legitimizes its initial action. 
Before addressing the structure of representation and attribution of individual 
acts to the collective it is necessary to point out that law is the symbolic form of the 
unity of a collective self in a democratic polity. Constituted power can be primarily 
understood as legal order. Following Kelsen, Lindahl argues that “…democracy 
functionalizes political unity by making of it the unity of a legal order. More 
precisely, the functional unity of the people is the unity of a legal order, a normative 
unity.
668
 This is necessary because any society is rife with division, conflict, and 
antagonism. There is no common ground or experience which can function as a 
substantial basis for unity. Modern liberal-democratic states solve this problem by 
making legal order function as point of symbolic and institutional unity of divided 
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societies. Moreover, “law conditions the political world of democracy in the sense 
that legal or state order is also the unity wherein division, thus political majorities 
and minorities, can ensue. In other words, a legal order not only determines the 
(normative) unity of a people, but constitutes the locus of political conflict and 
division.”669 Legal order sits uncomfortably between attempting to fix political unity 
and allowing for and even encouraging contestation and conflict.  
The ability of legal order to unify a divided society is further complicated by 
the logic of representation. A logic of representation is essential to a democratic 
polity understood as a reflexively oriented collective self. As noted above, 
constituted power constitutes a collective self by acting in its name and representing 
its origin. Certainly the collective self, the ipse-identity cannot actually act itself. “As 
Waldenfels put it: ‘(…) it is impossible for a we to say ‘we’. Saying ‘we’ is done by 
spokesmen, who are more or less directly authorized to speak…”670 In other words, 
“each particular act, as a legal act, ‘represents’ or symbolizes the political unity to 
which it belongs…”671 The unity necessary for constituent power only exists through 
its representations. Lindahl argues that the collective self only exists in the form of 
self-attributive acts by individuals.
672
 Essentially, an act is an action of the collective 
self if it can be attributed to the collective self, i.e. if everyone who constitutes the 
collective self would have acted in the same way or agrees that the action was 
legitimately carried out. As Lindahl argues, “The common good remains forever 
absent… an empty normative signifier that provides no normative orientation 
whatsoever. And as the common good is the way of conceiving of the people as a 
unity, to argue that the common good is only accessible through its particularizations 
is to assert that unity is necessarily a represented unity.”673 These representations 
rely on attributing the acts of individuals to the collective. The consequence of this is 
that constituent and constituted power do not have direct access to one another.
674
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This structure of representation creates contestation in two ways. First, 
because any legal act which claims to be done in the name of the collective must be 
retroactively legitimized all such claims are contestable.
675
 The democratic unity, or 
sections of it, could in some way refuse, or attempt to refuse, to legitimate any given 
action made on its behalf by a particular individual or even a state official. For 
instance, anti-gay marriage activists in California recently tried to force a high court 
judge to recuse himself in a case determining the legality of gay marriage because he 
was gay. The activists felt that his lifestyle choice and hence his particular legal 
actions could not represent and act in the name of what they claimed was the 
common good – banning gay marriage in the state. The second form of contestation 
stems from the fact that modern liberal-democratic regimes delay indefinitely final 
decisions on self-attribution. A democratic polity always exists in a mode of 
questionability because it forever delays final decisions on whether and how 
particular actions represent the reflexively oriented constituent power necessary to 
legitimize democratic governance. This means that liberal-democratic regimes are 
constantly engaging with their own contingent and contestable foundation. As 
Lindahl notes, “the democratic Rechtsstaat is the form of political organization that 
suspends, up to a point, the initial and subsequent closures in view of determining 
anew what interests are shared by a community and who is an interested party 
thereto.”676 A final decision on whether or not a particular statute or action of a state 
official represents and actualizes fundamental values and interests is forever delayed. 
As such those fundamental values and interests are forever contestable but, as 
Lindahl argued, only up to a point. 
 Certainly most actions of a state are legitimized by at least a portion of the 
population. The legitimacy of a police officer issuing a citation for speeding on the 
motorway is rarely questioned. The process of constructing and maintaining a 
democratic political community, mediated by the representational relationship 
between constituent and constituted power, does generate and concretize what are 
considered to be fundamental values, interests and a normative orientation. This 
entails the construction of a specific normative viewpoint with boundaries. As 
Lindahl points out, “constituent power—refers to the capacity to institute legal 
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meaning, and this means to generate a normative point of view from which 
individuals can understand and identify themselves as members of a legal 
community.”677 In order to establish this normative viewpoint and posit boundaries 
the democratic polity, because it is reflexively structured, must choose to include 
certain values and exclude others. Unity requires closure and closure is dependent on 
exclusion. “Closure is indispensable for normative orientation by the members of a 
community; in its absence, they would not know how they ought to behave.”678 
Alternately, a unity which allowed for infinite possibilities would be no unity at all.  
“For to assert that representation concretises political unity is to acknowledge that every 
representation of the common good includes and excludes values. Ineluctably, representation 
is an ambiguous achievement. On the one hand, exclusion is a positive feature of 
representation: closure is a necessary condition for the disclosure of a common or public 
space. On the other hand, the operation of normative inclusion and exclusion implies that 
representation always brings about a normative reduction: the disclosure of the common 
good as concretised in ‘this’ or ‘that’ value necessarily involves a normative closure of the 
good.” 679  
According to Lindahl there is no escape from this dynamic, some exclusions will be 
necessary. In order to affect a closure of the democratic polity it must posit a 
normative viewpoint against which representational acts can be judged.  
Furthermore, the democratic polity will understand the values it includes as 
its own values, which are on its side of the boundary it has posited. A democratic 
polity is constantly engaged in a process of constructing and maintaining its own 
social and representational space which actualizes its own values and notion of the 
common good. As Lindahl argues, “any and every legal order embodies a particular 
set of values,” what it considers to be its own values.680 Hence, a collective self must 
always look out over the boundaries of the political and legal order it sets for itself. 
As Waldenfels notes, “When a collective self is drawing a boundary in order to 
constitute itself it places itself inside the boundary. It becomes “an inside which 
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separates itself from an outside and thus produces a preference in the difference.” 681 
This preference in the difference is crucial because it helps to explain why a 
democratic regime or polity would feel threatened by the presence of values, 
interests and groups which are not its own. Any interest, value or group which does 
not fully belong to the collective self, the constituent power, is potentially a threat 
simply because they imply that the regime could be ordered differently.  
But what becomes of the values, interests and groups that are excluded from 
the normative point of view, and hence the legal order as well as the reflexively 
oriented constituent power? Lindahl argues that “the values excluded by political 
representation do not simply vanish into thin air. They are marginalized, that is to 
say, they remain at the fringes of a polity, embodied in forms of behavior that retain 
the potential of subverting the representations of the common good positivised in the 
legal order.”682 Additionally, the process of inclusion and exclusion is by no means 
peaceful or orderly. As Waldenfels argues “This process of marginalization does not 
take place in peaceful agreement. Margins, of whatever kind, whether marginal 
phenomena, marginal groups, or ‘marginal nations’ arise by something being forced 
to the edge where the light no longer reaches it. This exclusion is not done without 
disturbance and danger.”683 What does it mean to marginalize certain values, 
interests, interests or groups? These excluded and marginalized values, interests and 
groups do not simply go away the consciousness of the polity or fade into obscurity. 
Excluded values, interest and groups remain within a given social space even though 
they are excluded from the political community. Communist literature and a 
communist party may and do exist in countries which have enshrined individual 
property rights at the core of their legal system. The polity is always challenged by 
excluded elements, which, just by their presence, challenge the existence of the 
polity in some way. As Lindahl notes, “the operation of inclusion and exclusion 
condemns legal order to an irredeemable contingency.”684 Furthermore, as argued by 
Lindahl above, the democratic Rechtstaat is an institutional form which allows for 
contestation of fundamental values and interests.  
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Lindahl argues that because of the presence of these excluded values, 
interests and groups that  
“with varying degrees of intensity, a polity always finds itself in a ‘state of emergency’; a 
‘state of normality’ is a borderline case that a polity can only approach, without ever 
attaining. Waxing pathetic, the representational act that gives birth to a polity inevitably 
creates the conditions for its possible revolutionary overthrow and replacement by a new 
polity. The contingency of a polity and its contestability are two sides of the same coin.”685  
I agree that normality and emergency are in some sense borderline cases for any 
liberal-democratic regime and polity. Any liberal-democratic regime is attempting to 
reach a state of what it defines as normality. However, because the process of 
constructing normality necessarily involves excluding elements, and those elements 
do not disappear but remain to challenge the precariously constructed ‘normality’, 
normality as such can never be achieved. It is clear that ‘normal’ is conceptually 
impossible. We must also add to this that what is called ‘normal’ is actually the 
process of concretizing, sedimenting and maintaining a specific normative viewpoint 
which embodies particular values, interests and groups. Because of the particularity 
of the normative viewpoint we can conclude with Waldenfels that “normal itself is a 
polemical term…“686  ‘Normal’ is never neutrally or objectively determined. If the 
initial act of positing a democratic polity necessitates positing the fundamental 
values of a normative viewpoint then ‘normal’ is always politically determined. 
Further, it means that any defense of a ‘normal’ situation is a defense of what 
powerful political and legal actors claim is ‘normal’. As such any attempt to define a 
situation as an emergency and to mobilize emergency measures is political and 
should be responded to as such. Luckily, contestation of such claims is built into the 
structure of creating and maintaining a reflexive democratic regime.  
If the permanent situation of a liberal-democratic society is that the existence 
of the community and the politico-legal order is always challenged because that 
which it excludes in the process of unification always remains to show that the order 
could be differently constructed, the term emergency begins to lose its coherence. In 
contrast to traditional and mainstream theories of emergency which understand the 
concept as a temporary occurrence, emergency must be understood constitutive 
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feature of any liberal-democratic polity. But this does not mean the ‘the exception 
has become the norm’ or that the state of emergency is permanent. It means just the 
opposite, that ‘normality’ includes elements which continually threaten its existence 
simply through their mere presence. ‘Normal’ politics always involves contestation 
over the identity of the polity as well as the norms it sets for itself. As such ‘states of 
emergency’ are better conceptualized as contestation of contingent and precariously 
constructed politico-legal orders. Lindahl is right to assert that contingency and 
contestation are two sides of the same coin. ‘Emergency’ and ‘normality’ are not 
states in which a regime can exist in. Rather they are better understood as polemical, 
political notions used to conceptualize engagements with contingency.  
Lindahl and van Roermund, following Waldenfels, develop a more detailed 
analysis of the values, interests, and groups excluded by the process of constructing a 
reflexive democratic polity. They refer to the form excluded elements take as they 
remain to challenge a regime as alienness or the alien. Turning to a closer analysis of 
their concept of the alien will further the argument that liberal-democratic regimes 
and polities are always engaged in contestation and struggle over their most 
fundamental values, interests and normative principles. 
The Aliens Within 
Lindahl and van Roermund, building on Waldenfels, develop a structural 
analysis of the excluded elements and how they relate to the precariously unified 
political community. Waldenfels labeled these elements Fremden, the alien or 
strange depending on the translation. The alien is not “simply what is different.”687 It 
is distinguished from a polity from the perspective of that polity. As Waldenfels 
notes: “In the final analysis, the alien concerns me. The division into own and 
alien… stems from a process of self-differentiation.”688 The alien is that which is 
intentionally excluded in the process of constructing a reflexive political unity. That 
which is alien is the product of the necessary closure required for any form of 
political unity. The alien is “’at odds’ with the vantage point, i.e., the basic truth 
(principle, value, act) that grounds the order.”689 The alien is created by a democratic 
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polity yet it remains as that which challenges the polity and exposes its contingent 
foundations.  
This exclusion is not necessarily a physical or even final exclusion. Van 
Roermund notes that the alien arises “at the edges” and in the “fissures” of the 
order.
690
 Because they are not necessarily physically removed, the alien are elements 
which are excluded from the collective self, the ipseity, yet they are not necessarily 
excluded from the legal order. Indeed, they may be subject to the legal order, 
politically excluded while legally ‘included’. As van Roermund notes, that which is 
excluded by a legal order, the alien, “lingers on as a factual network of political 
states of affairs, in which some knots are more dominant than others, while still 
others do not even register.”691 I argue that groups such as a communist party are 
alien to liberal-democratic regimes yet they are still subject to the legal orders of 
those regimes.  
The boundary between the own and the alien is not clearly demarcated. As 
Waldenfels argues, “The boundaries between that which is governed by rules, that 
which remains open, and that which is against rules are more or less 
indeterminate.
692
 There is not binary distinction between inside and outside. The 
reflexive democratic polity acting by and for itself “does not enter the world as a 
light in the darkness; rather, it responds to a twilight zone of meaning in which it 
finds itself.”693 Additionally, the alien does not necessarily speak clearly. The alien 
makes a demand which the democratic polity must respond to. Such a demand 
challenges the polity “to explore (thus to revise) the twilight zone marked by 
predicates like ‘ordinary’, ‘disorderly’ and ‘extraordinary’.694 The boundaries 
between the own and the alien are porous. This means that a strict dichotomy 
between norm and exception, ordinary and extraordinary, on which so much 
contemporary work on states of emergency relies, cannot be conceptually 
maintained. Theories that do rely on a strict dichotomy are using an oversimplified 
notion of boundaries.  
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The presence of these excluded elements means that political community 
exists in a mode of questionability, innovation, rupture and responsiveness.
695
 We 
could also say that the presence of alien elements ensures constant engagement with 
contingent foundations. As noted above, marginalized groups and values do not 
disappear; they remain with the potential to subvert politico-legal order. The 
reflexively oriented democratic polity needs the alien because any identity needs 
closure in order to define itself. Van Roermund contends that the act of self-inclusion 
[of a polity] excludes those parts of the world that would in any way challenge, 
threaten, or question the collective self.
696
 This means that the alien is not simply 
what is different. It is distinguished from the vantage point of the normative 
viewpoint that makes the distinction and decides to exclude the alien in the first 
place. The alien is that which the polity decides is against the fundamental interests 
of its collective selfhood. Waldenfels argues that it is possible for an alien element to 
crack the ground of legitimation and force a democratic regime to confront its 
contingent foundations.
697
 It is this structure that Lindahl has in mind when he argues 
that any democratic polity is always in a constant ‘state of emergency’ because it is 
challenged by values, interests and groups it has marginalized in order to create and 
maintain its own identity. I contend that challenges by alien elements can produce 
situations which a politico-legal regime defines as a ‘state of emergency’.  
Waldenfels neatly encapsulates why the alien is experienced as a threat to the 
existence of a regime.  
“The alien can inspire curiosity and imagination, it can even enlighten us about ourselves – 
all this must be granted. Yet as soon as the alien breaks into the Arcanum of freedom and reason, it 
trips the ‘chaos’ alarm. Freedom and reason take up their arms. They fight because otherwise they 
would need to give up on themselves. But, inevitably, alienness leads to hostility, which only 
escalates, with each involved party becoming more and more committed to their belief that they alone 
have right on their side… Assumed to be coming from the outside, the alien is expected to carry its 
identification at all times as if it were an intruder.”698  
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Alienness is hostile because it reaches into and challenges the core elements of any 
democratic polity. Though this hostility seems almost unintentional, the result of 
curiosity rather than malevolent intent. Yet Waldenfels still insists that alienness is 
“always also marked by insecurity, threat, and incomprehension. These very factors 
are distributed in unequal fashion, depending on who determines the social and 
linguistic rules of the game, i.e., who ‘has the say’.”699 Alienness, then, is marked by 
insecurity and threat. But it is the collective self, the democratic polity which does 
the marking. This point speaks to the deep implication of liberal-democratic regimes 
in events they define as ‘states of emergency’. In order to constitute themselves 
regimes mark off an outside and exclude elements they deem to be contrary to their 
core values, principles, interests and groups. Then, as Waldenfels suggests, the 
regimes experience that which they excluded as a threat to their own existence. 
Furthermore, “Every attempt at mastering the alien leads to a violent rationalization 
which attempts in vain to rid the self and rationality of their contingency and 
genesis.”700 But such a goal is impossible. As convincing as Waldenfels account of 
the alien is, there still appears to be something missing. He does not fully account for 
the possibility that the alien actually is hostile to the democratic polity and its 
politico-legal regime. He acknowledges that the alien may remain “virulent in its 
exclusion” but does not say enough as to why this must be the case.701 This 
possibility is raised and accounted for in the work of Laclau and Mouffe on 
antagonism. 
The work of Laclau and Mouffe is crucial because they understand divisions 
and exclusions not as internal or external to society but as the limit of a social space 
such that society does not exist with any sense of full positivity or finality.
 702
 I 
contend that alienness is more fully understood when placed with their concept of 
antagonism. Though structurally similar to alienness antagonisms have a 
characteristic which alienness does not, mutual subversion. This characteristic 
explains why a democratic polity would necessarily experience the alien as threat, 
hostility and the onset of chaos. 
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Antagonism is a constitutive divide created by at least two groups opposing 
one another as they attempt to construct and maintain their own political identity and 
regime. Antagonisms postulate the limits of a given social space, “antagonism, as a 
witness of the impossibility of a final suture, is the ‘experience’ of the limit of the 
social. Strictly speaking, antagonisms are not internal but external to society; or 
rather, they constitute the limits of society, the latter’s impossibility of fully 
constituting itself.”703 In this sense antagonisms are very similar to alienness when 
Waldenfels states that “Alienness does not proceed from a division, but consists in a 
division.”704 As Laclau formulates it “A notion of constitutive antagonism, of a 
radical frontier, requires… a broken space.”705 While there are strong similarities 
between the two, antagonism adds a necessary element. 
What is crucial about antagonism, that the concept of alienness does not fully 
account for, is the relationship the polities on either side of an antagonism. An 
antagonistic relationship is not characterized, like alienness, purely as exclusion and 
inclusion over a threshold. Antagonism “must be conceived not as an objective 
relation of frontiers, but as reciprocal subversion of their contents.”706 It is this 
reciprocal subversion which alienness misses. And it is this reciprocal subversion 
which explains why a polity would experience the alien as hostile and threatening. 
The alien is not just what has been politically excluded. The alien is actively trying 
to undermine the polity so that it can create its own politico-legal regime. A polity 
views the alien as threatening because “in the case of antagonism… the presence of 
the ‘Other’ prevents me from being totally myself. The relation arises not from full 
totalities, but from the impossibility of their constitution.”707 The presence of 
antagonisms means that there will be groups, values and interests which are outside 
the polity, that do not share the normative viewpoint, the ‘preference in the 
difference’ as Waldenfels calls it, but that are subject to the legal order. Furthermore, 
they may be either attempting to dominate the politico-legal order as it is or to 
overthrow the order and create a new one.  
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Such a condition does not necessarily lead to those situations which are 
sometimes defined as ‘states of emergency’. A Laclau and Mouffe note, “this does 
not mean of course that such a relation is necessarily one of friend/enemy, i.e. an 
antagonistic one. But we should acknowledge that, in certain conditions, there is 
always the possibility that this we/they relation can become antagonistic, i.e. that it 
can turn into a relation of friend/enemy. This happens when the ‘they’ is perceived 
as putting into question the identity of the ‘we’ and as threatening its existence.”708 
Alienness and antagonism may lead to an existential threat but not necessarily so. 
However the notion of antagonism is still key because it posits mutual subversion 
between a polity and what it excludes, not simply the exclusion. This is what ensures 
the permanent contestation of the contingent and precarious foundations of a polity 
as well as the legal order which is in turn grounded on the polity. It also ensures that 
some situations or actions will be defined as states of emergency by state officials. 
The very process of constructing a liberal-democratic polity creates the groups, 
interests, and values that will always challenge it.  
Institutionalizing conflict – Antagonism, agonism and law 
Liberal-democratic legal orders foster and institutionalize contestation 
emanating from ‘antagonistic aliens’, if you’ll pardon the expression. Lindahl argues  
“that democracy links legitimacy to a certain interruption of attribution, an interruption that 
suspends, up to a point, the inaugural act of attribution, in view of determining anew who is a 
party to the community and what are the interests that join its members… democracy is the 
political form that seeks to renew – up to a point – this genetic condition of political 
community, institutionalizing the possibility of novel acts of bringing about the constitution 
of a collective self. Democracy does not abolish the ambiguity of ‘self-attribution’; it 
preserves this ambiguity, elevating it to the principle of political action.”709  
Lindahl’s point is that the form of the politico-legal order always allows contestation 
over the boundaries as well as the fundamental values, principles, and interests of a 
democratic polity. By interrupting attribution liberal-democracy postpones forever 
the final decision on who ‘we’ are, what ‘our’ fundamental values and interests are, 
and who is allowed to challenge us and how they may carry out that challenge. This 
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means that alien values, interests and groups which are politically excluded yet 
legally included are able to contest the fundamental normative viewpoint of the 
polity and the boundaries it sets for itself. Furthermore, alien elements may have a 
legal right to such contestation depending on the structure of civil and political rights 
enshrined by a regime. 
Such contestation is understood as a positive element of society. As such, 
liberal-democratic regimes are careful not to completely stifle conflict. On the 
contrary, Lindahl argues that “innovation and rupture are… positively elicited by 
democratic states under the rule of law.”710 He further argues that “the rule of law 
does not neutralize democratic politics: it spells out the institutional conditions for 
‘political action of a subject’, of a people as a unit in action.”711 It is important for 
conflict to be regulated by institutions such as law so that basic ground rules for 
legitimate contestation can be set. And as Waldenfels points out, “Beyond all actual 
conflicts, the possibility of conflict itself requires regulation.”712  
Mouffe takes a similar position when discussing the limits of pluralism. She 
argues that “a pluralist liberal democratic society does not deny the existence of 
conflicts but provides institutions allowing them to be expressed in an adversarial 
form.”713 The goal of an agonistic model of democracy is to allow for contestation 
but also to limit and contain it so that it does not become violent and corrosive. 
Indeed, Mouffe argues that “modern pluralist democracy – even a well ordered one – 
does not reside in the absence of domination and of violence but in the establishment 
of a set of institutions through which they can be limited and contested.”714 
Contestation is a good thing, but it must have its limits. Agonism, understood as 
healthy regulated conflict in which opponents recognize one another as adversaries 
and not as enemies, is preferred to antagonism since “antagonistic conflicts are less 
likely to emerge as long as agonistic legitimate political channels for dissenting 
voices exist. Otherwise dissent tends to take violent forms…”715 When contestation 
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is adversarial and both sides agree on the rules of the game “conflicts and 
confrontations, far from being s sign of imperfection, indicate that democracy is 
alive and inhabited by pluralism.”716 
Similarly, van Roermund argues that the quality of liberal-democracy “is 
dependent on how convincingly the irrepresentability of the people is 
institutionalised in political, socio-economic and cultural forms.”717 I agree with this 
assessment. Liberal-democracy institutionalizes the conflict created by the structure 
of representation and the creation of aliens which necessarily occurs during the 
process of constituting a political unity. All political unities/communities constitute 
themselves by excluding some interests, values, groups from the ‘we’ they create. 
Liberal-democracy is unique in that it recognizes those exclusions and 
institutionalizes contestation over how they were made, what they mean, how they 
function and whether or not they should continue. It is certainly advantageous but the 
drawback is the continuous presence of groups that want society to be organized 
differently and have a legally guaranteed to right to fight to make it so. 
The limits of contestation – Renewal up to a point 
Lindahl is careful to note though that the democratic regimes and democratic 
polities only allow contestation ‘up to a point’. Additionally, Mouffe argues that  
“the pluralism that I advocate requires discriminating between demands which are to be 
accepted as part of the agonistic debate and those which are to be excluded. A democratic 
society cannot treat those who put its basic institutions into question as legitimate 
adversaries. The agonistic approach does not pretend to encompass all differences and to 
overcome all forms of exclusions… Some demands are excluded, not because they are 
declared to be ‘evil’, but because they challenge the institutions constitutive of the 
democratic political association. To be sure, the very nature of those institutions is also part 
of the agonistic debate, but, for such a debate to take place, the existence of a shared 
symbolic space is necessary.”718  
The main question then is, ‘how do we decide when that point is reached? How do 
we know which demands, values and/or interests are to be excluded? Recall that 
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these decisions are always taken from a normative viewpoint which is not shared by 
all those who are subject to the legal order. From this perspective events that are 
deemed ‘states of emergency’ are situations in which the dominant powers in a 
society decide that the polity, as they have constructed it, is under too much threat, 
too much of a challenge. The problem is compounded by the fact mentioned above 
that sometimes those individuals and groups who are challenging the polity have a 
legal and constitutionally protected right to do so. Essentially determinations of 
normality and emergency concern situations in which dominant groups or state 
officials decide that the ‘point’ has been reached and their opponents are no longer 
playing the game fairly. It is a decision states that the opponents of the regime have 
reached or breached the limits of acceptable contestation. Since they have done so 
they cannot be responded to via the normal rules of contestation. The state must also 
release itself from the limits of contestation in order to protect itself, or so it claims. 
Such determinations are political as much as legal, moral and ethical.
719
  
If we agree with Mouffe that “rivalry and violence, far from being the 
exterior of exchange, are therefore its ever-present possibility. Reciprocity and 
hostility cannot be dissociated and we have to realize that the social order will 
always be threatened by violence,” we need not also agree that the state of 
emergency is permanent.
720
 Rather such a position recognizes that politics is a 
struggle to limit violence while respecting the rights of everyone to struggle and 
advocate for the type of society they want. If we also agree that liberal-democratic 
regimes and societies are implicated in and even help to foster and encourage 
contestation of their most fundamental values and principles, then we must conclude 
that situations defined by political and legal elites as ‘states of emergency’ are an 
integral aspect of the functioning of liberal-democratic regimes. Yet, because they 
are integral to liberal-democratic regimes they cannot be understood as emergencies. 
They are better conceptualized as political struggle at the limits of contestation. 
Conclusion 
It is more analytically useful to see ‘states of emergency’ as an issue 
embedded in the larger context of the limits of pluralism. The limits of contestation 
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are heavily influenced, even decided, by the dominant polity from their particular 
normative viewpoint. Decisions concerning normality and emergency are polemical 
weapons used by dominant groups to limit contestations over the contingent 
foundations of their own polities, their collective selfhood. As such, normality and 
emergency or exceptionality have no neutral or objective conceptual value. By 
allowing for the distinction and even agreeing that a situation is normal or in crisis is 
already to take the position of one group in the conflict. 
Such a move should be resisted. I argue that the first step to fostering 
democratic empowerment from within emergency politics is to refuse to take the 
position of those who declare that a ‘state of emergency’ is in existence. That 
declaration may be made out of genuine concern for a democratic polity but it is 
never made from a politically neutral viewpoint. Given the presence of antagonisms 
a declaration of emergency is never made from a point of view shared by all groups 
within a society. Declarations of a ‘state of emergency’ in liberal-democratic regimes 
must always be met with suspicion because they always limit contestation in a 
regime which generates, institutionalizes and attempts to regulate, yet also 
encourages such contestation.  
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